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Abstract 
The thesis consists of four chapters utilising applied micro-econometric techniques to 
develop a deeper understanding of the education sector. I apply traditional economic 
concepts such as productivity, immigration, insurance and technological innovation to 
the field of education economics.  
Chapter one considers the consequences of academic rank in primary school on later test 
scores. Using administrative data tracking the student population in England, I estimate 
the impact of rank on later attainment through the variation in the test-score distributions 
across schools. The positive impact of rank on attainment helps to explain some puzzles 
in the education literature, such as the lack of impact of selective schools.  
The second chapter involves immigration and investigates how the influx of overseas 
students has affected enrolment of domestic students at UK universities. Using 
administrative data, I employ methods used in the labour literature to model crowd-out. I 
find no evidence of crowd-out of domestic students, and some evidence of crowd in 
amongst postgraduate students.  
Chapter three establishes the threat of accusations as new source of demand for trade 
union membership amongst teachers. I model union membership as legal insurance, 
where demand is determined by the threat of accusations. I measure threat primarily 
through the incidence of media stories concerning teachers in the local area. Combining 
these data with union membership data from Labour Force Surveys, I find that 
unionisation rates increase with media coverage of allegations. 
The final chapter is an estimation of the impact of restricting technology in the 
workplace on productivity. This is applied to the education setting using the autonomous 
decisions by schools to ban mobile phones. Obtaining histories of phone policies 
through surveys and combining this with administrative data on individual pupil level 
attainment, I use a difference in difference analysis to estimate the impact on student 
performance. 
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In this thesis I apply traditional economic concepts to various aspects of the human 
capital formation process and education systems more generally. As we continue to move 
into the new knowledge economy, human capital is becoming ever more important. 
Therefore questions such as, how do children learn best? what influences subject choice? 
and which institutional features can be improved? become increasingly significant. 
However, the topic of education is not new to the field of Economics. Smith (1776), Becker 
(1964), and Mincer (1974) all made seminal contributions to how the complex topic of 
education can be modelled through use of economics. These combined with methodological 
advances (Heckman 1979; Todd and Wolpin, 2003) have led to significant gains in our 
understanding of how we learn. Policy makers increasingly turn to economists when 
designing and evaluating policies. The four chapters of this thesis all address topics that 
should be of interest to policy makers, but equally find answers that may surprise.  
Two of the chapters concern students at school and examine factors that impact on 
their educational outcomes. Chapter 2 explores how individuals’ academic rank amongst 
their peers in primary school affects their academic achievement in secondary school. The 
widely held traditional opinion is that having higher attaining peers is always better for a 
child’s attainment. However we show that an individual who has a higher rank, and hence 
has lower performing peers, goes on to do better in secondary school.  
It is a natural instinct for humans to make comparisons (Festinger, 1954), yet little is 
known about the long run consequences of ordinal rank amongst peers on productivity. This 
chapter makes use of administrative data on the entire student population in England in their 
transition from primary to secondary school. We study the effect of rank conditional on prior 
relative test scores as well as age varying school and student effects. We use the natural 
variation in test score distributions across schools and across subjects within pupils to 
separately identify the impact of rank from other cardinal measures of attainment. A student 
with a given above average test score would be ranked higher in school cohorts with more 
compressed distributions. The main finding is that being highly ranked during primary 
school has large and robust effects on secondary school achievement. The effect of being top 
of the class is more important for boys than girls.  
The paper goes on to examine potential channels that could account for these results, 
including learning about own ability. The chapter concludes that the most likely explanation 
is that the development of non-cognitive skills, such as confidence is improved when 
surrounded by peers who perform tasks worse than one’s self. Supporting evidence is 
provided by combining the administrative data with survey data on twelve thousand students 
which directly measures task specific confidence. This result speaks to why integration 
programs such as bussing (Angrist and Lang 2004) or moving students to less deprived 
neighbourhoods (Kling at al. 2007) have typically failed to find improvements of low 
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attaining students. Moreover it may also help to explain why students who just pass the 
entrance exams for selective schools fail to gain more than those that don’t (Cullen et. al., 
2006, Clark, 2010). The implication to policy is to highlight the importance of non-cognitive 
skills in the formation of human capital.     
The other chapter that examines student achievement directly is Chapter V. 
Information technology is commonly viewed as increasing productivity (Kruger, 1993; 
Malamud, 2011). However, since Solow’s (1987) infamous statement “You can see the 
computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics”, there has been a parallel 
literature that argues there have not been large improvements in productivity (DiNardo and 
Pischke, 1997) and offers four potential reasons for that (Brynjolfsson, 1991). This chapter 
adds to the literature by providing further evidence for another reason, that given the 
multifunctional nature of modern communication technology it has become a lot easier to be 
distracted. When this technology is easily to hand it effectively lowers the transition cost of 
shifting from work to procrastination to near zero.  
This type of technology is common to many workplaces today, which leads to the 
question of how much productivity is lost through this type of distraction. The chapter 
estimates the impact of the removal of mobile phones on student productivity. Using an 
educational context has the advantage that individual productivity measures are readily 
observable in the form of externally marked test scores. We exploit schools’ autonomy in 
mobile phone policies, meaning that schools introduced phone bans at different times. We 
use this variation in the implementation date to estimate the impact of the bans on student 
achievement through a difference in difference analysis. We collected the information on 
school policies through a survey of four large UK cities and combined it with long run 
administrative data on student performance. Our results indicate that after phones have been 
banned from schools, student grades on high stakes national examinations significantly 
improve, and that these gains are driven by the previously low achieving students. The 
chapter shows that access to technology is not always beneficial and that banning mobile 
phones from school premises can be a low cost policy to reduce educational inequality. 
The other two chapters of the thesis take a step back and consider the settings of the 
educational system itself. Chapter III investigates how the rapid influx of overseas students 
to UK higher education has affected the number of domestic students. As the demand for 
highly skilled labour is growing globally, higher education and who has access to it become 
increasingly important topics. In the UK overseas students pay considerably higher tuition 
fees than domestic students, but despite this their numbers have tripled since 1995. A critical 
policy question is therefore, whether these students take the places of natives or whether the 
additional income they generate acts to subsidise domestic students.  
Chapter 1. Introduction 
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We apply displacement models from the labour immigration literature to this 
education setting  (Peri and Sparber, 2011). In order to establish causal estimates we apply 
two different methods. Firstly, we use the historical share of students from a sending country 
attending a university department combined with current national changes in the stock of 
students from this country as a shift-share instrument. Secondly, we use an exogenous 
change in the Chinese visa regulations and exchange rate in combination with strong 
revealed subject preferences as a predictor of overseas student growth across and within 
universities over time.  
Using administrative data on the entire UK Higher Education population over the 
1994/5 to 2011/12 academic years, we find no evidence that the big rise in international 
students enrolling in UK universities has crowded out domestic students. This is the case at 
undergraduate level as well as for taught and research postgraduates. Indeed, we find 
evidence of cross-subsidisation for postgraduates, especially on masters programmes. A 
possible reason for the stronger effect for postgraduates than for undergraduates are the 
government regulations limiting the growth of student numbers on undergraduate degrees, 
which do not apply as strictly to postgraduate degrees. 
In the remaining chapter, I explore a curious development in the teacher labour 
market, namely that teachers’ unionisation rate has been increasing during a period of 
general decline in union membership. There is a large body of research establishing that 
teachers are the most important factor within schools in determining student achievement 
(Rockoff, 2004; Rivkin et al. 2005). Therefore understanding how the teacher labour market 
operates is crucial, especially given the ongoing debate regarding union power and student 
outcomes (Hoxby, 1996; Lovenheim 2009). This chapter recognises the threat of accusation 
as new source of demand for union representation and analyses how the threat of accusation 
has increased union density in specific labour markets. The fact that society has become 
increasingly litigious, could have many repercussions on labour markets, especially for those 
sectors where employees have unsupervised interactions with vulnerable groups. A rational 
response to such changes would be an increase in demand for insurance against these risks.  
I model union membership as a form of private legal insurance, where the decision to 
join is partly determined by the perceived threat of having an allegation made against the 
agent. This is examined by estimating the demand for union membership amongst UK 
teachers, which has been increasing over the last twenty years. I use media coverage of 
allegations relating to local teachers as a shock to the perceived threat. I find that 
unionisation rates increase with media coverage of relevant litigation at the regional and 
national levels. Ten relevant news stories in a region increase the probability of union 
membership by 5 percentage points. The size of the effect is dependent on the similarity of 
the teacher to the one mentioned in the story.  
Chapter 1. Introduction 
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This chapter provides a reason for why the demand for union membership in the 
teaching and related sectors has increased. Moreover, I provide a further answer to the 
puzzle of why individuals choose to join a union even if they could free ride and receive the 
higher pay and working conditions derived through union action without having to pay the 
union dues. Unions offering a private, excludable service can maintain demand for 
membership, as long as demand for that service remains. The implication for policy is that 
there may be an increasing unmet demand for union membership in previously under 
unionised service sectors. Furthermore this means that governments have the power to 
temper the demand for union membership through introducing regulations that protect 
individuals from allegation. Suggestive evidence of this can be seen in the fall in union 
density post 2005 governmental reforms on newspaper reporting; the union density 
continued to fall despite the worsening in economic conditions which is traditionally thought 
of as a key driver of union demand (Blanchflower et al. 1990). 
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1 Introduction 
It is human nature to make comparisons against one’s peers. Individuals make 
comparisons in terms of characteristics, traits and abilities in tasks (Festinger, 1954). 
However, individuals also often use cognitive shortcuts to simplify decision-making 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). One such shortcut would be to use simple ordinal rank 
instead of detailed cardinal information. Rather than working out where one stands in 
relation to the group mean, one might say ‘I am taller than Gill but shorter than Sarah’. 
In this simplified way of conceptualising the world, when we are making decisions one 
would be placing weight on ordinal rank as well as relative or absolute information. 
Indeed, it has recently been shown that ordinal rank, in addition to relative position, is 
used when individuals make comparisons with others (Brown et al., 2008; Kuziemko et 
al., 2011; Card et al., 2012). If people are ranking themselves amongst their peers, then 
ordinal in additional to cardinal information has the potential to affect investment 
decisions. These could in in turn determine later productivity, through various 
mechanisms such as learning about ability or the development of confidence.  
This paper examines, in the context of education, the additional impact of ordinal 
rank on subsequent productivity. Students in England take externally marked national 
exams at the end of primary school at age 11. We use this to calculate their rank 
amongst their primary school peers in three subjects. These students then start attending 
secondary schools with a new set of peers and are tested again in the same subjects three 
years later. We use this setting to estimate the effect of age-11 rank on age-14 test 
scores, in a new peer environment conditional on prior (age-11) relative test scores, in 
our main specification. To do so, we use administrative data on the entire English public 
school population as they move from a primary into secondary education.1 
The rank parameter is identified from the variation in test score distributions across 
and within primary schools cohorts, so that the same score relative to a school mean can 
have different ranks. Our estimates show that being highly ranked amongst your peers in 
a subject has large and robust effects on later performance in that same subject. 
Moreover, the impact of rank is significant across the entire rank distribution. These 
estimates use the school-by-subject-by-cohort variation in rank for a given test score and 
therefore allow for gains from individuals being ranked highly in one subject  to impact 
on results on other subjects. We also provide more demanding within-student 
specifications, which absorb the average growth rate of a student between age 11 and 14, 
                                                   
1
 Public schools account for 93% of the total student population in England. Comparable data for the 
remaining 7% attending private schools are not available. 
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therefore removing subject-spillovers and so reflect student specialisation. In these 
specifications, the variation used for estimation is the within-student-across-subject 
differences in rank conditional on test scores and average prior peer quality. We argue 
that conditioning on these age-11 test scores, primary-subject-cohort effects and 
individual student effects, the rank of a student in a subject within primary school is 
effectively random.  
Notably, primary school peers determine the rank measure but we estimate its effects 
on outcomes after the transition to secondary school. This makes our approach resilient 
to reflection problems (Manski, 1993) as the average student has 87% new peers in 
secondary school. We are therefore not relating individual and group outcomes from 
within the same peer group, as cautioned against by Angrist (2013). Moreover, our 
estimation sidesteps the standard issue of including a lagged dependent variable and 
individual effects simultaneously (Nickell, 1981), as the individual effects are recovered 
from test scores across subjects of a student at age 14, rather than from average test 
scores over time.  
The effects of rank that we present are large in the context of the education literature, 
with a one standard deviation increase in rank improving age-14 test scores by 0.08 
standard deviations. This is of comparable magnitude to being taught by a teacher one 
standard deviation above average (Aaronson, et al., 2007; Hanushek et al., 2005). As 
expected, the estimates relying on within-student variation in primary rank, conditional 
on ability, are smaller. Here, a one standard deviation increase in rank improves 
subsequent test scores in that subject by 0.055 within student standard deviations. This 
would mean being ranked at the 75th percentile of your primary school peers in a subject 
as opposed to the 25th percentile, improves age 14 test scores by 0.2 standard deviations 
in that same subject.  
The paper goes on to examine the nature of these effects and finds that they exist 
throughout the rank distribution, implying that students accurately place themselves 
within their class, despite not being explicitly informed of their rank. This is likely to 
occur due to the repeated interactions among peers throughout the six years of primary 
school as well as seating arrangements that that reflect rank positions in many English 
primary schools2. Moreover, for nearly all rank positions boys are more affected, both 
positively and negatively, than girls. Boys at the top of the class in a subject gain four 
                                                   
2
 In English Primary schools it is common for students to be seated at tables of four and for them to be 
set by pupil ability. Students can be sat at the ‘top table’ or the ‘bottom/naughty table’. This could 
assist students in establishing where they rank amongst all class members through a form of batch 
algorithm, e.g. ‘I’m on top table, but I’m the worst, therefore I’m fourth best.’   
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times more than comparable girls. Low-income students also gain more from being top 
of the class but are less negatively affected by being ranked below the median.  
Having presented this range of findings, the paper examines and tests threats to 
identification such as other forms of peer effects, measurement error and sorting to 
schools by parents. Using simulations we demonstrate that our findings are robust 
against non-linear peer effects, large measurement errors and are not just a statistical 
artefact. Using additional survey data, we further show that parental occupations predict 
subject-specific primary attainment but not rank. For example, children of accountants 
do better in Maths than in English. In contrast, parental occupational background has no 
relation to ordinal rank conditional on attainment. We interpret this as direct evidence 
for our main identification assumption that primary rank, conditional on class means and 
own attainment, is effectively random. 
Finally the paper discusses a number of mechanisms that could account for these 
results: learning about own ability (Ertac, 2006); competitiveness; external (parental) 
investment by task; and environment favouring certain ranks; but provides evidence that 
the mechanism that best accommodates all the findings is through the development of 
non-cognitive skills such as confidence. Combining our administrative data with survey 
data containing direct measures of subject-specific confidence, we show that those who 
ranked higher in primary school have larger measures of later confidence, conditional on 
relative test scores and student effects. Mirroring our findings on attainment, we find 
that boys’ confidence is more affected by their school rank than girls’ confidence.  
To build intuition for the effect of confidence, consider a child being the best in their 
neighbourhood at basketball. She will consider herself to be good at basketball, gaining 
confidence in her basketball abilities and resulting in her enjoying basketball more. This 
would then lead her to invest more time in playing basketball and so further develop her 
skills. Similarly, in the labour market, individuals rate their productivity in a task 
relative to their colleagues, and this in turn could determine in which field they 
specialize. More relevant to this paper, one might consider one’s own school career. 
Upon starting school, we may not know which subjects we are good at. But, through 
ranking ourselves relative to our peers, we develop a sense that we are a ‘math person’ 
or a ‘language person’. A ‘math person’ would be more confident in solving 
mathematical problems and enjoy math more, and therefore may invest more time into 
math homework, all of which could be reflected in their future math test scores. 
We believe this paper has two main contributions. First, to the best of the authors’ 
knowledge this is the first large-scale study to document the effects of ordinal rank in a 
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task on later productivity. Critically, this study documents an additional effect of ordinal 
rank, after controlling for prior achievement and the relative distances between peers, 
i.e. cardinal measures of performance. Therefore, we believe rank could be considered a 
new factor in the education production function. 3  Besides implications on partial 
equilibrium considerations of parents regarding the choice of the best school for their 
children, this finding has more general implications relating to informational 
transparency and productivity. For instance managers or teachers could improve 
productivity by emphasising an individual’s local rank position if that individual has a 
high rank. Alternatively, if an individual is in a high performing peer group and 
therefore may have a low local rank but ranks high globally, a manager should make the 
global rank more salient. 
Secondly, we believe that the result that ordinal rank matters for later outcomes has 
the potential to add to the explanation of findings in the following education topics 
where placing individuals amongst high-performing peers has had mixed results: school 
integration (Angrist and Lang, 2004; Kling et al. 2007) selective schools (Cullen, Jacob 
and Levitt, 2006; Clark 2010); and affirmative action (Arcidiacono et al. 2012; Robles 
and Krishna, 2012). Moreover the finding that rank may exacerbate early differences in 
achievement due to individual investment decisions based on relative performance 
contributes to the literatures on ethnicity (Fryer and Levitt, 2006; Hanushek and Rivkin 
2006; 2009), gender (Burgess et al, 2004; Machin & McNally, 2005) and relative age in 
cohort (i.e.  Black et al., 2011). 
The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on 
social comparisons. Section 3 sets out the empirical strategy and how the rank parameter 
is separately identified from relative achievement. This is followed by a brief description 
of the UK educational system, the administrative data, as well as the definition of rank 
used. Section 5 sets out the main results, nonlinearities and the heterogeneity by gender 
and parental income. Section 6 discusses and tests threats to identification such as peer 
effects, measurement error and endogenous sorting. Section 7 discusses potential 
mechanisms and provides additional survey evidence. Section 8 outlines other topics in 
education, which corroborate these findings. Finally, we conclude and discuss policy 
implications. 
                                                   
3
 There is a broad range of literature on the determinants of academic achievements, including natural 
ability (Watkins et al., 2007), family background (Hoxby, 2001), school inputs (Hanushek, 2006; 
Page et al., 2010), peer effects (Carrell et al., 2009; Lavy et al., 2012), and non-cognitive skills 
(Heckman et al., 2006); however, rank position has not yet been researched. 
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2 Related Literature 
The importance of ordinal rank rather than relative position for individuals was first 
forwarded by Parducci (1965) with range frequency theory. This has the theoretical 
prediction that comparisons are based upon ordinal position of items within a 
comparison set. This prediction has been illustrated empirically recently by Brown et al. 
(2008) and Card et al. (2012), who show an individual’s rank in addition to relative 
position in an income distribution is an important determinant of satisfaction. However, 
the economic literature on rank effects on productivity is sparse.4   
A related study on rank and informational transparency finds that providing 
employees with their productivity rank within the firm increased output throughout the 
productivity distribution (Blanes i Vidal and Nossol 2011). This is explained by workers 
becoming concerned about their rank position, as the impact occurred after the feedback 
policy was announced but before the information was released.5 Genakos and Pagliero 
(2012) find that in a tournament setting, where payoffs are based on relative 
performance and with continuous rank feedback, performance decreases as individuals 
are ranked higher.6 In both of these papers, individuals are concerned about their relative 
positions amongst their immediate peers. The education setting of this study varies in 
two critical ways. Firstly, students are graded on their absolute performance according to 
national scales, rather than relative to their peers. Secondly, we are estimating the effect 
of rank amongst previous peers on contemporaneous test scores, and not the effects of 
rank within the same peer group. Moreover, whilst both of these papers use rank 
measurements, neither additionally controls for relative distances, and are therefore not 
separating rank effects from any cardinal relative effects.  
The importance of ordinal rank in addition to relative position has been empirically 
illustrated by Brown et al. (2008) and Card et al. (2012). Most related to our paper, 
Clark et al. (2010) compares directly the importance of ordinal rather than relative 
position on discretionary work effort. They find that an employee’s income rank was a 
                                                   
4
 The discussion of social comparisons is often framed in the form of peer effects (Falk and Ichino, 
2006;i.e. Mas and Moretti, 2009, Carrell et al., 2009; Lavy et al., 2012) or the introduction of relative 
achievement feedback mechanisms (Eriksson et al. 2009; Azmat and Iriberri, 2010). These studies 
tend to find positive effects of peer quality on contemporaneous productivity, and that relative 
performance feedback increases productivity when there are piece rate incentives.  
5
 Kosfeld and Neckerman (2011) examine the use of rankings as a non-monetary incentive and find 
increases in productivity.  Specific to education, Jalava, Joensen and Pellas (2013) find that rank 
based grading increases test performance. 
6
 Brown (2011) shows in a tournament setting that when an individual of known outstanding ability 
(high prior high rank is known) is placed into a group those ranked immediately below them, have a 
large fall in productivity compared to low ranked participants. 
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stronger determinant of stated work effort compared with the average reference group 
income and so conclude that comparisons are ordinal rather than cardinal. This is similar 
to our paper as we also in effect estimate effects of rank and relative position, but 
different because we observe rank effects in a real effort setting rather than in stated 
amounts. 
3 Empirical strategy 
3.1 The measurement of rank net of ability and cardinal factors 
In order to identify the effect of primary school rank on later outcomes we require 
variation in rank for a given ability. Moreover, to separately identify the effect of ordinal 
rank from relative position requires variation in rank for a given distance from mean 
peer achievement. This comes about through the variation in test score distributions 
across school cohorts, within and across primary schools, so that students with the same 
test scores and same distance to peer means can have different ranks. Furthermore, as 
test score distributions vary across subjects within a school and cohort, a single student 
with the same score in all three subjects, as well as the same relative distances to peer 
mean achievements in these subjects, could have different subject ranks. To see this, 
consider the case illustrated by Figure 1, which shows unimodal and bimodal 
distributions of hypothetical English test scores for two cohorts of students in a primary 
school. The school has a very similar intake of students year-on-year, with the same 
number of students, and moreover the same mean, minimum and maximum student test 
scores despite having different distributions. As both cohorts have the same mean test 
scores, students who achieved the same absolute test scores across cohorts (Y), would 
also have the same relative score compared to the mean of their peers. However, the 
cohorts have different test score distributions, in the first students are more clusterd 
around the mean score and in the second test scores are more dispersed and has a 
bimodal distribution. Due to these different distributions, a student who scored Y in the 
unimodal cohort is ranked second, whilst the one in the bimodal cohort is ranked fifth.7  
Note that the rank effect that is identified conditional on the student fixed effect 
differs in interpretation from school-subject-cohort effects that we just illustrated 
because it uses the variation in test score distributions across subjects within a cohort. 
                                                   
7
 This is similar to Brown et al. (2008) who rely on the variation in the earnings distributions of a 
subset of workers across firms to separately identify the effect of relative earnings and ranks in 
earnings on employee satisfaction. 
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The variation used here is analogous to Figure 1 but comparing differences in 
distributions across subjects rather than within subjects and over time. 
3.2 A rank-augmented education production function 
This section uses the standard education production function approach to derive a 
rank-augmented value added specification that can be used to identify the effect of 
primary school rank, measured as outlined in section 3.1, on subsequent outcomes. 
To begin, we consider a basic contemporaneous education production function, using 
the framework as set out in Todd and Wolpin (2003), for student i studying subject s in 
primary school j, cohort c and in time period  = [1,2]: 
 	
 =  	 + 	
  (1) 
	
 =  
 + 	 + 	
 
where Y denotes national academic percentile rank in subject s at time t and X is a 
vector of observable non-time varying characteristics of the student. Here  represents 
the permanent impact of these non-time varying observable characteristics on academic 
achievement. In this specification there are two time periods, in period one students 
attend primary school and in the second period students attend secondary schools. The 
error term 	
 has three components; 
 represents the permanent unobserved effects 
of being taught subject j in primary school s in cohort c. This could reflect the effect of a 
teacher being particularly good at teaching maths in one year but not English, or that a 
student’s peers were good in English but not in science; 	  represents permanent 
unobserved student characteristics, this would include any stable parental inputs or 
natural ability of the child; 	
 is the idiosyncratic time specific error which includes 
secondary school effects. Under this restrictive specification only 	
 could cause the 
national academic rank of a student to change between primary and secondary school, as 
all other factors are permanent and have the same impact over time.  
This is a restrictive assumption, as the impact of observable and unobservable 
characteristics are likely to change as the student ages. One could imagine that 
neighbourhood effects may grow in importance as the child grows older, and that the 
effects of primary school are more important when the child is young and attending that 
school. Therefore we extend the model by allow for time-varying effects of these 
characteristics: 
 	
 =   	
 + 	 + 	 + 	
  (2) 
	
 =  
 + 
 + 	 + 	 + 	
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where  allows for the effect of student characteristics to vary over time. We have also 
introduced the parameter of interest  , which is the effect of having rank 	
, in 
subject s in cohort c and in primary school j on student achievement in that subject in the 
subsequent period t. We are interested in longer-run effects of rank positions students 
had during early education stages. We therefore assume that there is no effect of rank in 
the first period t=1 as there is no prior rank   = 0. We will hence be estimating 
 , the effect of primary school rank on period 2 outcomes. To simplify the notation 
the time subscript will be dropped, as only one rank parameter is estimated, .  
This specification also allows for the unobservables to have time varying effects. 
Again 	 represents unobserved individual effects that capture all time constant effects 
of a student over time and 
 represents the permanent effects of being taught in a 
specific school-subject-cohort. Now additionally we have 	  and 
  allowing for 
these error components to vary over time so that students can have individual-specific 
growth rates as they grow older, or that primary school teachers can affect the efficiency 
of their students to learn a certain subject in the future. 
Given this structure we now state explicitly the conditional impendence assumption 
that needs to be satisfied for estimating an unbiased rank parameter. Conditional on 
student characteristics, time varying and permanent primary school-subject-cohort level 
and individual effects, we assume there would be no expected differences in students’ 
outcomes except those driven by rank.  
 	 ⊥ 	| 	, 
 , 
 , 	, 	 for all R     (3) 
To achieve this we require measures of all these factors that may be correlated with 
rank and final outcomes. Conditioning on prior test scores will absorb all non-time 
varying effects as they will effect period-1 test scores to the same extent as period-2 test 
scores. Any input, observable or unobservable, that would affect academic attainment is 
captured in these test scores.8 Therefore we can express period two outcomes, age 14 
test scores, as a function of rank, prior test scores, student characteristics and 
unobservable effects. 
	
 =  	
 + ! "	
#	, 	, 	 , 
 , 	, 
$% + 
 +	 + 
 + 	 + &	
  (4) 
Using lagged test scores means that the remaining factors are those that affect the 
learning in period 2, between ages 11 and 14 (	, 
, 	). In our regressions, we 
                                                   
8
 Examples of these effects include students’ innate ability, parental investment, teacher effects, peer 
effects and primary school infrastructure 
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will allow the functional form of this lagged dependent variable to take two forms, either 
a 3rd degree polynomial or a fully flexible measure, which allows for a different effect at 
each national test score percentile. As we can observe certain characteristics and primary 
school attended,  and 
 can easily be estimated. The interpretation of 
 is that 
some primary schools are more effective at teaching for a later test than others, in a way 
that does not show up in the end-of-primary age-11 test scores.  
The discussion of recovering 	, the second period academic growth of individual i 
is below, but it is worth spending some time interpreting what the rank coefficient 
represents without its inclusion. Being ranked highly in primary school may have 
positive spillover effect in other subjects. Any estimation, which allows for individual 
growth rates during secondary school (second period), would absorb any spillover 
effects. Therefore, leaving 	 in the residual means that the rank parameter is the effect 
of rank of the subject in question and the correlation in rank from the other two subjects, 
as we have test scores for English, mathematics and science. 
In the second period the student will be attending secondary school k which may 
affect later test scores by subject, (, which is a component of the error term &	
, 
where &	
 = ( + 	
 . As stated above conditional on time-varying student 
effects, prior subject test scores and the other stated factors, we do not expect that these 
components will be correlated with primary rank. This is primarily because general 
secondary school effects are absorbed by the time varying student effect but we will 
return to the issue of secondary school choice in subsection 3.3.1.  
The first two specifications that we estimate that will recover the effect of rank due to 
overall changes in effort which allow for spill-overs between subjects, are the following:  
 	
 =  	
 + !#	
$ + 	 + 
 + &	
  (5) 
Where &	
 = 	 + ( + 	
 
 	
 =  	
 + !#	
$ + 	 + 
 + ( + -	
 (6)  
Where -	
 = 	 + 	
 
Note that we can further augment these regressions by using the average student 
growth rate across subjects to recover individual growth effects, 	. Note that despite 
using panel data, this is estimating the individual effect across subjects and not over 
time. Lavy (et al. 2012) also use a student-fixed effects strategy to estimate ability peer 
effects. Applied to this setting, when allowing for student effects, we effectively 
compare relative rankings within an individual, controlling for national subject-specific 
ability. The variation used to identify rank is correlation between the differential growth 
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rates by subject within each student and prior subject ranking. Therefore any individual 
characteristic that is not realised in age-11 test scores but contributes towards age-14 test 
scores is accounted for, including secondary school attended, as long as the effects are 
not subject specific.  
 	
 = . +  	
 + !#	
$ + 	 + 
 + &	
   (7) 
Where &	
 = ( + 	
 
In these specifications the rank parameter only represents the increase in test scores 
due to subject specific rank, as any general gains across all subjects would be absorbed 
by the student effect. This can be interpreted as the extent of specialisation in subject s 
due to primary school rank. It is for this reason, and the removal of other covarying 
factors, that we would expect the coefficient of the rank effect in specification (7) to be 
smaller than those found in (5) or (6). 
Finally, to also investigate potential non-linearites in the effect of ordinal rank on 
later outcomes, i.e. are effects driven by students being top or bottom of the class, we 
replace the linear ranking parameter with indicator variables according to quantiles in 
rank plus additional indicator variables for those at the top and bottom of each school-
subject-cohort (the rank measure is defined in section 4.2). We allow for non-linear 
effects according to vingtiles in rank, which can be applied to all the specifications 
presented. 9 
	
 = /01223	
 + 4 5	

0
/
, + /627	
 
 + !#	
$ + 	 + 
 + &	
 (8) 
In summary, if students react to ordinal information as well as cardinal informaiton, 
then we would expect the rank in adition to relative achivement to have a signficant 
effect on later achievement when estimating these equations. This is what is picked up 
by the  -coefficient. The following sections discuss potential threats to 
identification, the setting, and how rank is measured before we turn to the estimates.  
3.3 Threats to identification 
3.3.1 Secondary school selection 
A concern may remain that students could select secondary schools based on their 
rank in a particular subject during primary school in addition to their age-11 test scores. 
If, for example, students who were top of their class in maths aspire to attend a 
                                                   
9
 Estimates are robust to using deciles in rank rather than vigntiles and can be obtained upon request.   
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secondary school that specialises in maths, our estimates could be confounded by 
secondary school quality. This might seem unlikely because we know that ability sorting 
for secondary schools in England is largely based on average rather than subject-specific 
abilities (Lavy et al. 2012).  
Fortunately, our data allows us to address this concern directly by additionally 
controlling for secondary school attended. The resulting specification additionally 
allows for period-2 achievement to vary by secondary school k in subject s of cohort c, 
(.10 Intuitively, this is comparing students who are exposed to the same secondary 
school influences, thus identifying effects net of any potential subject-rank driven 
sorting into secondary education. However, secondary school attended can be argued to 
be an outcome, and therefore should not be conditioned upon. Specifications that include 
these effects are not our preferred model and should only be used as an indication of the 
extent that secondary school selection has effects on the estimates. As we will see, this 
modification does not affect our results. 
3.3.2 Unobserved individual factors and parental background 
Even with this flexible specification, one may still not be convinced that we are 
identifying the effect of rank on subsequent educational attainment. The rank of a 
student in primary school may be correlated with other unobserved individual factors 
that affect students’ outcomes. An example of this could be unobserved individual or 
parental aspirations that correlate with primary rank and later value added, i.e. a 
competitive child or ‘pushy parents’. Furthermore, using across-school variation might 
be problematic if schools transformed a student’s ability into test scores non-
monotonically. 11  We believe that the student fixed effects approach outlined by 
specification (7) addresses most of these concerns as all unobserved factors that affect 
test scores in all subjects in a similar way are now controlled for.  
Notice that while these general factors such as ‘pushy parents’ that could induce 
correlations between primary rank and later outcomes are now controlled for, the 
remaining assumption required for identification is that such unobserved factors are not 
subject-specific. We return to this issue in Section 6.4 where we show that parental 
occupations predict primary-subject test scores yet are orthogonal to primary-subject 
rankings.  
                                                   
10
 We use the Stata command reg2hdfe for these estimations (Guimaraes and Portugal, 2010). 
11
 If some schools are better at teaching low (high) ability students, then the ranking technology for 
ability may be different across schools. 
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3.3.3 Ability peer effects and measurement error  
Notice that all of our estimation specifications include primary-subject-cohort effects, 
which is also necessary to account for potential measurement error in the age-11 test 
scores arising through unobserved classroom-level shocks. In particular, if there are 
unobserved primary-school factors, these will create noise in the test score but not in the 
rank, as the ranking itself is mean-independent. As a result, the ranking variable could 
start to pick up ability-related information that could not be fully controlled for using 
only the national percentile test score. Including primary-school effects clears this kind 
of measurement error from the primary rank variable. We will return to these issues in 
Section 6, where we also examine in detail how these rank effects interplay with ability 
peer effects, as well as potential threats placed by various kinds of measurement errors. 
We will conclude that whilst the most obvious candidates, i.e. classroom-level shocks 
and ability peer effects are controlled for directly in our setting,  that higher order issues 
of measurement error and transitory non-linear peer effects do not invalidate our 
approach. 
4 Institutional setting, data and descriptive statistics 
4.1 The English School System 
The compulsory education system of England is made up of four Key Stages (KS); at 
the end of each stage students are evaluated in national exams. Key Stage Two (KS2) is 
taught during primary school between the ages of 7 and 11. The median size of a 
primary school cohort and the average primary school class size is 27 students (DFE, 
2011). Therefore, when referring to primary school rank, one could consider this as class 
rank. 12 At the end of the final year of primary school when the students are aged 11 
(Year 6), they take KS2 tests in English, math and science. These tests are externally 
graded on a national scale of between 0-100. This makes it possible to make 
comparisons in student achievement over time and across schools.  
Rather than receiving these raw scores, students are instead given one of five broad 
attainment levels. The lowest performing students are awarded Level 1, the top 
performing students are awarded Level 5. These levels are broad, which results in them 
being a coarse measure, with 85% of students achieve Level 4 or 5. These are non-high 
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 The maximum class size at Key Stage 1 is 30 students. A parallel set of results has been estimated 
using only cohorts of 30 and below, assuming these are single class cohorts. The results are 
qualitatively the same and are available from the authors upon request.  
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stakes exams for students and are mainly used by the government as a measure of school 
effectiveness.13 This means that students do not know their underlying exact test score, 
which we can use to calculate their local ranks. Rather, students infer their rank position 
in class through repeated interaction, teacher feedback, and often through seating 
arrangements that reflect ability. 
Students then transfer to secondary school, where they start working towards the third 
Key Stage (KS3). During this transition the average primary school sends students to six 
different secondary schools and the larger secondary schools receive students from 16 
different primary schools. Importantly, admission into secondary schools is generally 
non-selective and does not depend on end-of-primary KS2 test scores. A subset of 
schools can select on ability (grammar schools) but these schools administer their own 
admission tests. The KS2 is thus a low-stakes test with respect to secondary school 
choice. In the new school, a typical student has 87% new peers upon arrival. This large 
re-mixing of peers is beneficial, as it allows us to estimate the impact of rank form a 
previous peer group on subsequent outcomes. Key Stage 3 takes place over three years 
and at the end of Year 9, all students take KS3 examinations in English, math and 
science at age fourteen. Again KS3 is not a high-stakes test and is externally marked. 
Two years later, students take the national Key Stage 4 test at age 16 (KS4), which 
marks the end of compulsory education in England. The KS4 is graded from one to eight 
and students have some discretion in choosing the subjects they study and at what level. 
Since KS3 is graded on a fine scale [0-100], and students are tested in the same 
compulsory subjects only, we prefer this as the outcome measure for the purpose of our 
study. However, our results also hold using KS4 test scores14. 
4.2 Data Construction 
4.2.1 Administrative data 
The Department for Education (DfE) collects data on all students and all schools in state 
education in England. The Pupil Level Annual School Census (PLASC) collects student 
information such as gender, ethnicity, language skills, Special Educational Needs (SEN), 
                                                   
13
 The students also appear not to gain academically just from achieving a higher level. Regression 
discontinuity techniques show no gain for those students who just achieved a higher level. This 
setting is ideal for a regression discontinuity techniques as the score needed to reach a level changes 
by year and by subject, which would make it particularly hard to game.  
14
 Results can be obtained from the authors upon request. They are not presented here due to issues 
relating to the comparability of these test scores across students as they can be entered into different 
exams, along with the coarseness of the measures and students choosing to study additional optional 
subjects. 
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or being Free School Meals Eligible (FSME). The number of students and student 
characteristics are used to determine school funding. The National Pupil Database 
(NPD) contains student attainment data throughout their Key Stage progression in each 
of the three compulsory subjects. Each student is given a unique identifier so that they 
can be linked to schools and followed over time, allowing the government to produce 
value added measures and publish school league tables. As the functions of both of these 
datasets are at the school level, no class level data is collected.  
We have combined these data to create a dataset following the entire population of 
five cohorts of English school children. This begins at the age of 10/11 (Year 6) in the 
final year of Primary School when students take their Key Stage 2 examinations through 
to age 13/14 (Year 9) when they take Key Stage 3 tests. KS2 examinations were taken in 
the academic years 2000/2001 to 2005/2006 and so it follows that the KS3 examinations 
took place in 2003/2004 to 2007/8. From 2009 students were no longer externally 
assessed, instead teacher assessment was used to evaluate students at the end of Key 
Stage 3, hence this is the end point of our analysis.  
We imposed a set of restrictions on the data to obtain a balanced panel of students. 
We use only students who can be tracked with valid KS2 and KS3 exam information and 
background characteristics, 83% of the population. Secondly, we exclude students who 
appear to be double counted (1,060) and whose school identifiers do not match (12,900), 
approximately 0.6% of the remaining sample. Finally, we remove all students who 
attended a primary school whose cohort size was smaller than 10, as these small schools 
are likely to be atypical in a number of dimensions; this represents 2.8% of students15. 
This leaves us with approximately 454,000 students per cohort, with a final sample of 
just under 2.3 million student observations, or 6.8 million student-subject observations.  
As described in Section 4, the Key Stage test scores for both levels are percentalized 
by subject and cohort, so that each individual has six test scores between 0 and 100 
(three KS2 and three KS3). This ensures that students of the same nationally relative 
ability have the same national percentile rank, as a given test score could represent a 
different ability in different years or subjects. Importantly, this allows for test score 
comparisons to be made across subjects and across time, this does not impinge on our 
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 Estimations using the whole sample are very similar, only varying at the second decimal point. 
Contact authors for further results. 
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estimation strategy, which relies only on heterogeneous test score distributions across 
schools to generate variation in local rank. 16  
We rank students in each subject according to their age 11 national test scores within 
their primary school by cohort. To have a comparable local rank measurement across 
schools of different cohort size we transform the rank position of individual i with the 
following normalization: 
 	
 = 89:;<=9:;< ,       	
 = [0,1]  (9) 
where Njsc is the cohort size of school j in cohort c of subject s. An individual’s i 
ordinal rank position within this set is nijsc,, which is increasing in test score.  Rijsc is the 
standardised rank of the student. 17 For example, a student who had the second best score 
from a cohort of twenty-one students (nijsc=20, Njsc=21) will have Rijsc=0.95. This rank 
measure will be approximately  uniformly distributed, and bounded between 0 and 1, 
with the lowest rank student in each school cohort having R=0. In the case of draws of 
national percentile rank, each of the students is given the lower local rank. 
Rank is dependent on students own test scores, but is determined by the scores of 
others in their school. Again consider the students who scored X and Y in cohorts with 
different test score distributions from Figure 1. The students who scored Y, being the 
same distance above the mean in both school cohorts would have a rank of >?= 0.9 in 
Cohort A (unimodal distribution) and >@ = 0.6 in Cohort B (bimodal distribution). 
Similarly students who scored X would have a rank of A?= 0.1 in Cohort A and A@= 
0.4 in Cohort B. It is the different distribution of peer test scores that allows for the 
separate identification of the rank effect from a relative ability effect. As there is 
information for three subjects for each student, a student can have a different rank for 
each subject within her primary school. This feature of the data allows us to include 
student fixed effects in some of our regressions.  
 Note that since the students do not receive their detailed test scores, they will not be 
able to derive this same rank score themselves, nor will they be given an official 
                                                   
16
 Estimations using standardised rather than percentalized test scores provide similar estimates to the 
first decimal place in linear specification. For non-linear specifications the effect of rank appears 
more cubic in nature. However, these estimations suffer from non-comparability as a given test score 
could represent a different ability in different years or subjects. Year/subject effects would not 
account for all these differences as there are likely to be distributional differences. Allowing for either 
functional form of test scores to be interacted by year and subject was extremely computationally 
intensive, given our already demanding specification. Basic results are available from the authors 
upon request. 
17
 This is rank within school subject cohort, it cannot be done by class as no class level information is 
available.  However, all estimations have been replicated on schools which have cohort sizes of under 
30 (maximum class size) and have equivalent results. Obtainable upon request.  
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ranking. Instead, our measure of local rank is a proxy for the students’ experiences over 
the past six years of interacting with their peers in the classroom. The existence of any 
effect is driven through student beliefs about their rank position within their class.  
4.2.2 Survey data 
Additional information about a subsample of students is obtained through a 
representative survey of 16,122 students from the first cohort. The Longitudinal Survey 
of Young People in England (LSYPE) is managed by the Department for Education and 
follows a cohort of young people, collecting detailed information on their parental 
background, academic achievements, out of school activities and attitudes. 
We merge survey responses with our administrative data using a unique student 
identifier. This results in a dataset where we can track students from a primary school, 
determine their academic ranks and then observe their later measurements of confidence 
and attainment, allowing us to test if rank effects confidence conditional on attainment. 
This is the first research to merge LSYPE responses to the NPD for primary school 
information. 
At age 14 the students are asked how good they consider themselves to be in English, 
maths and science, with 5 possible responses that we code in the following way; 2 ‘Very 
Good’; 1 ‘Fairly Good’; 0 ‘Don’t Know’; -1 ‘Not Very Good’; -2 ‘Not Good At All’. 
We use this simple scale as a measure of subject specific self-concept. Whilst it is much 
more basic than surveys that focus on self-concept, it does capture the essence of the 
concept.  
The matching between the NPD and LSYPE was perfect. However, the LSYPE also 
surveys students attending private schools that are not included in the national datasets; 
moreover, as students not accurately tracked over time have been removed, a further 
3,731 survey responses could not match. Finally, 1,017 state school students did not 
fully complete these questions and so could not be used for the self-concept analysis. 
Our final dataset contains 11,898 student observations with self-concept measures. Even 
though the survey will not contain the attitude measures of every student in a school 
cohort, by matching the main data we will know where that student was ranked. This 
means we will be able to determine the correlation of rank on self-concept, conditional 
on age 11 test scores and school-subject-cohort fixed effects.  
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4.3 Descriptive statistics  
4.3.1 Main sample 
The data has the complete coverage of the state student population from age 10 to 14. 
We follow each student from their primary school through to secondary school, linking 
their rank in their school to their later outcomes. Table 1 shows summary statistics for 
all students that are used the analysis. Given that the test scores are represented in 
percentiles, all three subjects test scores at age 11 and 14 have a mean of 50 with a 
standard deviation of 28.  
The within-student standard deviation across the three subjects English, math and 
science is 12.68 national percentile points at age 11 with similar variation in the age 14 
tests. This is important as it shows that there is variation within student which is used in 
student effects regressions.  
Information relating to the background characteristics of the students is shown in the 
lower panel of Table 1 half the student population is male, over four-fifths are white 
British and about 15 per cent are Free School Meal Eligible (FSME) a standard measure 
of low parental income.  
Figure 2 shows the position of top- and bottom-ranked students, as defined by being 
in the top or bottom 5% within each school subject cohort, against their national 
percentile rank. We see the large variation across schools in the test scores that would 
make a student rank in the top or bottom. Whilst in the majority of schools students 
would need to score around the 90th percentile nationally to be a ‘top student’, in some 
schools a student need only be in the 50th percentile.  
We use this variation of test scores across schools to identify the effect of rank 
separately from relative ability. This was previously illustrated for a theoretical case in 
Figure 1, which shows the rank of an individual is dependent on the distribution of test 
scores even when maximum, minimum and mean test scores are the same in both 
schools. In the top panel of Figure 3 we replicate this with actual student test score data 
from six primary schools. Each point represents a student’s age 11 English test score. 
Each row represents a school which has a student ranked in the 1st and 100th national 
percentiles, has a mean percentile of 54 and a student in the 93rd percentile in English. 
This is a very specific case, but in each the student at the 93rd percentile has a different 
rank. For the estimations, we use all subjects and the distributions of test scores across 
all primary schools whilst accounting for mean school-subject-cohort test scores. 
Therefore the lower panel of Figure 3 plots the rank of every student in each subject by 
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de-meaned test score. The vertical thickness of the distribution of points indicates the 
support at throughout the rank distribution. For the mean students there is nearly full 
rank support. 
That there are differences in test score distributions across schools will be the result 
of many factors. One example is that a school in a rural area where there is little school 
choice may have a wider test score distribution than a school in a city where there is 
more parental sorting. However, conditional on school-subject-cohort and student 
effects, we are confident that these factors will not bias our results.      
4.3.2 Longitudinal Study of Young People in England 
Appendix Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for the LSYPE sample which we use to 
estimate rank effects on a direct measure of self-concept. The LSYPE respondents are 
representative of the main sample, although mean age 11 test scores are slightly lower 
and the proportion of Free School Meal Eligible is higher than the national at 18.6% and 
14.6% respectively (Appendix Table 3). 
The LSYPE students are asked to rate themselves in each of the subjects from ‘Not 
good at all’ to ‘Very Good,’ which is summarized in Appendix Table 5. Our measure of 
self-concept is coarse, with only five categories to choose from and around 60% 
choosing ‘fairly good’. We can see that students do think about their own ability, with 
less than 0.2% not having an opinion. As would be expected, those who considered 
themselves to be poor performers did tend to have lower average national KS2 percentile 
rank and lower rank within their school. However, there is also large variance in these 
ranks within these self-evaluated categories. For every subject, each self-assessment 
category with an opinion has at least one individual in the top 9% nationally, including 
those who considered themselves ‘Not Good’. Similarly, each category has an individual 
in the lowest performing percentile nationally, even those who consider themselves very 
good.18  
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 In Appendix Table 5 we also show the performance of the top and the bottom 10% of students 
within each self-assessment category that are less affected by outliers. We continue to see very large 
variance within categories. Consider Science in Panel C: of those who consider themselves ‘Very 
Good’ the bottom 10% performers in this category are ranked at the 17 percentile point nationally, 
whereas the top 10% of performers in the category that rated themselves ‘Not very good at all’ ranked 
at 64th percentile nationally. 
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5 Main Results 
5.1 Effect of Rank: comparing across school cohorts 
To begin the discussion of the results we present estimates of the impact of primary 
school rank on age 14 test scores. The estimates are reported in Panel A of Table 2, with 
the specifications becoming increasingly flexible moving across columns to the right. 
The first row shows estimates of the rank parameter using fully flexible set of controls 
for age 11 test scores, allowing each percentile score to have a different effect on later 
test scores. Due to computational constraints we are unable to run all specifications 
using this functional form and therefore the second row instead uses a third order 
polynomial of age 11 test scores. It appears that this is sufficient approximation to 
account for the effect of age 11 test scores.  All estimates control for a set of student 
characteristics and have standard errors clustered at the secondary school level19. 
 The first column is a basic specification, which only controls for age 11 test scores, 
student characteristics, along with cohort and subject fixed effects. This shows a 
comparatively large estimate: a student at the top of their cohort has an 11.6 larger 
national percentile rank gain in test scores compared to a student ranked at the bottom, 
ceteris paribus. However, this regression does not condition on school-subject-cohort 
effects and therefore the parameter cannot be interpreted as pure rank effect as it will 
also capture the effects of relative ability. Furthermore, it uses variation in average 
quality of students across schools, which might correlate to family background 
characteristics, later school quality, or other unobserved variables.  
Indeed, this is what we find in column (2) which is significantly smaller and 
additionally allows for any primary school-subject-cohort effects (Specification 5). 
Using this specification, the effect of being ranked top compared to bottom ceteris 
paribus is associated with a gain 7.96 national percentile ranks (0.29 standard 
deviations) conditional on a cubic of age 11 test scores. This can be interpreted as the 
additional ordinal rank effect. Given the distribution of test scores across schools, very 
few students would be bottom ranked at one school and top at another school. A more 
useful metric is to describe the effect size in terms of standard deviations, a one standard 
deviation increase in rank is associated with increases in later test scores by 0.085 
standard deviations or 2.36 national percentile points. Note that any determinant that has 
a permanent effect on student outcomes would be absorbed by prior test scores, this is 
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 Student characteristics are ethnicity, gender, ever Free School Meal Eligible (FSME) and Special 
Educational Needs (SEN) 
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the growth in national percentiles between the ages of 11 and 14 due to primary school 
rank.20 In comparison with other student characteristics, females’ growth rate is 1.01 
national percentile points higher than males and free school meal eligible students on 
average lose 2.96 national percentile points (Appendix Table 6).21     
We see that when additionally allowing for secondary school-subject-cohort effects 
(Specification 6) there is only a marginal impact on the estimates and are not 
significantly different from those in column 2. This is evidence that that there is 
negligible sorting into secondary schools by subject rank, conditional on student test 
scores. Given that secondary school attended can be argued to be an outcome, these 
effects will not be included in the within student analysis.   
5.2 Effect of Rank: within student analysis  
We now turn to estimates that use the within student variation to estimate the rank effect 
(Specification 7). Conditioning on student effects allows for individual growth rates, 
which absorb any student level characteristic. Since students attend the same primary 
and secondary school for all subjects, any general school quality or school sorting is also 
accounted for. Subject specific primary school quality is absorbed by the primary 
school-subject-cohort effects. This uses the variation in the relative growth rates across 
subjects within student according to differing rank in primary school. 
Besides removing potential biases, the inclusion of student effects changes the 
interpretation of the rank parameter. The student effect will also absorb any spillover 
effects gained through high ranks in other subjects and is only identifying the relative 
gains in that subject. Accordingly the within student estimate is considerably smaller. 
The effect from moving to the bottom to top of class ceteris paribus increases national 
percentile rank by 4.56 percentiles, as we see in Panel A, column (4) of Table 2. To 
make a comparison in terms of standard deviations this effect is scaled by the within 
student standard deviation of national percentile rank (11.32). Therefore, conditional on 
student and school-subject-cohort effects, the maximum effect of rank is 0.40 standard 
deviations. This is a very large effect, but a change from last to best rank within student 
represents an extreme treatment. It is more conceivable for a student to move 0.5 rank 
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 Using teacher assessment data on student ability to rank students near start of primary school, at 
age 7. We find that students who are consistently top of their primary school do additionally better in 
age 14 test. Results available upon request, not presented as main result due to coarseness and 
reliability of age 7 test scores.  
21
 Including the rank parameter in this specification reduces the Mean Square Error by 0.31. This is 
more than the reduction from allowing for a gender growth term (0.25) or an ethnicity growth term 
(0.28).  
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points, e.g. being at the 25th percentile in one subject and 75th at another. Our estimates 
imply that this student would improve their test scores in that subject by 0.20 standard 
deviations. In terms of effect size, given that a standard deviation of the rank within 
student is 0.138 for any one-standard deviation increase in rank, test scores increase by 
about 0.056 standard deviations.22  
Again, if there were any general gains through achieving a high rank in one subject, 
this would be absorbed in the within student estimates, and thus could be interpreted as 
the between subject substitutions of effort allocation, or a lower bound of the effect of 
being highly ranked. The difference between the within school estimates (7.96) and the 
within student estimates (4.56) can be interpreted as an upper bound of the gains from 
spilovers between subjects. A more detailed interpretation of the differences in effect 
size are provided in Section 7.5 once a mechanisms has been established, and Appendix 
3 which describes a basic model for this mechanism.   
5.3 Non-linear Effects 
The specifications thus far assumed the effect of rank is linear, however, it is 
conceivable that the effects of rank change throughout the rank distribution (Brown, 
2011). To address this we allow for non-linear effects of rank by replacing the rank 
parameter with a series of 20 indicator variables according to the vingtiles in rank, plus 
top and bottom of class dummies, as outlined in specification (8).  
The equivalent estimates from specification (5) and (7), i.e. without and with student 
fixed effects, are presented in Figure 4. The effect of rank appears to be almost linear 
throughout the rank distribution, with small flicks in the tails. Reassuringly, the placebo 
ranks (to be discussed in Section 6.3) are also insignificant when allowing for non-linear 
effects. In comparison, all rank coefficients are significantly different from the reference 
group of the median-ranked students (10th vingtile). This indicates that the effect of rank 
exists throughout; even those students ranked just above the median perform better three 
years later than those at the median. Given that students are not informed of rank, our 
interpretation of this is that students are good at ranking themselves within the 
classroom. This ranking developed through the constant exposure to peers over the 
length of primary school, which continually reinforces the effect on self-concept such 
that by the end of primary school they have strong beliefs about where they rank. 
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 For students with similar ranks across subjects the choice of specialization could be less clear. 
Indeed, in a sample of the bottom quartile of students in terms of rank differences, the estimated rank 
effect is 25% smaller than those from the top quartile. Detailed results available on request. 
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Finally, the fact that the rank effect exists throughout the distribution is in line with the 
idea that self-concept forms according to rank position. 
5.4 Heterogeneity by gender and parental income  
We now turn to how the effects of rank vary by student characteristics using the student 
fixed effects specification (7) with non-linear rank effects and interacting the rank 
variable with the dichotomous characteristic of interest.23 The student characteristics are 
Male: Female and, FSME: Non-FSME. The baseline group coefficients and the 
interaction plus baseline coefficients are plotted to show the effect of rank on test scores 
for both groups, illustrating how the different groups react to primary school rank.24  
 The first panel in Figure 5 shows the how rank relates to the gains in later test scores 
by gender. Males are more affected by rank throughout 95% of the rank distribution, this 
is shown by the steeper gradient of the rank effect. Males gain four times more from 
being at the top of the class, but also lose out marginally more from being in the bottom 
half. As this is within a student variation in later test scores, the coefficient could be 
interpreted as a specialising term, implying that prior rank has a stronger specialising 
effect on males than females.  
The second panel in Figure 5 shows that Free School Meal Eligible (FSME) students 
are less negatively affected by rank and more positively affected than Non-FSME 
students. FSME students with a high rank gain more than Non-FSME students, 
especially those ranked top in class, who gain almost twice as much. FSME students 
who are below the median have limited negative effects on later test scores. This could 
be interpreted as these students already having a low self-concept for other reasons and 
therefore the negative effects of low rank have less of an effect. Moreover the shallower 
gradient for Non-FSME students could also be interpreted that they are less affected by 
class rank as these students may have their academic self-concept being more be 
affected by factors outside of school.     
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 Interacting student characteristics rather than estimating the effects separately, ensures that students 
who attend the same school have the same relative.  Use of interactions is preferred over separate 
regressions as the school-subject-cohort effects will be shared across groups and so relative test scores 
according to that school’s mean will be the same for both.   
24
 The student characteristics themselves are not included in the estimations, as they are absorbed by 
the student effects. These characteristics interacted by rank, however, are not absorbed by student 
effects, because there is variation within the student due to having different ranks in each subject.  
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6 Robustness 
Some non-trivial empirical challenges arise when estimating the effect of rank 
conditional on test score because we do not independently observe both a students’ rank 
and a student’s ability. Instead, we rely on externally marked and nationally standardised 
tests at the end of primary school to derive a student’s local rank during primary 
education and also use this measure to control for a student’s subject-specific 
achievement. This may cause problems relating to the influence of peers, parents and 
measurement error on test scores. 
6.1 Peer Effects 
Firstly, given that we are discussing an atypical peer effect, it is important to address the 
issues associated with such.25 Any primary school peer effects that have a permanent 
effect on test scores do not bias the estimates as they are captured in the end-of-primary 
school test scores. Furthermore, we can account for contemporaneous secondary peer 
quality with the inclusion of secondary school-subject-cohort effects.26  
However, if peer effects have a transitory effect on test scores i.e. only current peers 
matter, any estimation of the effect of primary rank on age 14 test scores whilst 
controlling for primary test scores could be biased. This is to the extent that both the 
conditioning variable and rank will be correlated with primary peer effects. The intuition 
for this is as follows: in the presence of transitory peer effects, a student with lower 
quality peers would attain a lower primary school results than otherwise and also have a 
higher rank than otherwise. Thus, when controlling for primary test scores in the 
estimations, those who previously had low quality peers would appear to gain more as 
they now have a new peer group, who on average would be better. Since rank is 
negatively correlated with peer quality in primary test scores, it would appear that those 
with high rank make the most gains. Therefore having a measure of ability confounded 
by transitory peer effects would lead to an upward biased rank coefficient. 
This is shown to be the case in Appendix 1, where we create a data generating 
process in which we specify that subsequent test scores are not effected by rank. Instead 
test scores are only a function of ability and individual linear or non-linear peer effects. 
To be cautious we allow for these peer effects to be 20 times larger than those found in 
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 The standard reflection problem is not a first order issue in this situation, as students are surrounded 
by 87% new peers when they transfer to secondary school, and the rank effect is generated by primary 
school peers.  
26
 This has almost zero effects on our coefficients partly because of the large re-mixing of students 
during the primary-to-secondary transition, and the sorting to school not being rank dependent.  
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Lavy et al. (2012). We simulate these data 1000 times and estimate the rank parameter 
with different sets of controls. This shows that not controlling for the primary school 
peer group generates biased results, but that this bias is negligible when allowing for 
mean school-subject-cohort effects, even with these large non-linear peer effects. These 
simulations and further discussion can be found in Appendix 1 and Appendix Table 1. 
6.2 Measurement Error 
In addition to peer effects, individual test scores may be imperfect measures of inputs 
up until that point in time. Given that both rank and test scores will be affected by the 
same measurement error, but to different extents due the heterogeneous test score 
distributions, calculating the size of the bias is intractable. To gauge the extent of 
measurement error we again simulate the data assuming 20% of the variation in test 
scores is random noise, 70% student ability and 10% school effects, these proportions 
reflect that 80% of the variance of test scores is within schools and 20% across schools 
(Appendix 2). This shows that normally distributed individual-specific measurement 
error would work against finding any effects. 
The intuition for this is the following: a particular student having a large positive 
measurement error would result in both an inflated end-of-primary score and a higher 
local rank measure. Both of these would work against finding positive effect of rank on 
later outcomes, as we explicitly control for prior attainment. This student’s later test 
scores would hence be benchmarked against other students' with the same end of 
primary result but higher actual ability. Since the student only got a high local rank 
because of the measurement error, this would downward bias any positive rank effect 
estimate.  
6.3 Is rank just picking up ability? 
Our estimates of primary school subject-specific rank are relatively large, given that we 
are conditioning prior test scores and individual growth. As rank is highly correlated 
with student ability and test scores, there could be a concern that measurement error in 
the test scores for ability may be recovered in the rank measurement, if rank is measured 
with less error than test scores. 
Note that this is different from the measurement error concern discussed above. To 
address the specific measurement error problem of rank having less measurement error 
than test scores and thus containing residual ability information, we perform placebo 
tests. This involves generating a placebo-rank measure that uses underlying ability, but 
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would not reflect the social comparison experiences of students. To achieve this we re-
assigned randomly all students into primary schools by cohort and re-calculated the 
ranks that they would have had in these schools with their original age-11 test scores but 
with peers that they never actually interacted with. These placebo-ranks are highly 
correlated with age-11 test scores. If they were found to be significant determinants of 
later achievement, this would indicate that rank is picking up ability not captured in end 
of primary school outcomes. We re-estimate all the specifications fifty times using new 
placebo-ranks each time and present the mean results in Panel B of Table 2, and the non-
linear effects in Figure 4. We find no effects of these placebo ranks on later test scores. 
From these simulation results we conclude that our findings are unlikely to be 
mechanically driven by measurement error in test scores. 
6.4 Are student effects enough? Primary school sorting and parental 
occupation 
The causal interpretation that we give to estimates relies on the conditional 
independence assumption. That a student’s rank needs to be orthogonal to other subject-
varying determinants of a student's later achievement. Given the student effects, the 
variation need not be orthogonal to general determinants of the student's achievement, 
but would need to vary within a student across subjects. A prime example of this could 
be the occupational background of the parents. Children of scientists may have a higher 
learning curve in science throughout their academic career for reasons of parental 
investment or inherited ability. Similarly children of journalists for English and children 
of accountants in maths. This will not bias our results as long as conditional on age 11 
test scores parental occupation is orthogonal to primary school rank. Or more broadly, 
there would be a problem if conditional on other factors, rank was correlated to subject-
varying determinates of future achievement. This might well be the case if parents 
strongly aspire for their child to rank top in that subject and also have a higher academic 
growth rate in that subject between the ages 11 and 14. 
Typically parents are trying to get their child into the ‘best school’ possible in terms 
of average grades. This would work against any positive sorting by rank as higher 
average achievement would decrease the probability of their child having a high rank. 
This sorting on general achievement would be accounted for by the student fixed effect. 
However, if parents wanted to maximise their child’s rank in a particular subject, this 
could bias the results. In order to do this they would need to know the ability of their 
child and all potential peers by subject. This is unlikely to be the case, particularly for 
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such young children who have yet to enter formal education at age 4. Parents could 
possibly infer the likely distributions of peer ability if there is autocorrelation of the 
student achievement within a primary school. This means that if parents did know the 
ability of their child by subject, and the achievement distributions of primary schools 
they could potentially select a school on this basis.  
We test for this by using the LSYPE sample which has information on parental 
occupation. All parental occupations are classified into English, math, science, or ‘other’ 
and then an indicator variable is created for each student-subject if they have a parent 
who works in that field 27 . This is taken as an indicator for the parents’ subject 
preference. We then regress age-11 test scores on parental occupation, school-subject 
effects and student effects (Table 3, Panel A). This establishes that this measure of 
parental occupation is a significant predictor of student subject achievement even when 
allowing for individual effects. Then using rank as the dependent variable we test for a 
violation of the orthogonality condition in Panel B of Table 3. Here we see that whilst 
parental occupation does predict student achievement by subject, it does not predict rank 
conditional on test scores. This implies that parents are not selecting schools on the basis 
of rank for their child. We therefore do not reject that the orthogonality condition does 
not hold with respect to parental background. This does not rule out other co-varying 
factors that may bias the results but it provides us with confidence that this likely large 
factor does not. 
7 Mechanisms 
A number of different mechanisms could produce similar results; competitiveness; 
environmental favours certain ranks; external (parental) investment by task; students 
learn about their ability. In the following, we discuss how each coincides with the results 
presented so far.  
7.1 Hypothesis 1: Competitiveness  
If the goal of individuals was to be better than their peers, maximise rank, this could 
produce some of our results, but not the full pattern. 
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 Parental Standard Occupational Classification 2000 grouped in Science, Math, English and Other.  
Science (3.5%); 2.1 Science and technology, 2.2 Health Professionals, 2.3.2 Scientific researchers, 
3.1 Science and Engineering Technicians. Math (3.1%); 2.4.2 Business And Statistical Professionals, 
3.5.3 Business And Finance Associate Professionals. English (1.5%): 2.4.5.1 Librarians, 3.4.1 
Artistic and Literary Occupations, 3.4.3 Media Associate Professionals. Other: Remaining responses.  
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To see this, consider two students of the same ability who attend the same secondary 
school but went to primary schools of different peer quality. The student attending the 
primary school of low quality peers could provide less effort in their end of primary 
school tests and still be ranked top. This student would then achieve lower end of 
primary school test scores than the student who faced competition in primary school. At 
secondary school when they have the same level of competition, and due to their same 
ability they will have the same expected age 14 test scores. In our estimation, controlling 
for prior test scores will make it appear that the student who faced lower competition 
and was ranked higher, had larger growth and thus generate the positive effect of rank.   
However, if these mechanisms were driving the results, we would only expect to 
see these effects near the top of the rank distribution as it only applies to students who 
far exceed their peers and so get a lower than would be expected age-11 test scores. All 
those in the remainder of the distribution would be applying effort during primary school 
to gain a higher rank and so we should not see an effect. However given the result that 
the rank effect is approximately linear throughout it is unlikely that this type of 
competition mechanism is causing the effect.  
It could still be the case that primary school subject rank is positively correlated 
with the degree of competitiveness of the student. Then those who are the most 
competitive increase their effort the most when entering secondary school and so have 
higher test score growth. Note that in the student effects specification any general 
competitiveness of an individual would be accounted for, this competiveness would 
need to vary by subject. As previously mentioned, any factor that varies by student 
across subjects conditional on prior test scores could confound –on in this case, explain- 
the results. 
7.2 Hypothesis 2: The environment favours certain ranks  
Another possible explanation for this finding is that the environment could favour the 
growth of certain ranks of agents. As an example, one can imagine primary school 
teachers teaching to the low ability students if faced with a heterogeneous class group28. 
If this were the case, teachers may design their classes with the needs of the lowest 
ranked students in mind. This means that these students would achieve higher age 11 test 
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 We have run estimations controlling for the within school-subject-cohort variance to take into 
account that high variance classes may be more difficult to teach. However, these cannot include 
school-subject-cohort or student effects, and thus the estimates should not be cleanly interpreted as 
ordinal rank affects. Therefore these specifications only allowed for general school effects or no 
school effects. The inclusion of a school-subject-cohort variance into these specifications does not 
significantly alter the rank parameter. Our findings can be presented upon request.  
Chapter 2. Top of The Class 
46 
 
scores than they otherwise would have done and students further from the bottom lose 
out.  
What would this mean for the rank effect estimates? Again consider two students 
of the same ability who attend the same secondary school but different primary schools, 
where one was top of year. The top student would get less attention during primary 
school and therefore get a lower grade than they otherwise would have done. At 
secondary school they have the same attention due to their same ability and get the same 
age 14 test scores. In our estimation, controlling for prior test scores will make it appear 
that the top student had higher growth and thus generate the positive effect of rank. 
Therefore, teachers teaching to the bottom student could also generate a positive rank 
effect. This would require primary school teachers only being effective with lowest 
ranked students and secondary school teachers teaching to each ability level equally. 
Note if primary teachers taught to the median student, those at both extremes would lose 
out. So instead of a linear effect, we would find a U-shaped curve with both students at 
the bottom and the top of the distribution gaining relatively more during secondary 
school.  
If this was mainly due to the teacher focusing on those of low rank we would not 
necessarily expect to see large differences by gender, or free school meal status. We saw 
that males are more affected by rank than females, which would imply that males are 
more negatively affected by having the subject content not tailored to them e.g. top 
males under-achieve more during primary but catch up during secondary school. This is 
conceivable, however it runs counter to our estimate that males on average have lower 
growth in test scores between 11 and 14 (Appendix Table 6). Moreover, this does not 
also easily explain why free school meal students up to the middle of the class rankings 
are not negatively affected by the focus on the bottom, and those at the top of class are. 
Given these inconsistences, and that it relies on primary school teachers focusing solely 
on the lowest rank student and secondary school being tailored to student ability to 
generate similar effects, we doubt that his is the dominant reason for the effect.  
7.3 Hypothesis 3: External (parental) investment by task  
It may not be the students that are applying different effort by subject but that parents of 
the students are. Parents can assist the child at home with homework or other extra-
curricular activities. If the parents know that their child is ranked highly in one subject, 
they might encourage the child to do more activities and be more specialised in this 
subject. Note that as we are controlling for student effects, this must be subject specific 
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encouragement rather than general encouragement regarding schoolwork, and the 
additional investment must take place between ages 11 and 14. As we have already 
shown that conditional on test scores, parental occupation does not predict student rank, 
this hypothesis assumes parents react to achieved primary school rank rather than prior 
preferences.   
However, we believe there are two further counter arguments for this mechanism. 
Firstly, whilst some parents may choose to specialise their child, others may want to 
improve their child’s weakest subject. If parental investment focused on the weaker 
subject, this would reverse the rank effect for these students. To explain the positive 
rank effect, one would need to assume that the majority of parents wanted their child to 
specialise, which seems unrealistic for the ages eleven to fourteen. Secondly, parents are 
unlikely to be highly informed of their child’s exact rank in class in the English context. 
Teacher feedback to parents will convey some information for the parents to act upon, 
such as the student being the best or worst in class, but may not be able to discern a 
difference from being near the middle of the cohort rankings. Our results however, show 
significantly different effects from the median for all vingtiles with school-subject-
cohort effects29.  
7.4 Hypothesis 4: Students learn about their ability 
Another possibility is that students use the information obtained by their local rank to 
learn about their subject-specific abilities, and as a result allocate effort accordingly. 
This is similar to the model proposed by Ertac (2006) where individuals do not know 
their own ability and therefore use their own absolute and relative performance to learn 
about it. Note that this mechanism does not change an individual’s education production 
function, only their perception of it. We will argue below that this feature allows us to 
test the learning model, and fail to reject that the learning model has an effect. Thus we 
cannot provide evidence in favour of the learning model. .   
Under the learning hypothesis students additionally use local rank information to 
make effort investment decisions across subjects, applying more effort according to 
where there is higher perceived ability. This would produce the same predictions by 
subject as a mechanism that changed the production function, however it has a different 
prediction for average grades. Students with larger differences between local and 
                                                   
29
 Information on the within student comparative advantage by subject would be easier for a teacher to 
communicate, and so parents could use this to specialize the student. However, these effects would 
then appear less significant in the school-subject-cohort effects specifications. 
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national ranks (in absolute terms) would have a more distorted information about their 
true abilities. These students would then have a higher misallocation of effort across 
subjects under the learning model, assuming diminishing returns to learning in each 
subject and that students want to allocate effort where they are most productive. Those 
with higher misallocation of effort would thus achieve lower overall grades, compared to 
students whose local ranks happen to closely align with national ranks. This is because 
this misallocation would lead to inefficient effort allocation across subjects and thus 
reduce average grades obtained. Whereas, if the rank effects were caused by actual 
changes in the education production function (and not just learning and changes in 
perceptions), even if local rank was different from national rank, this would not lead to a 
misallocation of effort in terms of maximising grades.   
We do not have direct data on perceptions versus reality of costs, however we can 
test for misallocation of effort by examining how average grade achieved is correlated 
with misinformation. More precisely, we compute a measure of misinformation for 
students in each subject using their local rank 	
 = [0,1] and national percentile rank 
	
 = [1,100]  at age 11. Both are uniformly distributed and therefore we simply 
define misinformation BCD	
  as the absolute difference between the two after 
rescaling percentile rank: 
 BCD	
 = E	
 − 	
 100G E , HℎJKJ BCD = [0,1]   (10) 
This measure takes the value zero for students where their local rank happens to 
correspond exactly to the national rank. A large value, on the other hand, indicates large 
differences between local and national rank. Averaging this metric across subjects 
within student provides a mean indicator of misinformation for each student. To test 
directly if a student with a large amount of disinformation does significantly worse, we 
use a specification similar to (5) but with the by subject variation removed as we are 
examining the effect on average test scores. We estimate the following specification:  
 L	
 =  L	
 + !#L	
$ + 	 + M
 + N	BODLLLLL	
 + &	
  (11) 
Where &	
 = 	 + 	
 
where L	
 is average test scores across subjects in period t, L is average rank, M
 are  
primary school-cohort effects and BODLLLLL  the additional misinformation variable. If the 
amount of misinformation caused them to misallocate effort over subjects we would 
expect N	 < 0, alternatively the null hypothesis local rank causes changes to the actual 
production function and N	 = 0.       
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Q: SJTKUCUV N	 < 0 
Q0: WXYY N	 = 0 
We obtain the following estimates using our full sample of 2,271,999 students. For 
benchmarking purposes, we first estimate a version of specification (11) without the 
additional misinformation variable (Table 4). The effect of average rank on average test 
score is estimated at 10.7 and highly statistically significant.30 Column (2) adds the 
coefficient for the effect of misinformation, which is estimated to be small and 
statistically insignificant whilst the rank parameter remains almost unchanged. Given 
this specification we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the amount of misinformation 
does not cause students to misallocated effort. We therefore conclude that the learning 
mechanism alone is unlikely to generate our results, though we fully acknowledge the 
limitations of this test, in particular that we cannot control for primary-cohort-subject or 
student fixed effects in this specification. 
7.5 Hypothesis 5: Rank position develops self-concept  
An alternative explanation is that when surrounded by people who perform a task worse 
(better) than oneself, one develops a positive (negative) self-concept in that area. The 
psychological-education literature uses the term self-concept, which is formed through 
our interactions with the environment and peers (O’Mara et al., 2006). Individuals can 
have positive or negative self-concept about different aspects of themselves.  
Applied to our setting, we envisage that students with higher rank would develop 
positive academic self-concept. Self-concepts can be subject specific as well as for 
academic work generally, so that a student can consider themselves good at school but 
still bad at math (Marsh et al., 1988; Yeung et al., 2000). Valentine et al. (2004) found 
that students with a high self-concept would also develop positive non-cognitive skills 
such as confidence, resilience, and perseverance. There is also broad agreement in the 
psychological literature that academic self-concept is most malleable before age 11 
(Tiedemann, 2000; Lefot et al., 2010; Rubie-Davis, 2011), which is when we measure 
rank. The importance of such non-cognitive skills for both academic attainment and non-
academic attainment is now well established (Heckman and Rubinstein, 2001; Borghans 
et al., 2008; Lindqvist and Vestman, 2011).  
                                                   
30
 This is about three points lager compared to our previous estimates of Table 2 (column 2). Note, 
however, that this specification does not allow controlling for Primary-cohort-subject effects. Instead, 
only Primary-cohort effects can be included.   
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Therefore, the hypothesised mechanism is that an individual’s relative rank in a task 
amongst peers affects self-concept. This in turn has an impact on non-cognitive skills 
like resilience, persistence and confidence which affects the costs of effort for that task 
or task-specific productivity directly. An exemplary basic behavioural model that works 
through the changing-cost channel is provided in Appendix 3 31 . Students want to 
maximise total grades for a given total cost of effort, and have differential abilities and 
costs of effort for each subject. Students who have a high rank in a subject during 
primary school develop a positive self-concept, and have a lower cost of effort in that 
subject in secondary school. This will shift the student’s iso-cost line out along one axis 
for this subject and therefore they can reach higher isoquant and will optimally invest 
more effort in that subject (Appendix Figure 1, Panel B). If there were any general gains 
in confidence, that would reduce the cost of any academic effort and cause a parallel 
shift out of the iso-cost  line and therefore more effort would be allocated to all subjects.  
Applied to the results, the smaller estimates from the pupil fixed effects 
specifications, will have had any general confidence effect absorbed and so will only be 
picking up the effect of within student reallocation of effort across subjects. The school-
subject-cohort effect specifications, allow for spillovers between subjects within a pupil 
and can so be interpreted as a culmination of the income and substitution effects of rank 
across subject and so are accordingly larger (Appendix Figure 1, Panel C).    
To provide evidence for this mechanism we link the administrative data to the 
Longitudinal Survey of Yong People in England (LSYPE). We are able to match 
approximately twelve thousand students from the survey who answer questions on their 
self-concepts in each subject. This allows us to test directly if rank position within 
primary school has an effect on this measure of self-concept, conditional on attainment. 
The specifications are equivalent to (5) and (7) with the dependent variable now being 
student confidence. Since this survey was only run for one cohort, the school-subject-
cohort effects are replaced by school-subject effects. 
 Panel A of Table 5 presents these results and demonstrates that conditional on age 11 
test scores students with a higher primary school rank position are significantly more 
likely to say that they are good in that subject (column 1). Controlling for school-subject 
effects, the impact of moving from the bottom of class to the top is 0.196 points on a 
five point scale (-2, 2), or about twenty per cent of a standard deviation in our self-
                                                   
31
 Self-concept may instead affect a student’s ability in a task rather than cost of effort. This would 
lead to the same predicted changes in the effort ratios and empirical results. If we had time use data 
we would be able to differentiate between these causes, however given the data available, we are 
unable to determine if it is costs or abilities that are affected. 
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concept measure (see column 2).32 This suggests that students develop a clear sense of 
their strengths and weaknesses depending on their local rank position, conditional on 
relative test scores.  
While we would prefer to have a measure of self-concept directly at age 11 at the end 
of primary school, these measures are only available to us just prior to the age 14 tests. 
Therefore, in Panel B we additionally control for contemporaneous attainment at age 14, 
which is an outcome. To cautiously interpret these estimates, students with ‘the same’ 
age 11 and 14 results have higher self-concept if they have had a higher local rank in 
that subject in primary school.  
Note column (2), the specifications allowing for primary-subject effects cannot reject 
the null hypothesis that rank has no effect on self-concept. A reason for this is that there 
are few students per primary school in this survey (4.5 students conditional on at least 
one student being in the survey); as the survey was conducted at secondary schools. The 
small number of students per school severely limits the degrees of freedom in each 
school-subject group, the lack of variation is exacerbated due to the coarseness of the 
self-concept variable. This is exacerbated further when additionally conditioning on 
individual student effects column 3. To obtain a clearer view of the effect of rank on 
contemporaneous self-concept we estimate how rank based on age-14 test scores within 
a secondary school subject affects subject confidence conditional on secondary-subject 
effects and individual effects. The advantage of this is that there are on average 20 
students for each school that has students in the survey.33 These results can be found in 
Panel C, where we see that conditional on school-subject effects, moving from bottom to 
top of class improves confidence by 0.43 on the 5 point scale. Allowing for individuals 
to have different levels of confidence and only using the variation between subjects 
reduces the parameter to 0.38 but remains significant at 1% (column 3).  
Furthermore, we examine the heterogeneity of these effects by estimating the effect 
of age 14 rank on confidence separately by gender, conditional on student and school-
subject effects (lower part of Panel C). We find that the effect on male confidence is five 
times larger than the effect on females (Z[ \]^ =0.61, Z[ _^\]^  =0.12), which 
mirrors the results we find for the effect of rank on later test scores. Unfortunately due to 
                                                   
32
 The standard deviation of the self-concept measure is 0.99. 
33
 The reason why we do not look at the effect of KS3 rank on later outcomes is due to the tracking by 
subject in secondary school, which will be related to rank. This is not an issue with primary school 
rank, because even if there were tracking in primary schools, when moving to secondary school, 
students with the same test scores (but different primary ranks) would be assigned to the same track. 
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the smaller sample size of the LSYPE, we are unable to produce the effects non-linearly 
or by FSME status.  
The magnitudes of the secondary school ranks effects on secondary confidence are 
large, but we may expect the contemporaneous effect of primary rank on confidence at 
age 11 to be even larger, as self-concept is thought to be more malleable at this age 
(Tiedemann, 2000; Lefot et al., 2010; Rubie-Davis 2011). Moreover, we find indicative 
evidence that later confidence is affected by previous primary school rank.  
Overall given the effects of rank on direct measures of self-concept and the 
heterogeneity of effects found in the main results we are confident in our conclusion that 
self-concept forms according to rank position and that this affects later investment 
decisions.  
8 Corroborating research 
The finding that higher peer quality could have negative effects on later outcomes may 
seem controversial, but there are a number of topics in education that have findings 
which corroborate this hypothesis.  
Research on selective schools and school integration have shown mixed results from 
students attending selective or predominantly non-minority schools (Angrist and Lang, 
2004; Clark 2010; Cullen, et al., 2006; Kling et al., 2007). Many of these papers use a 
regression discontinuity design to compare the outcomes of the students that just passed 
the entrance exam to those that just failed. The general puzzle is that many papers find 
no benefit from attending these selective schools. However, our findings would speak to 
why the potential benefits of prestigious schools may be attenuated through the 
development of negative self-concepts amongst these marginal/bussed students, who 
necessarily would also be the low ranked students. This is consistent with Cullen, Jacob 
and Levitt (2006), who find that those whose peers improve the most gain the least: 
‘lottery winners have substantially lower class ranks throughout high school as a result 
of attending schools with higher achieving peers and are more likely to drop out’. 
Similar effects are found in the Higher Education literature with respect to affirmative 
action policies (Arcodiacono et al., 2012; Robles and Krishna, 2012).  
The early formation of self-concept and specialisation could also partly explain why 
some achievement gaps increase over the education cycle. Widening overall education 
gaps have been documented by race (Fryer and Levitt, 2006; Hanushek and Rivkin 
2006; 2009), small differences in early overall attainment could negatively affect general 
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academic self-concept, which would lead to decreased investment in education and 
exacerbate any initial differences. In the case of gender a gap occurs by subject, where 
males are overly represented in mathematics and science by the age of 18, despite girls 
outperforming boys at early ages in these subjects (Burgess et al, 2004; Machin & 
McNally, 2005). Even with girls performing better in all subjects, if boys do 
comparatively less badly in mathematics and are more affected by rank for investment 
decisions, then they would chose to invest more in those subjects. Finally the literature 
on age-effects in education shows that older children do better compared to their 
younger peers (i.e. Black et al., 2011). The development of positive self-concepts of the 
older children at an early age due to initial differences is a potential mechanism for the 
continuation of these effects as the students grow older. 
9 Conclusions 
Individuals continuously make social comparisons, which can affect our beliefs and 
investment decisions. If individuals make these comparisons using ordinal as well as 
cardinal information, then an individual’s rank amongst their peers could impact on their 
investments and later productivity.  
This paper examined how, conditional on relative achievement, rank amongst peers 
affects subsequent performance. Applied to an education setting we establish a new 
result, that rank position within primary school has significant effects on secondary 
school achievement. Moreover, a higher rank also improves students’ confidence, an 
important non-cognitive skill. These rank effects are in addition to any effect caused by 
a student’s relative distance from the class mean.  
The approximately linear impact of rank implies that students are very good at 
determining their rank amongst their peers. Furthermore, there is significant 
heterogeneity in the effect of rank with males being influenced considerably more. We 
find male confidence in a subject is five times more affected by their rank amongst their 
peers compared to females. Accordingly, male students specialise more according to 
their primary school rank than females. To the extent that boys gain four times more in 
later test scores from being top of the class compared to comparable female students. 
Contrastingly, students with low parental income background are not negatively affected 
by low rank positions during primary education. Together, we take this as evidence that 
an individual’s rank amongst their peers during primary school affects their self-
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concepts over many dimensions which in turn are likely to impact on the development of 
task specific non-cognitive skill and subsequent investment decisions.   
We cannot fully exclude other mechanisms, such as learning about ability, to 
generate parts of these results. However, we have shown that differences between local 
and national ranks have no negative impact on average performance. This speaks in 
favour of mechanisms that change the actual grade production function either through 
shifting task-specific productivity or cost, and against learning models where only 
student perceptions are affected. Given the impact of rank on a direct measure of 
confidence, we thus believe that rank is most likely to affect later results through non-
cognitive skills. 
It is worthwhile to think about policy implications of this finding. With specific 
regards to education, these findings lead to a natural question for a parent deciding on 
where to send their child (in partial equilibrium). Should my child attend a ‘prestigious 
school’ or a ‘worse school’ where she will have a higher rank? Rank is just one of many 
factors in the education production function, and therefore choosing solely on the basis 
of rank is unlikely to be correct. The authors are currently not aware of any study that 
identifies the effectiveness of schools in terms of standard deviations34; therefore, we use 
estimates of the impact of teachers as an indicative measure for effects of school quality 
for this benchmarking exercise. A teacher who is one standard deviation better than 
average improves student test scores by 0.1 to 0.2 standard deviations (Aaronson, et al. 
2007; Rivkin et al. 2005). Comparatively we find that a student with one standard 
deviation higher rank in primary school will score 0.08 standard deviations better at age 
14.35 Forthcoming work will look at the longer run impacts of primary school rank, as 
well as changes in school ranks from moving schools. 
We believe these findings have general implications for productivity and 
informational transparency. To improve productivity it would be optimal for managers 
or teachers to highlight an individual’s local rank position if that individual had a high 
local rank. If an individual is in a high-performing peer group and therefore may have a 
low local rank but a high global rank a manager should make the global rank more 
salient. For individuals who have low global and local ranks, managers should focus on 
absolute attainment, or focus on other tasks where the individual has higher ranks.  
                                                   
34
 Evaluations of school effectiveness using admission lotteries (i.e. Hoxby et al. 2009, Angrist et al. 
2010, Dobbie and Fryer 2011, Abdulkadiroglu et al. 2011) are comparing effectiveness between types 
rather than the whole distribution of effectiveness.   
35
 Note that these are still not directly comparable because the effect of the teacher is annual and 
quickly fades out, whereas the rank treatment lasts the duration of primary school (5 years) and the 
effect is found three years later.   
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Finally these findings have general implications regarding the formation of non-
cognitive skills and productivity. Given the heterogeneous effects of rank it would be 
possible to organise groups by individuals characteristics and abilities to maximise 
output. However this would be very cumbersome and administratively intensive. 
Therefore the key implication is that non-cognitive skills such as confidence, 
perseverance and resilience have large effects on productivity. Rank can be thought of as 
just one treatment that impacts on these behaviours, however there are many other 
interventions that could have positive effects on all individuals within a group and not 
just those above the median.   
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of Student Characteristics 
Mean S.D. Min Max 
Panel A: Student Characteristics 
Age 11 test scores     
KS2 English 50.29 28.03 1 100 
KS2 Math 50.52 28.19 1 100 
KS2 Science 50.01 28.03 1 100 
Within Student KS2 S.D.  12.68 7.70 0 57.16 
Age 14 test scores     
KS3 English 51.23 28.18 1 100 
KS3 Math 52.89 27.55 1 100 
KS3 Science 52.91 27.53 1 100 
Within Student KS3 S.D.  11.32 7.19 0 56.59 
 
Panel B: Rank Characteristics 
Rank English 0.488 0.296 0 1 
Rank Math 0.491 0.296 0 1 
Rank Science 0.485 0.295 0 1 
Within Student Rank S.D. 0.138 0.087 0 0.58 
 
Panel C: Background Characteristics 
SEN 0.175 0.380 0 1 
FSME 0.146 0.353 0 1 
Male 0.499 0.500 0 1 
Ethnicity 
White British 0.837 0.370 0 1 
Other White 0.019 0.135 0 1 
Asian 0.058 0.234 0 1 
Black 0.030 0.171 0 1 
Chinese 0.003 0.053 0 1 
Mixed 0.017 0.128 0 1 
Other 0.011 0.104 0 1 
Unknown 0.026 0.158 0 1 
Notes: 6,815,997 observations over 5 cohorts. Cohort 1 takes Key Stage 2 (KS2) examinations in 
2001 and Key Stage 3 (KS3) examinations in 2004. Cohort 5 takes KS2 in 2005 and KS3 in 2008. 
Test scores are percentalized tests scores by cohort-subject. All test scores come from national 
exams which are externally marked. The analysis stops in 2008 as after this point Key Stage 3 
exams became internally assessed.  
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Table 2: Effect of Primary School Rank (Age 11) on Age 14 Test Scores 
 
Raw 
 
(1) 
Primary 
 
(2) 
Primary-
Secondary 
(3) 
Primary- 
Student 
(4) 
 
Panel A: The effect of primary rank 
Primary Rank   
Flexible Age 11 Test Scores 
11.551** 7.662** 
  
0.293 0.145 
  
Primary Rank  
Cubic Age 11 Test Scores 
11.001** 7.960** 7.901** 4.562** 
0.298 0.145 0.146 0.132 
 
Panel B: The effect of placebo rank 
Placebo Rank  
Flexible Age 11 Test Scores 
0.0055 0.015 
  
0.100 0.011 
  
Placebo Rank  
Cubic Age 11 Test Scores 
0.0045 0.013 0.016 -0.008 
0.100 0.116 0.119 0.137 
Student characteristics    Abs 
Age 11 Test Scores     
Primary-cohort-subject Effects     
Secondary Effects   Abs Abs 
Secondary-cohort-subject Effects     
Student Effects     
Notes: Results obtained from twelve separate regressions based on 2,271,999 student observations and 
6,815,997 student-subject observations. The dependent variable is by cohort by subject percentalized KS3 
test scores. All specifications control for Key Stage 2 results, student characteristics, cohort effects and 
subject effects. Student characteristics are ethnicity, gender, free school meal (FSME) and special 
educational needs (SEN). Coefficients in columns (2) and (3) are estimated using Stata command 
reg2hdfe allowing two high dimensional fixed effects to be absorbed. Standard errors in italics and 
clustered at 3,800 secondary schools. Abs indicates that the effect is absorbed by another estimated effect.  
** 1% sig. 
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Table 3: Balancing by Parental Occupation 
 
Primary 
 
(1) 
Primary-  
Student 
(2) 
Panel A: Effects on age-11 tests  
Parental Occupation  
7.722** 1.706* 
0.840 0.783 
Panel B: Effects on Ordinal Rank  
Parental Occupation  
-0.004 0.000 
0.005 0.034 
Primary-subject  Effects   
Student Effects   
Notes: Results obtained from regressions based on 31,050 subject-student 
observations for which parental occupations could be identified from the LSYPE. 
Detailed occupational coding available from the authors on request. Panel A has KS2 
as dependent variable, in Panel B KS2 with polynomials up to cubic are included as 
controls. All regressions control for student characteristics and subject effects. 
Regressions in column (2) estimated using Stata command reg2hdfe.  ** 1%,* 5% 
significant.  
 
 
Table 4: Effect of Average Primary School Rank (Age 11) and 
Misinformation on Average Age 14 Test Scores 
 
Raw 
(1) 
Primary 
(2) 
Primary Rank   
 
10.710** 10.694** 
0.223 0.223 
Misinformation  
 
- -0.361 
- 0.233 
Student characteristics   
Age 11 Test Scores (cubic)   
Primary-cohort-subject Effects   
Notes: Results obtained from two separate regressions based on 2,271,999 student 
observations averaged over subjects where column (2) includes an additional 
explanatory variable on misinformation. The dependent variable is by cohort by 
subject percentalized average KS3 test scores. The misinformation measurement 
is the average absolute difference between local rank and national percentile rank 
for each student. Student characteristics are ethnicity, gender, free school meal 
(FSME) and special educational needs (SEN). Coefficients are estimated using 
Stata command reg2hdfe allowing two high dimensional fixed effects to be 
absorbed. Standard errors in italics and clustered at 3,800 secondary schools. ** 
1% sig. 
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Table 5: Effect of Rank on Self-Concept 
 
(1) (2)  (3) 
Panel A: Self-Concept on Age 11 Test Scores  
Primary Rank  
0.563** 0.196* 0.056 
0.038 0.117 0.18 
Panel B: Self-Concept on Age 11 & 14 Test Scores 
Primary Rank  
0.436** 0.109 0.014 
0.039 0.115 0.079 
Panel C: Self-Concept on Age 14 Test scores   
Secondary Rank  
0.897** 0.427** 0.382** 
0.048 0.099 0.155 
Secondary Rank – Male Students 0.754*** 0.530*** 0.606*** 
0.059 0.126 0.206 
Secondary Rank – Female Students 1.067*** 0.317* 0.115 
0.071 0.166 0.233 
School-by-subject effects    
Student Effects    
 
Notes: Results obtained from fifteen separate regressions based on 11,558 student observations and 34,674 
student-subject observations from the LSYPE sample (17,415 female, 17,259 male). For descriptives, see 
Appendix Table 3. The dependent variable is a course measure of self-concept by subject. All specifications 
in columns 1 and 2 control for observable student characteristics, these are absorbed by the student effect in 
column 3. Student characteristics are ethnicity, gender, free school meal (FSME) and special educational 
needs (SEN).Panels A and B condition on age 11 test scores (cubic) and primary school by subject effects. 
Panels B and C condition on age 14 test scores (cubic) and secondary school by subject effects.  Cohort 
effects are not included because the LSYPE data is only available for one cohort. Standard errors in 
parenthesis and clustered at 796 secondary schools ** 1% sig.  * 10% sig.  
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Figure 1: Rank Dependent on Distribution Given Absolute and Relative 
Score 
 
Notes: This figure illustrates that students with the same test score relative to the group mean can have 
different ranks depending on the distribution of test scores. Two cohorts of eleven students are 
represented, with each mark representing a student’s test score. Test scores are increasing from left to 
right. Each cohort has the same minimum, maximum and mean test scores. Cohort A has a unimodal 
distribution and Cohort B has a bimodal test score distribution. A student with a test score of X in 
Cohort A would have a lower rank than the same test score in Cohort B. Similarly a test score of Y 
would be ranked differently in Cohorts A and B. Given the definition of rank given in Section 5.2, the 
rank measurements for score X are A?= 0.1 and A@= 0.4 and for Y are >?= 0.9, >@= 0.6. This is 
based on the illustration from Brown et al. (2008).        
 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of Top and Bottom Students 
Notes: Box plots of age 11 test scores. Top Students are defined as students ranked in the top 5% of their 
school-subject-cohort (627	`X7CY = 	
[0.95, 1]). Bottom Students are defined as students ranked in the 
bottom 5% of their school-subject-cohort (1223	`X7CY = 	
[0, 0.05]). The ends on the whiskers mark the 
most extreme value within 1.5 inter-quartile-ranges of the nearest quartile.  Note that individual test scores have 
been randomly altered enough to ensure anonymity of individuals and schools. They are for illustrative 
purposes only, and in no way affects the interpretation of these figures. 
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Figure 3: Rank Distributions in Schools and Across Subjects 
 
 
Notes: In the upper panel each point represents a student’s Key Stage 2 test score.  The six 
schools that are represented have the same mean (54), minimum (0) and maximum (100) tests 
scores in English, and also have a student with a test score of 93. Each student with the test 
score of 93 has a different rank. The lower panel shows all students in our data. The Y-axis is 
the primary rank of students and the X-axis shows the de-meaned test scores by primary school-
subject-cohort. The colored points represent the three different test scores and ranks of students 
from Figure 5 with a test score of 93 in English. Note that the number of students per school as 
well as individual test scores have been randomly altered enough to ensure anonymity of 
individuals and schools. They are for illustrative purposes only and in no way affects the 
interpretation of these figures.  
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Figure 4: Effect of Placebo Primary School Rank on Secondary School 
Outcomes 
 
 
Notes: Non-linear effect with dummies for the vingtiles of rank plus a dummy for being top or bottom of 
school-subject-cohort. All specifications have subject specific rank and test score across three subjects. 
Placebo rank generated from actual test scores but randomly allocated peers, using the actual distribution of 
primary school size. All standard errors clustered at the actual secondary school attended. Specification 1: 
Student characteristics and primary, subject and cohort effects. Specification 2: Primary-subject-cohort group 
effects and student effects. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 5: Effect of Primary School rank on Secondary School outcomes 
by Student Characteristics 
 
 
Notes: FSME stands for Free School Meal Eligible student. Effects obtained from estimating 
the effect of rank on Non-FSME (Female) students and the interaction term with FSME (Male) 
students. Non-linear effect with dummies for the vingtiles of rank plus a dummy for being top 
or bottom of school-subject-cohort. All estimates use subject specific rank and test score across 
three subjects and condition on Primary-subject-cohort group effects and student effects. 
Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
0 0.5 1
G
a
in
 
in
 
la
te
r 
n
a
tio
n
a
l t
es
t s
co
re
s
(N
a
tio
n
a
l P
er
ce
n
til
e 
R
a
n
ks
)
Primary School Rank
Male
Female
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
0 0.5 1
G
a
in
 
in
 
la
te
r 
n
a
tio
n
a
l t
es
t s
co
re
s
(N
a
tio
n
a
l P
er
ce
n
til
e 
R
a
n
ks
)
Primary School Rank
Non-FSME
FSME
Chapter 2. Top of The Class 
68 
 
Appendix 1: Peer Effects 
There are concerns that with the existence of peer effects, peer quality jointly determines 
both a student’s rank position, as well as their age 11 results. This mechanical 
relationship could potentially bias our estimation. This is because in the presence of peer 
effects a student with lower quality peers would attain a lower age 11 test scores than 
otherwise and also have a higher rank than otherwise. Thus, when controlling for prior 
test scores in the age 14 estimations, when students have a new peer group, those who 
previously had low quality peers in primary school would appear to gain more. Since 
rank is negatively correlated with peer quality in primary, it would appear that those 
with high rank make the most gains. Therefore, having a measure of ability confounded 
by peer effects would lead to an upward-biased rank coefficient. 
This situation could be present in our data. We propose a resolution through the 
inclusion of subject-by-cohort-by-primary school controls. These effects will absorb any 
average peer effects within a classroom. However, they will not absorb any peer effects 
that are individual specific. This is because all students will have a different set of peers 
(because they cannot be a peer to themselves). Therefore, including class level controls 
will only remove the average class peer effect. The remaining bias will be dependent on 
the difference between the average peer effect and the individual peer effect and its 
correlation with rank. We are confident that the remaining effect of peers on the rank 
parameter will be negligible, given that the difference between average and individual 
peer effect decreases as class size increases. The bias will be further attenuated because 
the correlation between the difference and rank will be less than one, and both effects 
are small.  
We test this by running simulations of a data generating process where test scores are 
not affected by rank and are only a function of ability and school/peer effects; we then 
estimate the rank parameter given this data. We allow for the data-generating process to 
have linear mean-peer effects, as well as non-linear peer effects (Lavy et al. 2012). We 
are conservative and assume extremely large peer effects, allowing both types of peer 
effects to account for 10% of the variance of a student’s subject-specific outcome. Given 
that the square root of the explained variance is the correlation coefficient, this 
assumption implies that a one standard deviation increase in peer quality improves test 
scores by 0.31 standard deviations. In reality Lavy et al. (2012) find a 1sd increase in 
peers only increases test scores by 0.015standard deviations, a 20th of the size. 
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The data generating process is as follows: 
• We create 2900 students to 101 primary schools and 18 secondary schools of 
varying school sizes36. 
• A range of factors are used to determine achievement. Each of these factors 
are assigned a weight, such that the sum of the weights equal 1. This means 
weights can be interpreted as the proportion of the explained variance.  
• Students have a general ability .	 and a subject specific ability d	 taken from 
normal distributions with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. Taken together 
they are given a weighting of 0.7 as the within school variance of student 
achievement in the raw data is 0.85. Or a weight of 0.6 where rank effects 
exist.  
• All schools are heterogeneous in their impact on student outcomes, which are 
taken from normal distributions with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. School 
effects are given a weighting of 0.1 as the across school variance in student 
achievement in the raw data is 0.15. 
• Linear mean peer effects are the mean subject and general ability of peers not 
including themselves. Non-linear peer effect is the negative of the total 
number of peers in the bottom 5% of students in the population in that 
subject. Peer effects are given a weight of 0.1 much larger than reality. 
• We allow for measurement error in test scores to account for 10% of the 
variance. 
• We generate individual’s i  test scores as a function of general ability .	 
subject specific ability d	, primary peer subject effects e	
 or secondary peer 
subject effects f	, primary school effects 
 or secondary school effects ( 	, 
Age 11 and 14 measurement error 	
 or &	
 , and primary school Rank 
g	
. 
o Age 11 test scores 
	
=0.7*(.	+ d	) +0.10*
 +0.1*e	
 +0.1	
  
o Age 14 test scores where rank has no effect (Panel A):  
	
=0.7*(.	+ d	) +0.10* (+0.1*f	 +0.1&	
 
                                                   
36
 Primary school sizes; 14 students, 16, 25 students (x4 schools), 26 students (x5), 27 students 
(x10), 28 students (x10), 29 students (x10), 30 students (x60). Secondary School sizes: 26 students, 
89 students, 153 students, 160 students, 162 students, 170 students, 174 students, 178 students, 180 
students (x9),  
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o Age 14 test scores where rank has an effect (Panel B): 
	
=0.6*(.	+ d	) +0.10* (+0.1*f	+ 0.1g	
 +0.1&	
 
We simulate the data 1000 times and then estimate the rank parameter using the 
following specifications, with and without school-subject effects.  
	
 = [TUh	
 + >	
 + 	
  
	
 = [TUh	
 + >	
 + f	
 + &	
  
The results from these estimations can be found in appendix Table 1 & 2 below. When 
rank does not have an effect, we would expect	[ = 0, and when it does, [ =
0.1. With these inflated peer effects sizes, we find that controlling for school-subject-
cohort removes enough of the positive bias to make the effect of peers negligible 
(Appendix Table 1 & 2, column 3). If there are large non-linear peer effects, then this 
specification introduces a negative bias; therefore our results could be seen as upper 
bounds (Appendix Table 2, column 3). 
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Appendix Table A1: Simulation of Rank Estimation with Peer Effects 
 
Mean peer effects  Non-linear Peer Effects 
 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Panel A: Rank has no effect [=0.0 
Mean Z[ 0.046 0.000  0.302 -0.041 
Mean SE of Z[ 0.014 0.018  0.015 0.019 
SE of Z[ 0.015 0.019  0.031 0.020 
95% Lower Bound 0.015 -0.037  0.243 -0.079 
95% Upper Bound 0.077 0.035  0.364 -0.003 
Panel B: Rank has an effect [=0.1 
Mean Z[ 0.099 0.100 0.304 0.068 
Mean SE of Z[ 0.014 0.017 0.014 0.018 
SE of Z[ 0.015 0.018 0.027 0.018 
95% Lower Bound 0.069 0.066 0.252 0.033 
95% Upper Bound 0.129 0.133 0.358 0.104 
KS2 and Rank     
School-Subject-Effects     
Notes: 1000 iterations, 95% confidence bounds are obtained from 25th and 975th estimate of ordered rank 
parameters.. 
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Appendix 2: Measurement Error in Test Scores  
Test scores are scores are an imprecise measure of ability. Could this measurement error 
be driving the results? Given that rank and test scores will both be affected by the same 
measurement error (but to different extents due to heterogeneous test score distributions 
across classes), calculating the size of the bias is intractable. To gauge the potential 
effect of measurement error, we simulate the data generating process. This allows us to 
have a true measure of ability and a student test score of which 20% of the variation is 
measurement error. Comparing the estimates of the rank parameter both with and 
without measurement error provides us an indication of the extent to which 
measurement error could be driving the results. Rank measurement is then derived from 
the noisy test score measure in both cases.  
The data generating process is as follows: 
• 2900 students to 101 primary schools and 18 secondary schools of varying 
sizes37. 
• A range of factors are used to determine achievement. Each of these factors 
are assigned a weight, such that the sum of the weights equal 1. This means 
weights can be interpreted as the proportion of the explained variance.  
• Students have a general ability .	 and a subject specific ability d	 taken from 
normal distributions with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. Taken together 
they are given a weighting of 0.7 as the within school variance of student 
achievement in the raw data is 0.85. Or a weight of 0.6 where rank effects 
exist. 
• All schools are heterogeneous in their impact on student outcomes, which are 
taken from normal distributions with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. School 
effects are given a weighting of 0.1 as the across school variance in student 
achievement in the raw data is 0.15.  
• We allow for measurement error in test scores to account for 20% of the 
variance, double the effect of any school subject effects.  
• We generate individual’s i  test scores as a function of general ability .	  
subject specific ability d	, primary school effects 
 or secondary school 
                                                   
37
 Primary school sizes; 14 students, 16, 25 students (x4 schools), 26 students (x5), 27 students (x10), 
28 students (x10), 29 students (x10), 30 students (x60). Secondary School sizes: 26 students, 89 
students, 153 students, 160 students, 162 students, 170 students, 174 students, 178 students, 180 
students (x9),  
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effects ( 	, Age 11 and 14 measurement error 	
 or 	&	
 , and primary 
school Rank g	
 
o Age 11 test scores 
	
=0.7*(.	+ d	) +0.10*
 +0.2	
  
o Age 14 test scores where rank has no effect (Panel A):  
	
=0.7*(.	+ d	) +0.10* ( +0.2&	
 
o Age 14 test scores where rank has an effect (Panel B): 
	
=0.6*(.	+ d	) +0.10* (+ 0.1g	
 +0.2&	
 
We simulate the data 1000 times and then estimate the rank parameter using the 
following specifications, with and without school-subject effects, controlling either for 
true ability (.	+ d	) or age 11 test scores.  
	
 = [TUh	
 + ?i	]	>jkCYCl	
 + 	
  
	
 = [TUh	
 + ?i	]	>jkCYCl	
 + f	
 + &	
  
	
 = [TUh	
 + m	
 + 	
  
	
 = [TUh	
 + m	
 + f	
 + &	
  
The results of these specifications can be found in appendix Table 3 below. The 
ability specification produces unbiased results. When there is measurement error in the 
test score there is a downward bias to the rank effect when rank has an effect (Appendix 
Table 3, Column 5, Panel B). We find that including school-subject-cohort and student 
fixed effects removes this downward bias. 
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Appendix Table A2: Simulation with measurement error 
 
Condition on true ability: 
No measurement error 
 Condition on test scores: 
Large measurement error 
 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Rank has no effect [=0.0 
Mean Z[ -0.001 0.000 0.000  -0.010 0.015 -0.000 
Mean SE of Z[ 0.021 0.020 0.025  0.029 0.034 0.041 
SE of Z[ 0.037 0.021 0.025  0.030 0.036 0.042 
95% Lower Bound -0.074 -0.039 -0.047  -0.068 -0.054 -0.082 
95% Upper Bound 0.076 0.041 0.050  0.048 0.086 0.079 
Panel B: Rank has an effect [=0.1 
Mean Z[ 0.099 0.100 0.100 0.053 0.113 0.100 
Mean SE of Z[ 0.021 0.020 0.025 0.027 0.032 0.038 
SE of Z[ 0.037 0.021 0.025 0.029 0.033 0.039 
95% Lower Bound 0.026 0.061 0.053 -0.002 0.048 0.024 
95% Upper Bound 0.176 0.141 0.150 0.109 0.179 0.176 
Ability and Rank       
School-Subject-Effects       
Student Effects       
Notes: 1000 iterations, 95% confidence bounds are obtained from 25th and 975th estimate of ordered 
rank parameters.. 
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Appendix 3: Model of Effort Allocation 
To explicitly describe the mechanism, we put forward a basic behavioural model of how 
rank could affect later actions through self-concept. There are two stages, a learning 
stage followed by an action stage. In the learning stage, individuals of heterogeneous 
ability in different tasks are randomly allocated into groups. They perform tasks and 
compare their abilities relative to others in their group. This forms their task specific 
self-concept and a general self-concept. In the second stage, individuals are put into a 
new peer group in which they perform the same tasks. The self-concepts formed in the 
first stage affects their costs of effort for each task in the second stage.38 Individuals now 
allocate effort to each task to maximise output for a given level of effort and ability. In 
this simplified model we assume that individuals do not include later rank directly in 
their objective function. 
Without losing generality, we apply this to the education setting where students vary 
in ability across subjects and are randomly allocated to primary schools where they form 
a self-concept in each subject during the first stage. This is generated through students 
interacting with their peers, such as observing who answers questions, and teacher 
grading. For the purposes of the model, we assume that students exert no effort during 
primary school, with outcomes being a product of ability and school factors.  
In the second stage, we model students as grade maximising agents for a given total 
cost of effort 6		and subject ability level j	. The grade achieved Y, by a student i in 
subject s is a function of ability j	  and effort n	  according to a to a separable 
production function where there are decreasing returns to effort in each subject, 0<κ<1. 
For simplicity of notation, assume that there are only two subjects, s ={e, m}. The 
productivity of effort is additionally effected by subject specific school factors . The 
total test score of individual i is the sum of this function over subjects, therefore, for 
student i in school 	 the education production is: 
 	 = 	!oj	^ , n	^' + !oj	\	, n	\' = CJ ∙ j	^ ∙ n	^κ +	C3 ∙ j	\ ∙ n	\κ  (11) 
This can be rearranged in terms of n	^ so that an isoquant (rs) can be drawn for a 
given total grades 	, subject abilities and school effects, all the combinations of subject 
effort (see Figure 1). 
                                                   
38
 Self-concept instead affect an agent’s ability in a task rather than cost of effort. This would lead to 
the same predicted changes in the effort ratios and empirical results. Given the data available, we are 
unable to determine if it is costs or abilities that are affected. With information on time allocated on 
each task a positive relationship with rank would imply cost reductions, whereas no changes or 
decreases would imply gains in ability.  We have chosen costs, as this is the more parsimonious and 
intuitive of the two.    
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  n	^ = "m8<t8u∙?8u∙v8u
w
t8x∙?8x	 %
y
w
  (12) 
The self-concept of each subject that was generated in the first stage determines the 
student’s cost of effort. Those with a positive self-concept will find the cost of effort 
lower for example when faced with a difficult mathematics question, a student who 
considers herself good at mathematics would spend longer looking for a solution, 
compared to another student who may give up. Therefore, the cost of subject effort z	is 
a decreasing function of school subject rank , { = Vo'	HℎJKJ	V < 0. We assume 
costs of subject effort are linear in effort applied to that subject. We also allow for a 
general cost of effort {	|, which varies across individuals according to general academic 
self-concept and is a decreasing function of ranks in all subjects, 
{| = }o\, ^'	HℎJKJ	}o' < 0  for s={m,e}. This general cost function reflects a 
student’s general attitude towards education, and is linear in the sum of effort applied 
across all subjects, n	\ + n	^. The total cost of effort 6 that a student can apply is fixed, 
however the inclusion of a general cost of academic effort term, means that the total 
effort applied by a student is very flexible. 
  6	 ≥ {	\ ∙ n	\ + {	^ ∙ n	^ + {	| ∙ on	\ + n	^'  (13) 
This allows for an isocost line to be drawn using the cost of effort in each subject as 
the factor prices for a given total effort (see Figure 1, Panel A). There is additionally a 
non-binding time constraint, normalising the total time available to one, n	^ + n	\ < 1. 
As standard, the solution is where the technical rate of substitution equals the relative 
factor prices i.e. where the isoquant and isocost lines are tangential. 
 
Therefore student i wants to maximise total grades by solving: 
maxvxvu on^ , n\' = !on^' + !on\' 
 = J ∙ j^ ∙ n^κ +	3 ∙ j\ ∙ n\κ  (11) 
 D. .		6 ≥ {^ ∙ n^ + {\ ∙ n\ + {| ∙ on\ + n^'    (13) 
1 > n^ + n\    
 
Y =  − o6 − {^n^ − {\n\ − {| ∙ on\ + n^'' 
]
vx = 0	 → 	
m
vx = 	o{^ + {|'  
]
vu = 0	 → 	
m
vu = 	o{\ + {|'   
]
 = 0	 → {^n	^ + {\n\ + {| ∙ on\ + n	^' = 6  
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m
v: = 	κ ∙ D ∙ j ∙ nκ<    
Therefore		
κ ∙  ∙ j ∙ nD−1 = 	o{D + {V' 
Where  λ reflects the marginal grade per effort and λ>0 
κ ∙ J ∙ j^nκ^<
o{^ + {|' =  =
κ ∙ 3 ∙ j\n\κ<
o{\ + {|'  
This gives  
 
ox'
ou' =
J∙?x∙vxκy
3∙?u∙vuκy (14) 
It is also clear that given this specification effort exerted in a specific subject is 
dependent on the student’s ability and cost of effort in that subject and general self-
concept. 
 n	∗ = o8:'κ∙D∙?8: 
y
κy
  (15) 
In the above λ reflects the marginal grade per effort where λ>0. As costs are decreasing 
in subject rank and 0 < κ <1 any increase in rank in subject s will increase the later 
effort allocated to that subject. A student with an improved English self-concept would 
now have a lower cost of learning English and therefore increase their English to math 
effort ratio. The reduced costs also induce an income effect as more effort can be 
allocated for the same total effort costs. The isocost line shifts outwards and a higher 
isoquant can be reached (Figure 1 Panel B). This student would now optimally chose to 
exert more effort in English on > n0' and less effort in math oB < B0'. As a result, 
the total grades that can be achieved for a given cost of effort and ability level is higher.  
This has yet to take into account the reduction in general academic costs of effort 
{|,	due to a increase in general self-concept. An increase in general academic self-
concept would reduce the cost for both subjects, and so there would only be an income 
effect. This shifts the isocost curve out, increasing the maximum possible English and 
Math effort that could be allocated (Figure 1 Panel C). Given this specification, the final 
effect on math effort is ambiguous, as it depends on the shape and position on the 
isoquants and the importance of general self-concept. 
For the estimations that used the variation in rank within student, the individual 
effects absorb any individual general academic confidence gained by being ranked 
highly. These estimations are therefore equivalent to the case where  {| is fixed and 
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we’re just looking at the effect allocation across subjects. The specifications that do not 
include individual effects and instead use the within class variation do allow for spillover 
effects between subjects and so there can be general gains in confidence. This is the intuition 
for why the parameters recovered from the student effects estimations are smaller than those 
from the school cohort effect estimations. This two-subject example is for exposition only 
but easily extends to the setting where an individual is maximising total grades over 
three subjects.  
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Appendix Figure A1: Optimal Allocation of Effort 
Panel A 
  
Panel B  
 
Panel C 
 
 
 
  
Isoquant  r0: 
 n^0 = "m<tu∙?u∙vu
w
tx∙?x	 %
y
w
 
Optimal English effort n^0  and math effort 
n\0 , given cost of English and math effort  
{^s , {\s . Marginal cost of effort equals 
marginal test score gain where isoquant and 
isocost curve are tangential.  
 
Isoquant  r: 
 n^ = "my<tu∙?u∙vuy
w
tx∙?x	 %
y
w
 
A higher rank in English, improves English 
self-concept and reduces cost of effort in 
English {^0>{^ . Shifts isocost line out to 
new intercept on English axis. Increase 
English effort n^0 < n^  and decrease math 
effort n\s > n\  
 
Isoquant  r: 
 n^ = "my<tu∙?u∙vu
w
tx∙?x	 %
y
w
 
A higher rank in English, also improves 
general self-concept and reduces cost of effort 
in both subjects {>{ . Shifts isocost line 
out to new intercept on both axis. This 
increases effort applied in both subjects 
n < n.  
Total effects: More effort applied to English  
n^ > n^0, ambiguous effect on math. 
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Table A3: Descriptive Statistics of LSYPE Sample 
Mean S.D. Min Max 
Panel A: Student Characteristics 
Age 11 test scores     
KS2 English 49.48 27.77 1 100 
KS2 Math 50.11 28.37 1 100 
KS2 Science 48.69 28.30 1 100 
Within Student KS2 S.D.  12.71 7.69 0 47.44 
Age 14 test scores     
KS3 English 50.67 28.00 1 100 
KS3 Math 52.99 27.61 1 100 
KS3 Science 52.21 27.71 1 100 
Within Student KS3 S.D.  12.71 7.69 0 47.44 
 
Panel B: Rank Characteristics 
Rank English 0.491 0.295 0 1 
Rank Math 0.496 0.297 0 1 
Rank Science 0.482 0.294 0 1 
Within Student Rank S.D. 0.140 0.086 0 0.49 
 
Panel C: Background Characteristics 
SEN 0.166 0.372 0 1 
FSME 0.186 0.389 0 1 
Male 0.498 0.500 0 1 
Ethnicity 
White British 0.651 0.477 0 1 
Other White 0.026 0.159 0 1 
Asian 0.175 0.380 0 1 
Black 0.081 0.273 0 1 
Chinese 0.002 0.048 0 1 
Mixed 0.002 0.046 0 1 
Other 0.035 0.184 0 1 
Unknown 0.028 0.164 0 1 
Notes: 34,674 observations from the cohort who took KS2 in 2001 and KS3 in 2004. Test 
scores are percentalized tests scores by cohort-subject. 
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Table A4: Descriptive Statistics Top and Bottom Ranked Students  
 
Panel A: Top 
 National 
Average 
Ranked in Top 
5% Nationally 
(Age 11) 
Ranked in Top 
5% of Primary 
School (Age 11) 
Self-concept 
Considered themselves: 
Very Good 
Male 49.9% 49.3% 49.5% 53.5% 
FSME 14.6% 4.8% 8.1% 18.5% 
SEN 17.5% 2.2% 2.8% 11.2% 
Minority 16.3% 13.8% 15.5% 41.1% 
Obs. 6,815,997 353,464 365,176 8,192 
     
Panel B:Bottom 
 National 
Average 
Ranked in 
Bottom 5% 
Nationally  
(Age 11) 
Ranked in 
Bottom 5% of 
Primary School 
(Age 11) 
Self-concept 
Considered themselves: 
Not Good 
Male 49.9% 50.9% 51.5% 44.6% 
FSME 14.6% 30.8% 23.7% 20.1% 
SEN 17.5% 68.8% 61.4% 25.2% 
Minority 16.3% 22.1% 17.9% 28.8% 
Obs. 6,815,997 280,675 467,208 5,211 
Notes: Data from 5 cohorts. Cohort 1 is age 11 in 2001 and age 14 in 2004, which is the only 
cohort we have self-concept measures for from the LSYPE dataset. Student characteristics are 
ethnicity, gender, free school meal (FSME) and special educational needs (SEN), minority is 
non-white.   
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Appendix Table A5: Descriptive Statistics of Self-Concept, National and 
Local Rank  
 
National Percentile Rank  
Age 11  
Local School Rank*100 
Age 11 
 
Share Mean 10th 90th   Mean 10th  90th  Obs. 
How good do you think you are at… 
 
Panel A: …English? 
 
Not Good At All 1.1% 28 4 62  27 0 62 132 
Not Very Good 13.5% 35 7 70  33 3 73 1563 
Don't Know 0.1% 31 10 53  35 0 63 11 
Fairly Good 62.5% 49 12 85  48 9 88 7222 
Very Good 22.8% 62 21 95  63 20 96 2630 
 
Panel B:…Math? 
 
Not Good At All 1.6% 25 3 56  22 0 56 188 
Not Very Good 11.9% 31 5 62  29 2 64 1377 
Don't Know 0.1% 53 12 90  56 10 93 15 
Fairly Good 63.8% 47 12 85  47 9 86 7371 
Very Good 22.6% 70 30 97  71 31 98 2607 
 
Panel C:…Science? 
 
Not Good At All 2.1% 32 5 64  31 3 70 237 
Not Very Good 14.8% 37 6 76  36 3 75 1714 
Don't Know 0.2% 38 17 76  40 11 68 21 
Fairly Good 57.4% 48 10 86  47 8 88 6631 
Very Good 25.6% 59 17 94  60 18 95 2955 
Notes: Results obtained from 11,558 student observations and 34,674 student-subject observations 
from LSYPE sample. Mean confidence is 0.91 with a standard deviation of 0.99. 
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Appendix Table A6: Age 14 Test Scores on Rank (showing controls) 
 
(Raw) (1) (2) (3) 
 
Panel A: The effect of primary rank 
Primary Rank  11.001** 7.960** 7.901** 4.562** 
0.298 0.145 0.146 0.132 
Male 
-0.912** -1.007** -0.833**  
0.070 0.045 0.021  
Free School Meal Eligible 
-6.451** -2.962** -2.651**  
0.070 0.030 0.027  
Special Educational Needs 
-5.148** -4.401** -4.308**  
0.047 0.033 0.032  
Non-White British 1.201** 1.873** 1.526**  
0.122 0.525 0.045  
Cohort Effects  Abs Abs Abs 
Subject Effects  Abs Abs Abs 
Cubic Key Stage 2 controls      
Primary-cohort-subject Effects     
Secondary Effects   Abs Abs 
Secondary-cohort-subject Effects     
Student Effects      
Notes: Results obtained from twelve separate regressions based on 2,271,999 student observations 
and 6,815,997 student-subject observations. The dependent variable is by cohort by subject 
percentalized KS3 test scores. All specifications control for Key Stage 2 results, student 
characteristics, cohort effects and subject effects. Science is the reference subjects, and the second 
cohort is the reference cohort.  Student characteristics are ethnicity, gender, free school meal (FSME) 
and special educational needs (SEN). Coefficients in columns (2) and (3) are estimated using Stata 
command reg2hdfe allowing two high dimensional fixed effects to be absorbed. Standard errors in 
italics and clustered at 3,800 secondary schools. Abs indicates that the effect is absorbed by another 
estimated effect.  ** 1% sig. 
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1 Introduction 
International students bring considerable revenue to universities across the world, 
through their rising numbers and by paying higher tution fees than domestic students. A 
critical policy question is whether, because of their increasing numbers, these students 
take the places of natives or whether the additional income they generate acts to 
subsidise domestic students. This forms the subject matter of this study where we ask 
the question: do international students crowd out, or crowd in, domestic students to the 
UK higher education sector? 
There have been very rapid and sizable increases in the number of international 
students globally, with 4.3 million students currently registered as studying abroad 
(OECD, 2013). Universities in the UK have been in a prime position to recruit these 
international students. They are generally considered to be of a high quality, with a 
number of universities placing very high in international world rankings.1 Furthermore, 
given that English is the major lingua franca of business and academia, universities in 
English-speaking countries have a clear advantage in attracting international students. 
Thus, the UK ranks second, after Australia, in the percentage of enrolled university 
students who come from overseas (OECD, 2013).  
Aggregate figures show that the total number of overseas students in UK universities 
has quadrupled since the 1994/1995 academic year, standing at 266 thousand full-time 
students by 2011/12. The postgraduate sector has seen the highest growth in overseas 
students in terms of proportions and absolute numbers. There are now over five times as 
many overseas taught postgraduates than there were in 1994/95, increasing from 28 
thousand then to 140 thousand by 20011/12. Overseas typically pay higher tuition fees 
than domestic students and, as such, have become a major source of income for the UK 
HE sector, with estimates suggesting they currently contribute about 11.6 percent of the 
total income of the sector and 39 percent of all fee income from full time home and 
overseas students (HEIDI 2012), despite only making up 6% of students. 
                                                 
1
 For example, in Shanghai’s Jiao Tong University’s ranking two UK universities appear in the top 10 
world rankings and five in the top 50 (and nine in the top 100). 
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One test of whether there is crowd in or crowd out comes from studying correlations 
between changes in the number of domestic students and changes in the number of 
international students within universities over time.2 A negative association would 
correspond to crowd out (or displacement) and a positive one to crowd in (or 
subsidisation). This is not unlike the approach taken in the literature on immigration and 
the labour market where researchers look for possible displacement of native workers by 
immigrant flows (see, inter alia, Borjas, 1999, or  Card and DiNardo, 2000).  
However, as is the case with that literature, there are concerns related to endogenous 
sorting. In the case of HE it is common patterns of sorting to universities by domestic 
and overseas students which can render such estimates as biased.  To address these 
concerns, in our analysis we therefore use two separate methods in attempts to identify a 
relationship between changes in domestic and foreign students that ensures the direction 
of causation flows from foreign to domestic student numbers.  
The first of these has parallels with the labour economics literature on immigration 
where authors use the fact that immigrants from particular sending countries tend to 
settle in places where previous migrants from their country have settled (so called 
‘enclaves’).3 We adopt the same kind of exercise in terms of enrolment choices of 
international students. To do so, we use the historical share of students from a sending 
country attending a university department combined with current national changes in the 
stock of students from this country as a shift-share instrument to predict exogenous 
variations in the number of overseas students attending that university department.4  
A second approach considers the fact that there have been very rapid increases in the 
number of students enrolling in UK universities from China, especially in the 2000s. We 
use a change in Chinese visa regulations in combination with strong revealed subject 
preferences and price sensitivity amongst Chinese students as a predictor of overseas 
student growth across and within universities over time.5  
                                                 
2
 This approach is adopted in some US work, for example, Borjas (2007). 
3
 See Card (2005) or Card (2009). 
4
 More precisely, in our empirical work below, we look at field of study and university as that is the level 
of analysis that our data permits. See the Data Appendix for more detail. 
5
 The recent research on the effects of imports from China on the labour market and on firm productivity 
utilises big shifts in the Chinese share of imports to advanced countries in an analogous way (see Autor, 
Dorn and Hanson, 2013, and Bloom, Draca and Van Reenen, 2011). 
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We analyse administrative data for the entire UK population of Higher Education 
(HE) students over an eighteen year period (running from academic years 1994/95 
through to 2011/12) which covers the time period when rapid internationalisation of the 
UK HE sector occurred. We document the scale of the increased supply of overseas 
students to the HE sector and then analyse its effects on the number of domestic students 
and home fee paying students using the methods outlined above.6 The empirical analysis 
is carried out separately for undergraduates, taught postgraduates and research 
postgraduates. 
Given the high policy relevance of these questions, it seems very surprising that there 
is hardly any research on the issue of whether there is any crowding out of natives by 
foreigners in university enrolments. This has not been empirically examined in the UK, 
and there are just a couple of research papers in the US. Borjas (2007) examines 
enrolment trends in US graduate programs from 1978 to 1998 and reports no average 
effect of foreign students on natives in graduate programs.7 Hoxby (1998) examines if 
disadvantaged natives are affected by the presence of foreign students in higher 
education by exploiting a policy change in the fee structure in the Californian HE 
system. She also finds no significant effects, but does find indications that 
disadvantaged natives suffer a crowding out effect from immigrant students. Hoxby 
claims the likely mechanisms underpinning this work being through competition for 
affirmative action targets and financial aid.8   
To preview our main findings, we find no evidence that the big rise in international 
students enrolling in UK universities has crowded out domestic students. This is the case 
at undergraduate level and for taught and research postgraduates. Indeed, we find 
                                                 
6
 Home fee students include all EU students who are those eligible for government subsidies and fee 
regulations and therefore face lower fees than overseas students.    
7
 When extending his analysis to focus upon sub-groups, Borjas does find a significant negative effect for 
a subsample of native white males and demonstrates that this can neither be explained by demographics 
nor by a decline in demand for college places by males.   
8
 In terms of using similar methodological approaches to our analysis (and those of Borjas and Hoxby), 
but in the very different context of compulsory schooling, Betts (1998) and Gould, Lavy and Paserman 
(2004) report that increased immigrant inflows have significant adverse effects on the educational 
outcomes of native students. This is, of course, a very different setting and in the context of HE (and 
opposite to compulsory schooling) in HE foreign students are more likely to come from higher socio-
economic backgrounds. Other related schooling studies are Geay, McNally and Telhaj (2013) who look at 
non-native speakers in English schools and Ohinata and Van Ours (2013) who study immigrant children 
in Dutch schools. 
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evidence of subsidisation for postgraduates, especially on Master’s programmes. Thus 
the answer to the question posed in the title of the paper seems to be one of crowd in 
rather than crowd out. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 offers a description of the UK 
higher education sector and how it has changed over time, placing a particualr 
references on the changing mix of domestic and foreign students. Section 3 describes the 
data we use and the research designs that we implement. Section 4 reports the results, 
while section 5 offers some conclusions. 
2 The UK Higher Education Sector 
2.2  Long Run Participation Trends 
Figure 1 shows trends in higher education (HE) participation in the UK since the 
academic year 1981/82. In 1981/82 the participation rate in higher education for the 
appropriate age cohort (i.e. the flow of individuals participating at that time) was just 
over one in ten. It went up very rapidly during the 1990s expansion and has continued to 
rise, reaching 40 percent by the academic year 2011/12.  
Thus, many more young people now attend higher education than in the past. 
Abstracting away from whether or not this is a good thing, and the issues to do with 
whether richer individuals (or those from higher social class backgrounds) benefitted 
more from this expansion,9 the funding of HE changed radically over time period. The 
system moved from one of being broadly ‘free’ (i.e. non-fee paying with maintenance 
grants for students) to one where students pay fees and no longer receive maintenance 
grants, but have to take out loans to fund their education.10 
As described in the introduction, there has also been a rapid expansion of the number 
of non-UK students attending UK universities. There are a number of reasons for this 
(which we detail below) as it has become evident that universities themselves have had 
become more reliant on generating more income from these international students.  
                                                 
9
 For discussion of the social mobility implications of HE expansion see Blanden and Machin (2004) or Lindley and 
Machin (2012). 
10
 For more detail see Dearden, Fitzsimons, Goodman and Kaplan (2008) or Dearden, Fitzsimons and Wyness (2013). 
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Our focus in this paper is on the implications of this for UK students. Has the 
increased number of foreign students crowded out domestic students? Or has the 
increased income that universities receive from foreign students (typically charged at 
higher fees than domestic students11) enabled universities to take on home students and 
effectively crowded them in?  
We study these questions using administrative data on the entire UK HE population 
over the 1994/95 to 2011/12 academic years. The start year is because of the creation of 
the so-called ‘new’ universities who we wish to include in our analysis and because 
consistently defined data from the Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) begins 
from then. Our analysis uses data covering the vast majority of students enrolled in 
universities over this time period, covering 161 universities in our full sample and 144 
in the balanced panel who are observed in every year (more details on the data are given 
below and in the Data Appendix). 
2.3  Trends in Student Numbers from 1994/5 to 2011/12 
As already noted, the size of the UK HE sector has been rapidly growing. Table 1 
shows summary statistics from our data, for the unbalanced and balanced panels of 
universities. As the numbers in Table 1 show, the total number of full-time students in 
all universities in the sample (the columns labelled ‘full sample’) increased from 1.06 
million in the 1994/95 academic year to 1.65 million in the 2011/12 academic year. In 
1994/95 there were 65 thousand international students enrolled – or around 6 percent. 
By 2011/12 this had risen to 246 thousand, or around 15 percent of all (full-time) 
students. 
Sharp increases in the relative numbers of international students have occurred at 
both undergraduate level and at postgraduate level. Figure 2 shows trends over time 
(where the numbers of each are indexed at 1 in 1994/95) in the numbers of domestic and 
foreign undergraduates, taught postgraduates and research postgraduates. The relative 
                                                 
11
 Average international fees for an undergraduate (postgraduate) course were  £9,360 (£9,520) in 2009/10 (Murphy, 
2014). Comparatively for domestic undergraduates universities received £3,000 in fees and a mínimum of £3,947 in 
subsidies from the Government, dependent on subject and location. 
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increase is clear for all three, but is especially marked amongst full-time taught 
postgraduates. 
2.4  Rules on University Admissions 
It is worth noting that because of government funding of places for home 
undergraduates and taught postgraduates there is a constraint on growth during this time 
period due to government quotas. During this period universities educating these 
students received funding from the Higher Education Funding Council for England 
(HEFCE), who set a Student Control Number (SCN) dictating the maximum number of 
home fee students allowed to be enrolled by each university.12 Universities who took on 
more home students than they were allocated were issued a fine per student. At the same 
time universities were allowed to under-recruit by up to 5 percent and still get funding 
for the full amount, which obviously acted to increase per-pupil funding. Universities 
could choose not to count all taught postgraduate students against its Student Control 
Number, foregoing any government funding for these students.13 
At the same time, universities were allowed to bid for Additional Student Numbers 
(ASN) to increase its SCN and its teaching grant accordingly. The way in which HEFCE 
awarded these ASNs changed over time.  Prior to 2000/01 they were allocated according 
to government plans for growth of student numbers by region and subject area or for 
specific projects. From 2000/01, this was amended so that institutions could submit 
proposals for ASN. For an application to be successful an institution needed to have 
filled its existing student places, show excellence and provide evidence that there is 
demand for additional places. One feature of this was for universities to use overseas 
students as a signal of this demand. This potentially allowed the number of overseas 
students to influence the number of domestic students, even with government quotas. 
From 2005 the government suspended competitive ASN bids and once again allocated 
additional places according to specific developments or goals.  
                                                 
12
 Government funding was dependent on the location of the university and the cost of the subject taught. There are 
four subject categories which are given cost weightings; Class D courses involves only lectures have weight 1; Class 
C courses have a fieldwork or studio element have weight 1.3; Class B courses are laboratory-based subjects and have 
a weight of 1.7; Class A courses are medicine and dentistry and have a weight of 4. 
13
 To do this the fees charged for the course need to exceed the teaching subsidy per student (£3,951) plus an 
assumed fee (£3,591).  
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Funding for research postgraduate students was not subject to these caps. Funding for 
these students is allocated in proportion to the number of home research postgraduates 
in their first 3 years of full time study (6 years for part time) in departments rated 4+ in 
the previous Research Assessment Exercise (RAE), weighted by London residence and 
subject costs. This is unrestricted funding with no caps on the maximum amounts of 
students at a university, however the total amount of money is capped and split amongst 
institutions. 
By contrast to these regulations on home students, overseas students receive no 
government subsidies, and therefore have no limits to the number enrolled by individual 
institutions. The only limiting factor is the number of overseas student visas approved 
by the UK immigration office and from the sending country.  
Hence the very large growth in the number of overseas students documented in 
Figure 2 and Table 1. By the 2011/12 academic year, there were 115 percent more 
research postgraduates, 229 percent more undergraduates and 547 percent more taught 
postgraduates from overseas as compared to 1994/95.  
In addition to domestic students and overseas students are non-UK European Union 
(EU) students. EU regulations mean that all students domiciled in the EU are required to 
be treated in the same way. This means that all UK and EU students pay the same fees 
and are referred to as home students. A further consequence of this is that EU students 
receive the same funding as an equivalent domestic students and it is for this reason that 
they come under the same quota system as domestic students.14  
 
                                                 
14
 Therefore non-UK EU students displace domestic students on a one-for-one basis. In our empirical work, we 
thus show results treating UK only and UK plus EU students as domestic students and home fee students. As one 
would expect, given that from a university funding perspective the students are equivalent, results prove to be rather 
similar. In 2011/2012 non-UK EU students comprised 4 percent of home fee undergraduates, percent of taught 
postgraduates and 21 percent of research postgraduates (see Table 1). 
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2.5 Origin Countries of Overseas Students 
The composition of overseas students has remained relatively stable over this time 
period by broad region of origin.15 Figure 3 shows Asia to be by far the largest source 
region of students, followed by Africa and then North America.  
However, as Figure 3 also shows, there has been one large and notable change in the 
composition of overseas students, namely the influx of Chinese students. In 1995 there 
were 1,510 Chinese students amongst all UK universities studying full time at any level. 
This remained fairly stable until 1998, after which it began where it began to increase 
rapidly, almost doubling year on year between 2000 and 2003. By 2005 there were 
39,820 Chinese students, corresponding to an enormous 1,900 percent increase over a 
seven year period. Again this remained stable until 2009 when the number began 
growing quickly, the Chinese now account for more 4 percent of all students and 26 
percent of all overseas students.  
The rapid expansion and subsequent levelling off in these numbers was caused by a 
change in the Chinese visa licencing for students. In 1999 the Chinese Government 
introduced new regulations16 which allowed for the formations of licencing agencies 
making it considerably easier for self-funded Chinese students to study abroad. 
Although it had been possible to self-fund since 198117, international study was still 
characterised by around 5000 government funded students from the leading universities 
being sent to strategically productive placements abroad. The opening of these agencies 
dramatically increased the size of the self-funded sector, in 1998 there were 11,443 self-
funded students, by 2002 there were 117,000 (Li and Zhang, 2010). 
The self-funded nature of Chinese students has meant they are very concentrated in 
certain fields of study. Figures A1 and A2 in the Appendix clearly show these strong 
subject preferences. The subjects with the largest increase in numbers were Business & 
Management, Maths & Computing, Economics and Engineering, whilst there is very 
little growth in the remaining subjects. Furthermore given that Chinese students became 
                                                 
15
 Countries were grouped to the following broad regions using NSCC groupings; Africa, Asia, Europe (EU and 
Non EU), Middle East, North America and the Rest of the World.   
16
 Regulations for the Administration of Intermediary Agencies for Self-Funded Study Abroad 1999 (PRC). 
17
 State Council – Interim Provisions for Study Abroad with Self-funding. 
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predominately self-funded they also became more price responsive. Prior to 1998 the 
demand of student places by Chinese students was unlikely to be responsive to the 
British Pound: Yuan exchange rate. After then the exchange rate became potentially 
more important as a determinant of the number of Chinese students, a feature we exploit 
in our empirical strategy below. 
3  Data and Research Designs 
3.2  Data Description 
The administrative data we use comes from the Higher Education Statistical Agency 
(HESA) and contains information on all full time students studying at higher education 
institutions between the academic years 1994/95 and 2011/12, comprising 18.6 million 
individuals in total. We have count data for universities broken down across the 
following groups: 165 subject areas, 267 domiciles of origin, 3 levels of study, 3 fee 
statuses and 2 genders over 18 years.18 
We conduct separate analyses for undergraduates, taught postgraduates and research 
postgraduates. To eliminate the issue of universities opening and closing (which could 
result in spurious results) we use a balanced panel of universities. This is defined as 
including those with a positive student count for each of the levels (UG, PGT, and PGR) 
in all of the years. This brings our sample to 144 institutions.19 Summary statistics are 
shown in Table 1 (in the columns labelled ‘balanced panel’). It is evident that our 
sample contains the vast majority of students as compared to the full sample (where 
there were 149 universities in 1994/95 and 161 in 2011/12), suggesting any entrants or 
exit are small. 
There are many university courses on offer at UK universities. We have data on 165 
distinct fields of study categories. During the early years of our data, the number of 
overseas students was relatively small in some universities and so therefore to ensure 
that there were sufficient non-zero shares of students from countries, we aggregated 
groupings of related subjects. The 165 subjects are grouped into 5 subject areas; (1) 
                                                 
18
 So, as an example, in a given academic year  we can calculate the number of male French students at Oxford paying home fees 
who are studying physics at undergraduate level. 
19
 For the 41universities that merge during the time period, we consider them as one university throughout our sample period. 
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Medicine, dentistry and subjects allied to medicine; (2) Sciences; (3) Social Sciences, 
Law and Business, (4) English, Languages and History; and (5) Creative arts, design and 
education.  
Table 1 shows student numbers in each of these five groups, and also in twelve 
smaller groups which we can look at for some of our analysis (the part on Chinese 
student inflows) when we focus on a university panel rather than a field of study by 
university panel.20 More details on these, and other definitional aspects of the data, are 
given in the Data Description in the Appendix. 
3.3  Modelling Approach 
Our initial research set up borrows from the related literature (in terms of approach) 
that studies the impacts of immigrant inflows on native outcomes. The most well-known 
work in this area studies the impact of inflows on labour market outcomes, but there are 
also studies looking at other outcomes like crime, use of public services and education.21 
When considering the impact of immigrant flows on native outcomes, various 
authors (like Borjas, 2006, and Card, 2007) have set up empirical specifications to net 
out problems to do with initial conditions and mechanical biases. Peri and Sparber 
(2011) summarise these arguments and claim that, in the context of spatial variations 
across cities, the best representation relates changes in native or immigrant outcomes 
(employment in their case) that are scaled by the lagged size of their spatial unit (the 
city). Our analogous outcomes are domestic and international student numbers at study 
field by university level, so we develop a baseline estimating equation of the following 
form for subject by university i in year t:  
 it i,t-1 i,t-1 i it i,t-1 i,t-1 t it(D - D )/S = α + β (F - F )/S + T + ε  (1) 
where i denotes field of study by university, t denotes year, D is the number of domestic 
students, F is the number of international students, so that S = D + F, and the equation 
includes a full set of field of study by university fixed effects (αi) and time effects (Tt) 
                                                 
20
 Results using 12 subject areas instead of the 5 broad areas are available from the authors upon request. They are similar, but 
because of a higher preponderance of zeros the first stage results were not as strong. 
21
 Examples of studies of crime and immigration are, inter alia, Bell, Fasani and Machin (2013), on public services 
and immigration see Wadsworth (2013) and on education and migraton see Dustmann and Glitz (2011). 
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and an error term (εit). As the model is specified in changes it accounts for underlying 
differences across universities, with αi controlling for average growth rates by university 
field of study and Tt accounting for annual aggregate growth rates. Therefore, the 
identifying variation comes from deviations of growth rates from university field of 
study growth trends.   
In (1) β is the key parameter of interest for whether or not there is a crowding in or 
out within a university. A positive β is suggestive of subsidisation, whilst a negative β 
implies displacement. This coefficient can be interpreted as the number of domestic 
students who respond to each additional overseas student (e.g. a coefficient of -1 implies 
one-for-one crowding out). These estimates are not affected by cell size, nor is there any 
artificial correlation between the dependent and explanatory variable.   
Whilst equation (1) is quite stringent in that it specifies the relationship in terms of 
within field of study by university changes and includes a full set of fixed effects, it does 
not (unless these fixed effects factor out any possible bias) account for the potential 
endogeneity of overseas demand. This is important as universities that experience 
shocks, such as changes in university rankings or new teaching buildings, may affect the 
supply or demand of places for domestic and overseas students simultaneously. To 
address this issue of common unobserved shocks, we use instrumental variable 
techniques to generate an exogenous source of variation in the number of overseas 
students at university subject area level.  
We adopt two approaches to do this. The first employs the shift share approach that 
has been commonly used in the immigration literature (e.g. by Card, 2009). This 
approach relies on prior immigrant settlement patterns as a source of identifying 
information. The idea rests on the notion that the current relative flow of immigrants to a 
city is related to historical population shares. The thought experiment is that a city with 
an historically high share of the immigrants from a particular source country, is more 
likely to experience growth when the national amount of immigrants from that source 
country increases, compared to a city with a low historical share. The key assumption is 
that the national inflow rates from each source country are exogenous to conditions of 
any city.  
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When thinking of university enrolments, the conceptual analogue is that individuals 
from a particular origin country are more likely to go to universities, and study subjects, 
where previous students attended. Anecdotally, this seems reasonable in that there are 
well known examples of students from particular countries studying the same kind of 
degrees in particular countries. Obviously it is an empirical question as to how strongly 
the instrument predicts. 
More formally, the instrumental variable we use to predict the change in the share of 
foreign students for field of study by university time is the following: 
 0 0
n
it cit ct ct
c=1
∆P = (F /F )∆F∑  (2) 
where we use the initial distribution of foreign students from country c and allocate 
the flow of foreign students from that country between period t and t+1, according to 
that distribution in time 0 and the total change in students from country c. We do this for 
1994/95 to 1998/99 as the initial time period and predict future annual flows (2001/02 to 
2011/12) to each university subject area.  This means there is year on year by university 
subject area variation generated from a combination of national inflow figures and the 
historical shares. 
From this we generate two instrumental variables. The first, IV1, groups all Non-EU 
countries together as one category. In this case c is an indicator for originating from 
non-home fee paying country. The second set, IV2, uses the shares on a country basis, 
so c represents the country of origin. IV2 has the benefit that, because it uses the 
proportion of students from an individual country, it allows for specific country 
university subject relationships. For example, if the science department at University A 
has a higher than average proportion of the national total of students from Non-EU 
country Z, then when the total amount of students from country Z increases we expect a 
larger than average increase in the number of overseas science students at University A. 
Furthermore if another Non-EU country Y which has no students at university A had an 
increase in their student numbers, this would not affect the number of overseas students 
at university A. Contrary to this method IV1 would use the share of Non-EU students as 
a whole, and any increase in the number of students from country Y at the national level 
would be in part allocated to university A.  
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The disadvantage of this method is that because IV2 uses specific country university 
subject area pairs, the proportion may be more liable to change over time. Even though 
these shares were generated over a four year period between 1995-8, some countries had 
little to no representations in some cells that have subsequently may have become more 
prominent. So any future increases in their numbers would not be reflected in predicted 
changes at that university subject level. The benefit of IV1 is that it captures the 
international character of a university, and therefore does not rely on specific countries 
to be present at a university during the 1995-8 period. The key assumption remains that 
the national inflow rates from each source country are exogenous to conditions in a 
particular university department. This is likely to be the case given that we have 570 
university subject cells, each only contributing a small amount to the total.  
The shift share approach assumes that historical shares of students at university 
departments are informative about current flows. It turns out that this is typically true as 
our results that the location patterns for past students are strongly reflective of where 
later students chose to study. However, for reasons we have already discussed, this is 
not likely to hold for China, which is an important country during this period of 
expansion. Prior to 1998 the majority of Chinese students were granted a student visa if 
their choice of course was supported by the state. However, once self-sponsorship 
became easier, the numbers of Chinese students studying Business or Economics 
increased very rapidly indeed.  
We thus focus on inflows of Chinese students in detail and implement an alternative 
IV strategy which uses the Chinese policy change as a source of exogenous variation in 
the change in number of Chinese students attending UK universities. After the 
simplification of the Chinese student visa application process the number of overseas 
students studying Business or Economics rapidly increased.  
This increase is shown very clearly in Figure 4 which shows big increases, for these 
two growth subjects. Figure 4 also (like the earlier Figure 3) shows that the majority of 
the growth occurs between 1999/2000 and 2004/05. Then, after a lull, a second strong 
growth phase occurred from 2008/09 to 2011/12. Interestingly, this occurred after the 
Chinese Yuan huge 80 percent appreciation against the Great British Pound during 
2008, as is shown in Figure A3 of the Appendix.  
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It is evident that, with the increase in self sponsored students the number of Chinese 
students attending UK universities became increasingly dependent on the exchange rate. 
Table 2 shows the price sensitivity of Chinese students before and after the visa reform. 
The results show that changes in the number of Chinese students were uncorrelated with 
the exchange rate prior to the reform (when they were predominantly funded by the 
Chinese Government), but were significantly correlated post reform. Moreover, it is the 
growth subjects are the most sensitive to exchange rate fluctuations.    
Therefore to implement an instrumental variable strategy in the study of changing 
Chinese student numbers we generate an indicator variable for each growth subject post 
reform, plus a growth indicator interacted with the Yuan:Pound exchange rate. We argue 
that these sources of overseas student growth are exogenous to university departments in 
the UK and so we use these combinations as instruments for the change in the number of 
overseas students at a university department.  
4 Results  
4.2  University by Field of Study Panel 
Table 3 shows estimates of equation (1) for undergraduates, taught postgraduates and 
research postgraduates. Two specifications are reported for each, one where the 
dependent variable is the proportional change in the number of home students (i.e. UK 
and EU students) and one where it is the proportional change in the number of domestic 
students (i.e. UK only). The first row of  Table 3 shows ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimates, and the second row shows the two stage least squares (2SLS) estimates. The 
first stages corresponding to the latter (which are the same for the home and domestic 
specifications) are reported below these, together with associated F-statistics for the 
instruments. 
The first thing to note from the Table is that all the OLS coefficients are estimated to 
be positive, and statistically significant, implying no evidence of crowd out. However, 
for the reasons articulated above, we need to consider what happens when we allow for 
common shocks to affect both changes in domestic and foreign students via our 
instrumental variable strategy. The F-tests reported for the first stage show that the 
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instruments are very good predictors of the change in foreign students (they are all 
above 10, and some strongly so). Thus transposing over the enclave idea that has been 
exploited in the immigration literature to the inflow of foreign students to specific fields 
of study and university seems to work well. The positive enclave effect is intuitively 
very plausible (i.e. that foreign students go to study the same subjects in the same 
universities as previous students from their home country did). Interestingly, the 2SLS 
estimates are, like the OLS estimates, all positive as well. Thus our evidence is much 
more in line with the notion of crowding in, where foreign students bring in additional 
income that can cross-subsidise domestic students, rather than crowding out. 
The pattern across the three groups of students is informative in this regard as well. 
The 2SLS estimates are significant and positive for the postgraduate groups, but not for 
the undergraduates. Thus for undergraduates, there is on average no crowd out or crowd 
in, but for postgraduates where universities have freedom to increase the number of 
home students and where fees can be sizable for foreign students, there is evidence of 
crowding in. The coefficient above unity for the taught postgraduates is suggestive that 
Master’s courses are the major place where this occurs. 
Table 4 reports separate estimates for the 20 Russell Group and 124 non-Russell 
Group universities in our sample.22 The evidence of crowd in seems to be more marked 
for the former group. This is not so surprising given their ability to recruit international 
students and that these top universities charge higher tuition fees and, in doing so, 
generate a significant income stream. Again there is little significant evidence of crowd 
in of undergraduate students, which is reflective of government restrictions on 
undergraduate numbers.   
4.3  Increases in Chinese Students 
We next move to the analysis of Chinese student inflows. To do so the estimating 
equation is structured as before, but the key independent variable of interest becomes 
changes in the number of Chinese students, C: 
 it i,t-1 i,t-1 i it i,t-1 i,t-1 t it(D - D )/S = α + β (C - C )/S + T + ε  (3) 
                                                 
22
 The full set of results, structured in the same way as Table 3 for the Russell Group and non-Russell Group 
universities are reported in Tables A2 and A3 in the appendix. 
Chapter 3. Paying Out and Crowding Out? 
100 
 
Table 5 shows the estimates of equation (3). The Table is structured in a similar way 
to Table 3, with OLS estimates in the first row, 2SLS estimates in the second and the 
first stages from the latter below. As with the panel analysis above, the OLS estimates 
all show positive estimated coefficients. Also in line with those results, the first stages 
using the reform/exchange rate instruments are strong, with one exception the research 
postgraduates. 
The 2SLS estimates from the undergraduate and taught postgraduate regressions are 
both positive, although the undergraduate estimate is imprecisely determined. The 
taught postgraduates estimate is of similar magnitude to the earlier results and offers 
strong evidence of crowd in. Thus it seems that increased enrolment of Chinese students 
on Master’s courses has become an important factor in generating income streams for 
UK universities that have also enabled universities to take on more domestic students in 
these subjects. 
The estimated 2SLS coefficient for research postgraduates is the only negative one 
we have been able to uncover in our entire empirical analysis. It is, however, close to 
zero and, owing to the weak first stage, is very poorly determined. This is likely due to 
the relatively small increases in the number of Chinese students undertaking research 
degrees. Again, this offers no evidence whatsoever for the hypothesis that foreign 
students have crowded out domestic students in UK universities. Thus both of our causal 
approaches reach the same conclusion. 
5  Conclusions 
In this paper we study the rapid inflows of international students to UK universities, 
asking the questions as to whether their increased enrolment and paying out of high fees 
has had any impact on the enrolment of domestic students. We frame this as a question 
of whether one can detect any evidence that their increased numbers have displaced 
domestic students or whether their increased numbers have gone hand-in-hand with 
increased numbers of domestic students. 
To properly consider this question, it is important to set up a research design that 
allows for common shocks that could cause numbers of domestic and foreign students to 
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covary with one another. We do this in two ways.  First, in a manner similar to that 
adopted in the immigration literature, we use the historical share of students from a 
sending country attending a university department combined with current national 
changes in the stock of students from this country as a shift-share instrument. Secondly, 
we use an exogenous change in the Chinese visa regulations and exchange rate in 
combination with strong revealed subject preferences as a predictor of overseas student 
growth.   
Using administrative data on the entire UK HE population over the 1994/5 to 
2011/12 academic years, in both of these approaches we find no evidence that the big 
rise in international students enrolling in UK universities has crowded out domestic 
students. This is the case at undergraduate level and for taught and research 
postgraduates. Indeed, in some cases we find evidence of subsidisation for 
postgraduates, especially on Master’s programmes where numbers of domestic and 
foreign students have covaried positively with one another as both have increased 
significantly through time. For undergraduates, there is little evidence of crowding in or 
crowding out. This is suggestive evidence that the government quotas on the number of 
domestic students has impeded growth. Despite this, the increased number of overseas 
students combined with their higher than average fees would still have resulted in higher 
funding per domestic student. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Student Attendance 
  Full Sample Balanced Sample 
 
1994/5 2011/12 
Percentage 
Change 
1994/5 2011/12 
Percentage 
Change 
 
      
Undergraduate Students       
Home 891.2 1240.7 39.2 873.2 1214.4 39.1 
Domestic 854.3 1165.7 36.5 836.9 1140.9 36.3 
Overseas 37.6 123.5 228.8 37.1 121.7 228.4 
Total 928.8 1372.8 47.8 910.2 1343.2 47.6 
 
      
Taught Postgraduate       
Home 69.1 101.2 46.5 68.0 99.3 46.2 
Domestic 59.1 77.7 31.3 58.1 76.1 30.9 
Overseas 15.0 96.9 547.1 14.7 95.4 549.9 
Total 84.1 199.9 137.8 82.6 196.1 137.4 
 
      
Research Postgraduate       
Home 32.7 48.0 46.7 32.1 47.1 46.8 
Domestic 27.9 37.3 33.7 27.4 36.6 33.6 
Overseas 12.0 25.8 114.9 11.9 25.4 114.0 
Total 44.7 74.0 65.5 44.0 72.7 65.3 
 
      
Subject Areas       
Medical  172.4 387.5 124.8 169.9 384.4 126.2 
Science 283.9 339.8 19.7 279.8 335.9 20.1 
Social Science 272.9 465.5 70.6 266.3 460.1 72.8 
Languages/History 140.8 206.1 46.3 137.6 201.5 46.5 
Arts & Other 187.5 247.9 32.2 183.2 246.5 34.5 
 
      
Medicine & Dentistry 96.8 215.9 123.0 94.7 214.7 126.7 
Biology & Veterinary  75.6 171.1 126.3 75.2 169.5 125.4 
Physical Sciences 66.1 73.6 11.3 65.1 73.1 12.3 
Maths & Computing 76.5 105.4 37.8 74.5 104.7 40.5 
Engineering 95.7 109.1 14.0 93.8 106.9 14.0 
Architecture & Technology 46.5 51.3 10.3 46.4 50.5 8.8 
Law & Social Studies 120.8 193 59.8 117.8 190.8 62.0 
Economics 22.7 34.7 52.9 21.7 33.9 56.2 
Business & Management 127.8 237.6 85.9 126.8 235.6 85.8 
Language & Humanities 140.8 206.1 46.4 137.6 201.5 46.4 
Education & Creative Arts 138.5 241.9 74.7 136.5 241.1 76.6 
Other & Combined 48.7 6 -87.7 46.7 5.4 -88.4 
 
      
Total Overseas Students 64.6 246.2 381.1 63.7 242.5 380.7 
Total Students 1057.6 1646.7 155.7 1036.8 1612.0 155.5 
Number of Universities 149 161  144 144  
 
      
Notes: Totals shown in 1000s. Source: HESA administrative data of full time students at UK HE institutions 
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Table 2: Changes in The Sensitivity of Chinese Students to Pound-Yuan Exchange Rate, Pre- and Post-Reform 
 Undergraduates Taught Postgraduates Research Postgraduates 
 
Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Change 
Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Change 
Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Change 
          
Business 
0.118 
0.159 
[300] 
0.496 
0.075 
[1400] 
0.378 
0.176 
-1.280 
0.670 
[301] 
2.050 
0.361 
[1600] 
3.330 
0.761 
-0.827 
1.064 
[281] 
-0.561 
0.262 
[1424] 
0.266 
1.096 
          
Economics 
0.016 
0.150 
[183] 
0.414 
0.116 
[854] 
0.398 
0.189 
0.102 
1.043 
[160] 
2.185 
1.521 
[713] 
2.287 
1.107 
-0.949 
1.271 
[194] 
-0.503 
0.416 
[836] 
0.447 
1.337 
          
All 
Subjects 
-0.021 
0.030 
[3156] 
0.113 
0.016 
[14728] 
0.134 
0.034 
-0.389 
0.148 
[2905] 
1.000 
0.099 
[14898] 
1.390 
0.178 
0.028 
0.210 
[3026] 
0.014 
0.034 
[14291] 
-0.017 
0.213 
          
 
Notes: This table presents the estimates from 18 regressions of the normalized change in Chinese students on the exchange rate, for 
undergraduates, taught postgraduates and research post graduates. A further nine regressions are in the Change columns to estimate the change 
in this relationship..  Robust standard errors in italics. Numbers of students in square brackets. Regressions are weighted by the appropriate 
mean of the student populations over the differenced years. Source: British Pound Sterling and Chinese Yuan exchange rate from the 
International Monetary Fund 
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Table 3: University by Field of Study (5) Panel Estimates 
 
Estimates of  
  it i,t-1 i,t-1 i it i,t-1 i,t-1 t it(D - D )/S = α + β (F - F )/S + T + ε  
 Undergraduates Taught 
Postgraduates 
Research 
Postgraduates 
 Home Domestic Home Domestic Home Domestic 
Ordinary Least Squares: 
Change in Foreign 
Students 
0.772 0.702 0.581 0.510 0.938 0.679 
0.297 0.288 0.286 0.257 0.252 0.157 
       
Two Stage Least Squares: Squares: 
Change in Foreign 
Students 
0.060 0.053 1.442 1.268 0.949 0.763 
0.364 0.341 0.889 0.802 0.139 0.144 
    
First Stage: IV1 0.182 1.052 1.465 
 0.159 0.288 0.305 
    
First Stage: IV2 0.496 -0.199 0.462 
 0.153 0.170 0.167 
    
F-Test 23.04 11.32 26.86 
    
Sample Size 7,444 7,444 6,945 6,945 6,514 6,514 
Number of 144 144 144 144 144 144 
       
 
Notes: All regressions include, year and subject-institution fixed effects, with robust standard errors in italics. 
Regressions are weighted by the appropriate mean of the student populations over the differenced years. 2SLS F 
statistic is based on the Kleinbergen-Paap Wald F statistic, allowing for non iid errors.    
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Table 4: University by Field of Study (5) Panel Estimates,  
Russell Group and Non-Russell Group Universities 
 
Estimates of  
it i,t-1 i,t-1 i it i,t-1 i,t-1 t it(D - D )/S = α + β (F - F )/S + T + ε  
 Undergraduates Taught 
Postgraduates 
Research 
Postgraduates 
 Home Domestic Home Domestic Home Domestic 
       
Panel A. Russell Group       
Two Stage Least  Squares:        
Change in Foreign 
Students 
2.241 2.140   2.286 2.092 0.866 0.683 
1.273 1.304 0.653 0.628 0.190 0.162 
F-Test for First Stage 4.99 7.44 21.69 
       
Sample Size 1167 1167 1179 1179 1172 1172 
Number of Universities 20 20 20 20 20 20 
       
Panel B. Non-Russell       
Two Stage Least Squares:       
Change in Foreign 
Students 
-0.034 -0.030 0.397 0.335 0.996 0.804 
0.396 0.371 0.155 0.138 0.177 0.145 
F-Test for First Stage 19.64 37.62 16.55 
       
Sample Size 6,277 6,277 5,342 5,342 5,766 5,766 
Number of Universities 124 124 124 124 124 124 
       
Notes: All regressions include, year and subject-institution fixed effects, with robust standard errors in brackets. 
Regressions are weighted by the appropriate mean of the student populations over the differenced years. 2SLS F 
statistic is based on the Kleinbergen-Paap Wald F statistic, allowing for non iid errors.    
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Table 5: Chinese Students, University Panel by Field of Study (11) 
Estimates 
 
Estimates of  
it i,t-1 i,t-1 i it i,t-1 i,t-1 t it(D - D )/S = α + β (C - C )/S + T + ε  
 Undergraduates Taught 
Postgraduates 
Research 
Postgraduates 
 Home Domestic Home Domestic Home Domestic 
Ordinary Least Squares: 
Change in Chinese 
Students 
0.487 0.540 0.388 0.577 1.111 1.587 
0.138 0.144 0.081 0.104 0.279 0.342 
Two Stage Least Squares: 
Change in Chinese 0.815 0.584 1.538 1.705 -0.112 -0.374 
 0.586 0.601 0.828 0.930 0.587 0.958 
First Stage:     
Business X Reform -0.029 -0.088 0.050 
 0.006 0.028 0.021 
Business X Reform  0.453 1.490 -0.602 
X Exchange Rate 0.074 0.352 0.254 
Economics X Reform -0.023 -0.091 0.048 
 0.009 0.082 0.031 
Economics X Reform  0.367 1.746 -0.558 
X Exchange Rate 0.111 1.055 0.397 
    
F-Test 29.03 15.93 2.36 
       
Sample Size 17,663 17,663 17,386 17,386 17,026 17,026 
Number of Universities 144 144 144 144 144 144 
 
      
Notes: All regressions include, year and subject-institution fixed effects, with robust standard errors in 
brackets. Regressions are weighted by the appropriate mean of the student populations over the differenced 
years. 2SLS F statistic is based on the Kleinbergen-Paap Wald F statistic, allowing for non iid errors. 
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Figure 1 Trends in UK Higher Education Participation 
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Notes: The Age Participation Index (API) is the number of domiciled young people (aged less than 21) who are initial 
entrants to full time and sandwich undergraduate courses as a percentage of the 18 to 19 year old GB population. The API 
was discontinued in 2001 and replaced by the Higher Education Initial Participation Rate (HEIPR), which has a different 
definition as it covers entrants to HE from different age groups (for the one reported here covering ages 17 to 20).  
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Figure 2: Growth of Full-time Students by Level and Domicile in UK Higher Education 
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Notes: Domestic students are all students domiciled in the UK paying 
Home fee levels. Overseas students are all Non-UK students paying Non-
Home fees. All totals rounded to nearest 100. Undergraduates; 1994/95- 
854,300 domestic, 37,600 overseas;  2011/12 - 1,165,700 domestic, 
123,500 overseas. Taught postgraduates: 1994/95- 59,100  domestic, 
15,000 overseas. 2011/12- 77,700  domestic, 96,900 overseas. Research 
postgraduates: 1994/95- 27,900 domestic, 12,000 overseas. 2011/12- 
37,300 domestic, 25,800 overseas  
Source: HESA 1994/5- 2011/12 administrative population data.  
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Figure 3: Flows of International Students to UK Higher Education 
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Source: HESA 1994/5- 2011/12 administrative population data.  
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Figure 4: Flows of Chinese Students in Growth and Other Subjects 
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Source: HESA 1994/5- 2011/12 administrative population data.  
Notes: Growth Subjects are ‘Business and Management’ and Economics 
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Appendix 1: Data Description 
1  Basic Processing of HESA Data  
We use HESA standard population measures from 1995 to 2012 (corresponding to 
the academic years 1994-1995 to 2011-2012), the maximum available amount of years 
with consistent data definitions. We use restricted to our analysis to the change in 
number of full time students in university subject areas. Full time students are defined as 
attending an institution for periods amounting to at least 24 weeks within the year of 
study and during those weeks studying at least 21 hours. Changes in student numbers 
are calculated on an annual basis and are standardised by the according total of the 
previous year. Weights are used in all calculations. Each observation is weighted by the 
mean student population of the lagged and previous year of the appropriate university 
subject areas.  
2  Higher Education Institutions 
There are 210 Higher Education Institutions in the UK over this time period. We 
have administrative data on 202 of these institutions. The missing universities are: 
Camborne School of Mines, Liverpool Hope University, Craigie College of Education, 
Duncan of Jordanstone College of Art, Manchester Business School, Welsh Agricultural 
College, University College Birmingham, and London Metropolitan University. They 
were not included as they either enrolled no students that met the student population 
definition or they had requested HESA not to release the data to researchers. Of the 202 
institutions 41 merged with another university during the observation period and so had 
their totals retrospectively aggregated. This makes the unbalanced panel of 161 
universities. Of these 17 are removed as they either open or close and therefore leaves us 
with a balanced panel of 144 of universities which are used in the final analysis. This 
consisted of the 144 universities that continually existed from 1995 to 2012.   
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3  Student Population 
We use the HESA Student record which has counts of all students registered at a 
reporting higher education institution (HE institution) who follow courses that lead to 
the award of a qualification(s) or institutional credit, excluding those registered as 
studying wholly overseas e.g. overseas sandwich year students. If it is known at the 
beginning of the course that a student will spend a block of eight weeks or more in the 
UK as part of their programme then they are included on the Student record throughout, 
and not included in the Aggregate offshore record. Moreover Postdoctoral students are 
also not included in the HESA Student record. 
From the HESA Student record the HESA standard HE population has is derived. It 
includes all higher education enrolments as at 1 December of the academic year, except: 
dormant students (those who have ceased studying but have not formally de-registered); 
incoming visiting and exchange students; students studying for the whole of their 
programme of study outside of the UK; students who left the institution prior to 1 
December of the academic year, or who commenced a programme of study after this 
date; students on sabbatical; writing-up students 
The population data is provided in the form of counts by specified student 
characteristics, e.g. total number of w level students from country x, paying fee level f 
studying subject y, at university z. These can be aggregated up to departmental, 
university or national levels for each of these categories. Brief definitions of these 
categories and how they are aggregated is given below.   
4  Student Levels 
The Level of Study refers to the qualification aim of the student. These are classified 
into four levels; First Degree, Other Undergraduate, Postgraduate Taught, 
Postgraduate Research.  
First Degree and Other Undergraduate refer to Bachelor degrees (BSc, BA, etc.), 
first degrees with Qualified Teacher Status and equivalents including foundation 
degrees, diplomas in higher education (including those with eligibility to register to 
practice with a health or social care or veterinary statutory regulatory body), Higher 
Chapter 3. Paying Out and Crowding Out? 
116 
 
National Diploma (HND), and Higher National Certificate (HNC). These levels were 
combined together to form the undergraduate population measure.  
Postgraduate Taught includes master’s degrees (MSc, MA, etc.), postgraduate 
bachelor’s degrees at level M and postgraduate diplomas or certificates not studied 
primarily through research, such as the Postgraduate Certificate in Education (PGCE). It 
will also include doctorate students not primarily taught through research. These form 
the second student level. 
Postgraduate Research refers to all students studying towards a doctorate, master’s 
degrees and postgraduate diplomas or certificates studied primarily through research. 
5  Country of Origin  
It is mandatory to collect the domicile of all students. These are mapped to countries 
using the National Statistics Country Classification 2006 grouping of countries 
(www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-method/classifications/current-standard-
classifications/national-statistics-country-classification/index.html) which provides 251 
domiciles. These were reduced down to 75 countries, grouping all countries with less 
than 5000 students-years in the UK over the entire 18 year period into one category. 
This represented 6.3 percent of the total population or 9.8 percent of the Non-UK 
population. Where no data is supplied about the student's domicile, fee eligibility is used 
to assign to either UK region unknown or Non-European-Union unknown. These 
countries were basis to form additional regional totals; Domestic-from the UK; EU – 
students domiciled in the EU accounting for the growth in the EU; Non-EU – remaining 
countries.  
6  Fee Level 
Students are either eligible to pay Home Fees or Overseas fees. All students resident 
in the UK and the remainder of the EU are subsidised by the UK government and are 
eligible to pay Home Fees. Home Fee was originally set at zero (free) for undergraduate 
students, but was increased to £1000 per year in 1998/9, a maximum of £3000 in 
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2006/7.23 The Home Fees for Taught and Research postgraduate students is unregulated 
but has remained comparatively low with median fees of £4000 in 2009/10 (Murphy, 
2014). All Non-EU students are not subsidised and therefore pay the full market rate for 
a course. These fees are considerably more with the average Overseas fees for 
undergraduates were £9,360 and £9,520 for postgraduate students. The data provided 
information on the fee status of each student; 1) Eligible to pay home fees (87%); 2) Not 
eligible to pay home fees (10%); and 3) Eligibility to pay home fees not assessed (2%). 
 
7  Subject of Study 
In the UK system students are studying always towards a particular subject goal. All 
subjects are categorised into JACS subject 161 codes consisting of a letter followed by a 
single digit, where the initial letter identifies the subject group. There are 20 major 
subject groups; 
1) Medicine & dentistry; 2) Subjects allied to medicine; 3) Biological sciences; 4) 
Veterinary & Agriculture science; 5) Physical sciences; 6) Mathematical & Computer 
science; 7) Engineering; 8) Mineral technology; 9) Architecture, building & planning; 
10) Social, economic & political studies; 11) Law; 12) Business & administrative 
studies; 13) Mass communications & documentation; 14) English/Classics; 15) 
European Languages; 16) Modern Languages; 17) Historical & philosophical studies; 
18) Creative arts & design; 19) Education; 20) Combined.  
During the first estimation method using the historical shares of students from 
country x studying subject y at university z. During the mid-1990’s there were fewer 
overseas students and therefore the subject areas were grouped into 5 major subject 
groups. For the second estimation method the growth over the whole period was use and 
therefore allowed to have more subject groupings, including separating the sub-group 
Economics from the major grouping of Social Science. The coding for these subject 
aggregations can be found in Data Appendix Table 1.  
 
                                                 
23
 After the end of the same the Home Fee tuition fee cap increased to £9000 in 2012/13. 
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8 Currency Exchange 
The British Pound Sterling and Chinese Yuan exchange rate is obtained from the 
International Monetary Fund   
(http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/data/param_rms_mth.aspx). This provided the daily 
exchange rates. The mean annual exchange rate was calculated on the academic year 
basis up until the September of that year. i.e. the mean exchange rate from September 1st 
1994 to August 30th 1995 is used for the academic year 1995-1996. This reflects the 
exchange rate when potential students were deciding which country/university to attend. 
9 Additional Data cleaning 
HESA advised that the student totals for Cambridge in 2006 were incorrectly 
recorded. Correspondingly totals were interpolated by averaging preceding and 
proceeding years. 
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Table A1: Subject Coding 
 
 JACS Subject Groups 5 Subject Groups 11 Subject Groups 
1 Medicine & dentistry 1  Medicine, Dentistry & allied subjects 1 Medicine & Dentistry 
2 Subjects allied to medicine 1  Medicine, Dentistry & allied subjects 1 Medicine & Dentistry 
3 Biological sciences 1  Medicine, Dentistry & allied subjects 2 Biology & Veterinary Sciences 
4 Veterinary & Agriculture science 1  Medicine, Dentistry & allied subjects 2 Biology & Veterinary Sciences 
5 Physical sciences 2 Sciences and MECT 3 Physical Sciences 
6 Mathematical & Computer science 2 Sciences and MECT 4 Maths & Computing 
7 Engineering 2 Sciences and MECT 5 Engineering 
8 Mineral technology 2 Sciences and MECT 6 Architecture & Technology 
9 Architecture, building & planning 2 Sciences and MECT 6 Architecture & Technology 
10 Social, economic & political studies 3  Social Sciences, Law & Business 7 Law & Social Studies 
11 Law 3  Social Sciences, Law & Business 8 Economics 
12 Business & administrative studies 3  Social Sciences, Law & Business 9 Business & Management 
13 Mass communications & documentation 4  English, Language & History 10 Language & Humanities 
14 English/Classics 4  English, Language & History 10 Language & Humanities 
15 European Languages 4  English, Language & History 10 Language & Humanities 
16 Modern Languages 4  English, Language & History 10 Language & Humanities 
17 Historical & philosophical studies 4  English, Language & History 10 Language & Humanities 
18 Creative arts & design 5  Creative Arts, Design, Education & Other 11 Education & Creative Arts 
19 Education 5  Creative Arts, Design, Education & Other 11 Education & Creative Arts 
20 Combined & Other NA Not Used  NA Not Used 
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Table A.2: Russell Group Universities by Field of Study (5) Panel 
Estimates 
 
Estimates of  
it i,t-1 i,t-1 i it i,t-1 i,t-1 t it(D - D )/S = α + β (F - F )/S + T + ε  
 Undergraduates Taught 
Postgraduates 
Research 
Postgraduates 
 Home Domestic Home Domestic Home Domestic 
Ordinary Least Squares:      
Change in Foreign 
Students 
0.806 0.714 2.241 1.943 0.743 0.554 
0.251 0.245 1.273 1.164 0.156 0.123 
Two Stage Least Squares:      
Change in Foreign 
Students 
2.241   2.140   2.286 2.092 0.866 0.683 
1.273 1.304 0.653 0.628 0.190 0.162 
    
First Stage: IV1 0.085 0.865 0.950 
 0.147 0.496 0.279 
First Stage: IV2 0.501 0.102 0.400 
 0.184 0.444 0.156 
    
F-Test 4.99 7.44 21.69 
       
Sample Size 1,167 1,167 1,179 1,179 1,172 1,172 
Number of Universities 20 20 20 20 20 20 
       
Notes: All regressions include, year and subject-institution fixed effects, with robust standard errors in 
italics. Regressions are weighted by the appropriate mean of the student populations over the differenced 
years. 2SLS F statistic is based on the Kleinbergen-Paap Wald F statistic, allowing for non iid errors.    
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Table A.3: Non-Russell Group Universities by Field of Study (5) Panel 
Estimates 
 
Estimates of  
it i,t-1 i,t-1 i it i,t-1 i,t-1 t it(D - D )/S = α + β (F - F )/S + T + ε  
 Undergraduates Taught 
Postgraduates 
Research 
Postgraduates 
 Home Domestic Home Domestic Home Domestic 
Ordinary Least Squares: 
Change in Foreign 0.718 0.703 0.292 0.260 0.955 0.689 
 
0.321 0.311 0.074 0.066 0.272 0.169 
Two Stage Least Squares: 
Change in Foreign 
Students 
-0.034 -0.030 0.397 0.335 0.996 0.804 
0.396 0.371 0.155 0.138 0.177 0.145 
       
First Stage: IV1 0.223 1.234 1.827 
 0.226 0.241 0.476 
First Stage: IV2 0.466 -0.265 0.449 
 0.165 0.184 0.214 
    
F-Test 19.64 37.62 16.55 
       
Sample Size 6,277 6,277 5,342 5,342 5,766 5,766 
Number of Universities 124 124 124 124 124 124 
       
Notes: All regressions include, year and subject-institution fixed effects, with robust standard errors in 
brackets. Regressions are weighted by the appropriate mean of the student populations over the 
differenced years. 2SLS F statistic is based on the Kleinbergen-Paap Wald F statistic, allowing for non 
iid errors.    
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Figure A1: Total Numbers of Chinese Students by Field of Study 
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Figure A2: Total Numbers of Undergraduate, Taught Postgraduate and 
Research Postgraduate Chinese Students by Field of Study 
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Figure A.3: Pound:Yuan Exchange Rate 
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Notes: Source International Monetary Fund.  Note based on last day of month exchange rates up until 1999, 
when daily exchange rates are used. 
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1. Introduction 
Trade union density has been in decline across the developed world and across many 
sectors (Neumann and Rissman, 1984; Blanchflower and Bryson, 2008). However, there 
are some occupational groups that have seen an increase in demand for membership. 
This paper identifies a new source of demand for union representation, and how it has 
increased union density in these specific labour markets. The paper also provides an 
explanation for the longstanding free rider problem in the union literature: in 
occupations where pay and working conditions are determined centrally, and 
membership is not mandatory, why do individuals pay their monthly union dues 
(Freeman and Medoff 1984; Bryson and Forth, 2010)?   
Society has become increasingly litigious and this could have many repercussions on 
workplaces and labour markets. These affects would be most acutely felt in occupations 
where employees have unsupervised interactions with vulnerable groups and are most at 
risk of accusations. A rational response by these employees to such changes would be an 
increase demand for insurance against these risks. Trade unions offer legal protection 
and advice to individuals who were members at the time when the allegation is made 
and when it was alleged to have occurred. In a vain similar to Blanchflower et al. (1990) 
who model union demand as a reaction to threat of unemployment, I model union 
demand as a reaction to the threat of accusations. Here union membership is a form of 
private legal insurance where individuals can chose to purchase it at an annual cost, and 
have better expected outcomes if an allegation is made against them. Therefore the 
decision to join is partly determined by the perceived threat level of having an allegation 
made against the risk averse agent.  
I test this model by estimating the demand for union membership amongst UK 
teachers over the last two decades. As with most developed countries, the UK has seen a 
large decline in union membership. Total membership in 1979 stood at 13.2 million, 
twenty years later this had fallen to 7.9 million (DfB, 2009). The vast majority of 
occupational groups have experienced a fall in unionisation rates. However, the 
occupations that have bucked this trend the most, experiencing a rise in union 
membership, are characterised by having unsupervised employees working with 
vulnerable groups. The four occupations with the highest percentage point increases in 
union density since 1992 are Educational Assistants (28.7%), Secondary School 
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Teachers (12.5%), Primary School Teachers (8.5%) and the Police (6.7%).1 Teachers 
were already one of the most unionised occupations making these additional gains even 
more remarkable.2 In 1993 76.5% of teachers were unionised, by 2005 this had reached 
a peak of 87.0%, this 10.5 percentage point gain was whilst the rest of the UK workforce 
has seen a 6 percentage point decline in union density (Figure 1).   
The UK teacher labour market is also a prime example of the trade union free-rider 
problem, in that pay and working conditions are determined centrally, and teachers are 
not required to be a member (or pay union dues) to teach. Why do they chose to be 
members?3 Moreover, since 1987 teacher trade unions have had no official roll in the 
determination of pay, and could only state their recommendations. Despite this drop in 
union bargaining power, union membership has continued to increase, therefore there 
must be other benefits to joining a union. This is illustrated by the finding that from 
2001 the proportion of teachers who thought that their pay and working conditions were 
affected by trade unions remained constant at, and then decreased from 75%, but the 
proportion of teachers that were in a union was higher at 83% and increased to 87% by 
2005 (Figure 2). 
A rational explanation for this increase in demand is an increase in the private 
benefits of union membership. One such benefit which is highly promoted by the unions 
is the legal advice and protection provided in the event of an allegation being made.4 
Teachers who are members of a union at the time of the incident and when the allegation 
is made receive an official representative for the internal disciplinary meetings and legal 
representation if it does escalate. The teacher trade unions themselves consider this 
service to be the major driver of union demand.5 Moreover as part of the terms and 
conditions of membership many unions reserve the right to use the facts of successful 
cases to publicise their criminal representation scheme (NASUWT, 2014). It is not just 
                                                          
1
 Of all three digit occupational groups with at least 100 employees per year. The unionisation rate 
amongst the clergy also increased rapidly reaching a peak in 2005 of 14.3% up from a base of 2.8% in 
1992 but had less than 100 observations for 5 of the 18 years. 
2 Educational Assistants 20.4% to 48.1%, Secondary School Teachers 76.1% to 88.6%, Primary 
School Teachers 82.3% to 90.8% and the Police 76.8% to 83.5%. 
3
 The annual membership fees for a full time teacher in 2013 in the two largest teacher unions in the 
UK were £167 NASUWT and £170 NUT.  
4
 The benefits of union membership now revolve more around servicing rather than organising. It is 
easier to exclude non-members from services  such as: Continuing Professional Development,  group 
discounts, group insurance offers. 
5
 Paddy Marshal, Head Recruitment Officer NUT stated in a phone interview in relation to the legal 
insurance that “the safety net is the biggest potential benefit”, April 2009. Tracy Twist, Assistant 
General Secretary of NASUWT stated in a meeting with me that “a lot of teachers join because of 
these concerns”. 
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the unions that consider the threat of accusations as a determinate of union membership, 
teachers do also. In a survey of Hertfordshire teachers in 2010/11 I found that in 
answering the question “What were the MAIN reasons why you initially joined a teacher 
union?”, the most popular response was “support in the event of allegations from 
pupils”, which 85% of the respondents indicated (Appendix Table 1). 
For fear of allegations to explain the rise in demand for union membership the threat 
of allegations also needs to have risen over this time period. There are no comparable 
records directly measuring the threat of allegations annually, however one teacher union 
reported dealing with 71 cases of alleged sexual or physical abuse in 1991, 134 in 1992 
and 158 in 1993 (Independent, 1994) and then estimated dealing with 800-900 per year 
in 2009 (Keates, 2009).6 To obtain a more detailed and comprehensive measure of threat 
against teachers, I use the number of national newspaper stories involving accusations of 
teachers. I treat this media coverage of allegations relating to local teachers as an 
exogenous shock to the perceived threat. The hypothesis is that in years and regions 
which have more stories concerning allegations involving teachers, the demand for 
teacher union membership will increase.  
Similar approaches have seen media coverage change individuals’ expectations 
regarding social security (van der Wiel, 2009), inflation (Carroll, 2003; Lamla and Lein 
2008) and returns to education (McGuigan et al. 2012). These papers found that 
newspaper reporting in period t affected expectations of outcomes in period t+1. 
Relating media reports to the demand for insurance specifically, Gallagher (2013) found 
that demand for flood insurance increased in regions that experienced flooding in the 
previous year. Moreover in non-flooded communities that were in the same television 
media market that the flood took place, these effects continue to persist for five years 
after the event. This paper provides similar estimates but for the demand for legal 
insurance post media coverage and adds to the literature, by using the details of each 
story, to learn more about how individuals update their expectations according to how 
similar it is to their own situation. 
The media coverage information comes from the LexisNexis database over two 
decades from 1991 to 2011. I use a rubric to codify all news stories from national 
newspapers in the UK relating to teachers, according to how relevant they would be to a 
teacher who may be concerned about having an allegation made against them. For 
                                                          
6
 NASUWT membership over this period increased by 63% (Certification Office, 2010) whilst the 
number of allegations against its members increased by 1167%.  
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example, a news story concerning false allegations would be extremely highly relevant, 
but a coverage of a teacher who admits guilt of a crime would not (details in Section 4). 
I have also extracted additional details from each story including the date, location, 
gender of the teacher and the school type. Whilst I cannot know how many or which 
newspapers individuals actually read, I expect that changes in the overall reporting 
levels to reflect general changes in perceived threat.  
I find that unionisation rates increase with media coverage of relevant litigation at 
the regional and national levels. Ten relevant news stories in a region increase the 
probability of union membership by 5 percentage points. Additionally, the size of the 
effect is dependent on the relevance of the story to the teacher. Teachers from secondary 
schools react to stories involving other secondary school teachers but not to those 
involving primary school teachers. Similarly, the demand for union membership 
increases amongst male teachers when there is media coverage concerning other male 
teachers but not female teachers. For falsification tests, I confirm that media coverage of 
cases involving teachers which are not relevant to a teacher’s decision to join a union are 
un-related to the unionisation rate. Moreover the impact of these stories decreases as the 
labour market becomes less similar to that of teachers. The model allows me to simulate 
demand from 1992 to 2010 with media coverage set to zero throughout the period. In 
this case predicted union membership remains stable at around  81% whilst observed 
membership actually rose to 87.5%.   
In November 2005 new procedures were introduced by the government which 
restricted what could be published by newspapers before a case had gone to term (HM 
Government, 2006). Accordingly, post 2005 I observe a fall in the number of news 
stories involving teachers and a fall in the overall unionisation rate. I collected additional 
data on the actual number of allegations through Freedom of Information requests to all 
Local Authorities in England. There is a geographical correlation between the incidents 
of allegations and news coverage, but whilst the unionisation rate and amount of media 
coverage fell the total number of allegations continued to rise.7 In a horserace between 
allegations and news coverage, over a shorter time period in a limited sample, I find that 
the incidents of news stories continue to have a significant relationship, but the number 
of actual allegations is not correlated. This is indicative that teachers are relating to the 
perceived threat of an allegation being made, rather than changes to the actual threat 
                                                          
7
 This actual allegations data is only available post 2006 and therefore could not be used for the main 
analysis.  
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level. This may not be due to teachers behaving irrationally. Rather news coverage is 
more salient and so is less costly to collect and use to update expectations, compared 
with actual allegation probabilities which may not be immediately available.    
The contribution of this paper is that it identifies a new source of demand for union 
representation, and how it has increased union density in specific labour markets against 
a background of general union decline. The paper also provides an additional 
explanation for the longstanding free rider puzzle in the union literature, that employees 
should rationally free-ride on the union benefits and not pay the costs, but individuals do 
join unions. Therefore there must be a private excludable benefit form membership, this 
has been discussed previously, but is the first to empirically show the demand for a 
private service in the form of legal insurance. The policy implication is if governments 
or employers wanted to reduce the demand for union membership, they could do so by 
providing more support in the workplace against allegations being made against staff.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, I formalise a model for 
union demand dependent on perceived threat of allegation. Section 3 describes the data 
sources and how the media coverage data was collected. Section 4 presents estimates of 
the impact of media coverage on demand for union membership. Section 5 provides 
some falsification exercises and explores the impact of actual versus reported 
allegations. Section 6 concludes.    
 
2. Demand for Union Membership Model 
2.1 Model and assumptions 
Teacher unions provide a unique service in the form of legal advice and protection 
against allegations made by students. I model union membership as form of legal 
insurance that the teachers can chose to pay for with annual dues. The benefit is that the 
expected outcome once an allegation has been made is better if the teacher is a member 
of a trade union.  
To formalise this decision process we need to make the following assumptions. 
There are multiple types of teachers that vary in their risk aversion, their actual risk of 
allegations being made against them and their other characteristics that can be correlated 
with the net benefits of union membership. These dimensions of teachers types are 
summarised by , which simultaneously represents risk aversion, riskiness and 
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characteristics of a teacher8. This allows for variation in insurance take up across 
individuals with the same observable characteristics. Each teacher’s utility is a function 
of income  and type ,  , , which has decreasing marginal benefits from income. 
They are employed in schools which are ‘open shops’, where union and non-union 
members are both employed and earn the same wages	 > 0. There is only one trade 
union and if a teacher decides to join the union they pay annual cost c>0. Therefore 
teacher wages can either be spent on union fees or left as disposable income  =  − . 
The perceived probability of an allegation being made against a teacher with 
characteristics  from region , in year , is . This an increasing function of news 
stories s in the first derivative and negative in the second, reflecting the diminishing 
marginal impact of the news stories in a region.9 If an allegation is made against a 
teacher they incur cost , regardless of the subsequent outcome, reflecting the social 
costs and potential damage to career prospects. Similarly there is an additional cost  if a 
teacher is found guilty of an allegation, and that  ≫ . I can now rank utilities for any 
given state of the world for all types :  
 
,  >  − ,  >  − ,  >  −  − ,  >	 
  −  − ,  >  −  −  − ,    (1) 
 
where  and  	are the utilities of non-members and members respectively with no 
allegation against them.  is the utility of winning a case,  is the utility of losing a 
case, which depend on union status. For union members  =  −  − , , and 
 =  −  −  − , , non-union members utilities  and  follow a similar 
structure, but do not incur membership cost . The state with the highest utility is a non-
member with no allegations against them 	and the worst state is a union member who 
lost their case .   
The probability of a teacher being exonerated is  which is increasing in the 
amount of resources devoted to their defence x. Teachers are not allowed to employ 
representation for internal school hearings, the only representation that teachers are 
                                                          
8
 Note that this allows for some types of teachers to potentially commit offences. All teachers were 
innocent all the time there would be no market for insurance as all teachers would be presumed non 
guilty. 
9
 The perceived threat can also be a function of other factors in addition to news stories, such as the 
actual number of allegations. Section 5.4 investigates the use of this other less salient measure of 
threat. 
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allowed, apart from themselves, is that of the union. Given the restrictions that exist for 
teachers in employing private representation, I assume that the effective resources that 
can be devoted to a case are always higher that the cost of union dues (x>>c). This 
reflects that income cannot be easily translated into defensive resources.10 Therefore 
expected utility of a teacher once an allegation is made  is a convex combination of 
winning and losing utilities for their union status. 
 
  =  + 1 −  (2) 
 =  + 1 −  
 
I can now model the teachers decision process regarding union membership. An 
individual of type ∗ is indifferent between joining a union or not, when there are no 
marginal benefits, " = 0, e.g. the expected utility from membership equals the 
subjective expected utility from non-membership.   
 
 " = #$%$"%ℎ'( − #)*) −$%$"%ℎ'( = 0		 
 " = + + ,1 − - − , 	∗. − + + ,1 − -, 	∗. = 0 (3) 
 
As  − , 	∗ < , 	∗, and the perceived probability of an allegation is the 
same for an individual if they are a member or not, this means that the expected utility 
once an allegation is made for a union member, is greater than for a non-union member  
 > . We must have that since the only difference between  and  comes from   
, for unions to have any members we need that unions provide more resources in for 
defence  > .  
Taking the first derivative of (2) with respect to the number of news stories, it can 
also be shown that the expected gain from membership for the marginal member is a 
function of news reports 
 
1"
1
= 23	 − ′ − , 	∗5 − 23	 − ′, 	∗5 
 = 3	 − 	 + ′2, 	∗ −  − , 	∗5  (4) 
                                                          
10
 This is likely to be a large contributing factor why no private market for teacher legal insurance 
exists in the UK. 
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Given the assumptions that 3 > 0, 	 − 	 > 0 and  − , 	∗ < , 	∗, 
then it follows that 67
68
>0. For an indifferent teacher with taste for risk ∗, the marginal 
benefit of unions is increasing the number of news stories, as this increases the expected 
probability of an allegation being made.  
 
2.2 Comparative Statics 
I now present comparative statics to illustrate the case of a teacher of type ∗ would 
chose to be a union member when the perceived risk of an allegation is high, but choose 
not to when the perceived risk is low. Panel A of Figure 3 shows her utility function 
, ∗	, and the utility levels specified in (1). The chord linking the points   and 
 represent the convex combination of the two and represent the expected utility of a 
member once an allegation has been made (similarly for the points   and  for 
non-members). The point along the chord where the teacher will be is determined by the 
probability of success . As   > , the union member will be higher up the 
chord than the non-union member, and we can plot  > . Note that  and  
intersections both lie beneath the utility curve, reflecting the utility lost through risk 
aversion.  
It follows that a non-union member with income , would either receive , ∗	 
or , the expected utility of a non-union member once an allegation has been made. 
Therefore the expected utility before an allegation is made is a combination of these two 
outcomes. The lower chord that links the intersection of the utility curve with  to the 
intersection with , represents this expected utility space of a teacher who is not a union 
member (Figure 3 Panels B and C). Similarly, before an allegation is made, a union 
teacher is at a point on the upper chord between  − , ∗	 and , reflecting that 
she is paying dues, but also has  expected utility if an allegation is made. 
This time point at which a teacher is along this new chord is dependent on their 
expectations of an allegation being made against them. Panel B of Figure 3 shows a high 
threat scenario =0.5, and the individual will be at the midpoint of each chord. With 
this high perceived threat level we can see that the expected utility from membership is 
greater than that of non-membership, # > #. In contrast Panel C shows the same 
teacher with the same taste for risk and type ∗ and same amount of union dues c, would 
chose not to be in a union if the risk level was low =0.1. In this case, although the 
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teacher is at a higher point on each chord, the non-union option is more attractive as no 
dues are paid.  
This basic example demonstrates that the demand for union membership is directly 
related to the perceived threat of allegations, . When there is a low probability of 
an allegation being made, the cost of union membership outweighs the gains through 
better representation if an allegation was to occur and so teachers will not join the union.  
 
2.3 Econometric Specification 
I build on this basic model of rational decision making by the teacher to join the 
union as the basis of the estimation strategy. It stated that teacher i from region j in time 
period t will choose to join the union if the expected benefits of joining the union are 
positive, #9 − #9 > 0. Each of these terms will be a function of many factors in 
addition to perceived threat of an allegation being made and will be related to the 
teachers type . This can be summarised by the two following equations. 
 
 #9
 = : + ;	,- + <=9 + >
 + ?
 + @9

 (5) 
 #9
 = : + ;	,- + <=9 + >
 + ?
 + @9

   (6) 
 
where  is the perceived threat in region j in time period t. The remaining 
parameters account for the other characteristics of a teacher type . : and :are the 
general benefits for being a (non)union member for all individuals in all time periods. 
=9 is a vector of observable individual characteristics which affect the perceived 
benefits such age, qualifications, or gender. > are the additional gains for being a union 
member in region j, this could reflect taste for unions in a particular region. ? allows 
for differential gains from union membership each year, which impacts all teachers in in 
the same way, such as any general perceived fall in union power. Individuals also have 
an idiosyncratic taste for (non)union membership which varies overtime, @9. The 
probability that individual i in region j at time period t will be a trade union member is 
A,#9
 > #9
 -, using the standard result (McFadden, 1976) we can combine 
equations 5 and 6 into the following  
 
 A,#9
 > #9
 - = 	
BCD	EFGH,8IJ-FKLMIJFNIOPQ9RIFSJTPUVJ
WFPXEFGH,8IJ-FKLMIJFNIOPQ9RIFSJTPUVJ
  (7) 
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where each parameter is now the marginal benefit for individual i to join the union 
(; = ; − ;). However, I am not able to separately identify the perceived threat from 
stories  ,- and the marginal gain from a unit of threat ;. Instead I will be estimating 
the combination of the two, the expected marginal gain per story. Given that by 
assumption  ,- is a quadratic function, this will parameterised into the effect per 
story YW, and it’s square YZ. The demand for union membership can then be estimated 
using a logistic regression, where the parameters of interest is YW + 2YZ\]]] representing 
the marginal effect of an additional story at the mean news coverage on union 
membership.  
 9 = : + YW + YZ
Z + <=9 + > + ? + @9 (8) 
 
where U is an indicator variable if individual i in period t is a union member or not and 
 is the number of stories in region j in time period t. This specification assumes that 
media coverage in region j has no impact on the perceived benefits of union membership 
in a different region. To allow for spill-overs and to obtain estimates of the total impact 
of news stories on union membership, I additionally include a measure for total news 
stories nationally each year,  and replace the year effects term with a more restrictive 
time trend term. 
 9 = : + YW + YZ
Z + Y^
_U + Y`
_UZ + <=9 + > + a% + @9   (9) 
 
Following similar reasoning that teachers are more likely to be affected by news 
stories originating in their region, one may expect certain stories to have a larger impact 
on certain teachers who share characteristics with the teacher involved in the media 
coverage. For example, a news story involving false allegations against a male teacher 
may be more relevant to other male teachers compared to female teachers. I investigate 
this by allowing the threat to vary by the characteristics of the teacher in the story  
and estimate the impact when the characteristics of the teacher are the same or different 
to the characteristics of the story, =9 = =8 	and =9 ≠ =8. Any differences in the 
effect may be due to the threat that a given story generates is greater,  ,- >
	,3- when =9 = =8 	and =9 ≠ =8 or the expected marginal gain driven by the 
story is larger (;LMIJcLdIJ > ;LMIJeLdIJ). Again, I cannot separately identify these effects 
but will instead estimate the marginal effect of a similar or less similar story.  
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)'*)9 = : + Y9 + Y9
Z + <=9 + > + ? + @9 
 )'*)9 = : + Y93 + Y93
Z + <=9 + > + ? + @9 (10) 
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
3.1 Union Membership Data 
The objective of this paper is to estimate the effect of the threat of allegations on the 
individual decision to join a trade union. The population of interest is individuals 
employed in occupations which are at high risk of having an allegation made against 
them, and where union membership (or purchasing of indemnity insurance) is non-
compulsory.11 I have chosen to focus this paper on the teacher labour market as it is a 
well-defined occupational group with a large number of employees and has also had 
considerable press attention regarding accusations from students over the last two 
decades.  
To obtain information on teachers and their union status, I used data from the UK 
Quarterly Labour Force Surveys (QLFS) over the period 1992 through 2010. The QLFS 
is conducted by the Office of National Statistics and follows approximately 60,000 
households every quarter. A rotating panel of households are surveyed over five 
quarters, and are then removed and replaced with a new household. Individuals are 
asked for employment and personal characteristics. This allows me to condition on 
factors that have been shown to be important determinants of union status (Machin, 
2006); age, tenure, gender, region, occupation, public sector employee, qualifications 
and region. Information relating to union membership is only collected in the autumn 
quarter.12 The estimates are generated over the period 1993 to 2010, as some individual 
characteristics are not available in 1992.  
Teachers are identified through three digit occupation codes, which allows teachers 
who work in Primary Schools, Secondary Schools and Special Schools to be separately 
                                                          
11
 For example, UK doctors are required to become members of the British Medical Association 
which is the professional association and registered trade union for doctors in the UK. Similarly for 
Physiotherapists and Radiologists who each have a professional body which provide including 
insurance cover, professional and legal advice, and support for continuing professional development 
(Royal College of Radiologists, and Chartered Society of Physiotherapy).  
12
 As the QLFS is a continuously rotating panel of households interview over five quarters and 
information relating to union membership is obtained every autumn, a quarter of individuals are asked 
twice about their union status. Unfortunately the number of repeated teacher observations is too small 
to run auxiliary analysis on this sample.   
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identified. This results in a final sample used for estimation of 30,392 teachers, with on 
average 1,782 teachers per year, 827 of which teaching at Primary Schools and 817 
teaching at Secondary Schools. Summary statistics on teachers in comparison to the 
workforce in general can be found in Table 1. As one may expect the teacher labour 
market is considerably different, 88.6% are employed in the public sector compared with 
24.6% in the wider economy. Moreover the teacher population is also more female 
(72.5% versus 47.5%) and has a higher proportion of graduates (74.3% versus 18%). 
Regarding the main characteristics of interest, the unionisation rate of teachers is 
84% compared with 27.6% for non-teachers and 59.4% in the public sector as a whole. 
This paper uses the twenty detailed Government Office Regions as the region of 
analysis, which is derived from Local Authority residence. These larger regions allow 
for news stories to have wider impacts outside of their immediate vicinity.13 
 
3.2 Media Coverage 
Many different factors may influence the perceived threat of an allegation being 
made against a teacher. This paper uses the impact of media coverage originating in the 
region teacher i is a resident of as an indicator for overall threat. To assume this to be 
exogenous that there is no moral hazard on the behalf of teachers, that they are not more 
likely to commit an offence if they are a union member. Moreover it also requires that 
cases involving union members are no more likely to be mentioned than not. It would be 
very difficult to have a measure of all news coverage e.g. television programmes, news 
websites, newspapers and magazines. Therefore, similar to other papers (Carroll, 2003; 
Lamla and Lein, 2008; van der Wiel, 2009) I will be using the number of articles in 
national newspapers as a proxy for all media coverage. The data on news stories is 
obtained from LexisNexis, an online database of media published in the UK.14  I 
searched for all articles which contained the word ‘teacher’ in the headline and included 
any of the following terms (or derivatives) in the headline or main text; teacher, 
damages, sued, litigation, allegation, jail, court, dismissed or fired, over the period 
                                                          
13
 Use of the restricted access QLFS with Local Authority information is not possible before 2002 as 
these files have been converted to the new calendar framework and as union questions were only 
asked in the Autumn  were removed from files.  
14
 Some national newspapers were not included in the LexisNexis database throughout the entire 
period. To have a consistent measure of newspaper coverage over time these newspapers are excluded 
from the analysis. Their inclusion does not change the interpretation of the results. These newspapers 
are The Morning Star, The Express, The Daily Telegraph, Sunday Express, Sunday Telegraph, The 
Sun, The News of the World, The People.  
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September 1991 to August 2010. Using the date of the QLFS interview and media 
publication date, I allocate media coverage from the twelve months prior to the 
interview to the teacher. 
As advised in Woolley (2000) I created a rubric by which to classify news stories 
before the search was conducted. This coding frame classified news stories into four 
levels according to how relevant they would be to influence the perceived benefit of 
joining a union; Extremely Relevant- teacher found innocent and case thrown out; 
Highly Relevant- teacher currently on trial; Little Relevance- Guilty of a lesser 
offence/on trial strong evidence; Not Relevant- Teacher admits guilt of extreme sexual 
abuse (See Appendix Table 2). Note, it is possible that a single case can appear in 
different levels as the newspaper stories develop over time. In total 1709 stories were 
coded, of which 623 were classified as extremely relevant and a further 548 as highly 
relevant.  
The newspaper stories are also categorised by story type according to if they 
involve: Allegations; Being Sued, Suing, Being Attacked, Criminal Activity, Being 
Sacked, Employment Tribunal and Teacher Union Activity. For the main analysis the 
story types of interest are ‘Allegations’, ‘Being Sued’ and ‘Criminal Activity’, with 
auxiliary analyses using all story types. The total number of stories of this type in the 
balanced panel of newspapers that are extremely or highly relevant are 439. Table 2 
summarises the total number of stories by level and type. 
The number of relevant stories has dramatically increased, between 1992 to 1998 the 
mean number of stories involving allegations against teachers per year was 6.6, from 
1999 to 2007 this had increased to 37.9 (See Figure 3). Post 2005 there was a fall in the 
number of news stories in national newspapers which coincides which a change in the 
law which gave more protection to teachers to prevent their case being reported before 
the individual had been charged with a criminal offence.15   
In addition to the relevance and region of the news stories, I have also extracted 
information on the teacher involved in the story. From the name of the teacher, or 
pronoun used in each story I was able to infer the gender of the teacher. Using references 
to the school name or the age of the pupils involved I was able to determine if the 
                                                          
15
 In accordance with the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) guidance the police will not 
normally provide any information to the Press or media that might identify teacher who is under 
investigation, unless and until the person is charged with a criminal offence. In exceptional cases 
where the police might depart from that rule, e.g. an appeal to trace a suspect, the reasons should be 
documented and partner agencies consulted beforehand. 
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teacher was teaching in a Primary or Secondary school. In this way I was able to assign 
gender in 96.6% of stories and primary or secondary school level in 82.4% of stories. 
For stories where the gender or school level of the teacher were not mentioned, the story 
was not counted for either group. Stories relating to trade unions are only counted 
towards the total number of stories nationally. Stories involving secondary school 
teachers are the most common representing 66.3% of highly relevant stories. The 
balance between the genders is more equal with 50.7% of highly relevant stories 
involving male teachers and 46.5% involving female teachers (Table 3).   
 
4.2 Actual Allegations 
I obtained information on the actual allegations made against public sector employees 
who work with children and young people through use of the Freedom of Information 
Act. After contacting all 152 Local Authorities in England I received responses from 
118 (See Appendix 1 for detailed list). This details which sector occupational group the 
allegation was made against, and the nature of the allegation.16 Teachers received more 
than half of all allegations out of all occupations that work with children, with 52.6%. Of 
these, 56.9% are physical in nature and 23.9% sexual, which is comparable with 
allegations for all non-teacher occupational groups with 52.5% and 25.1% respectively 
(Table 4). These data also provides a count of the outcomes of allegations over the 
previous twelve months, which I have codified into four categories; 1) Not Upheld; 2) 
Police Involvement; 3) Disciplinary Procedures, and 4) Referral.17 These outcomes 
cannot be connected to occupations, but in general 46.1% of these allegations are not 
upheld (Table 5). This means that for an innocent teacher there is still a risk of having an 
allegation being made against them.  
The total number of allegations provides us with the size of actual risk. The 
shortcoming of these data is that it was not compulsory for Local Authorities to record 
this information and therefore the data are over a comparatively shorter period of time. 
                                                          
16
 There are 15 occupational groups: Social, Care, Health, Education, Foster Carers, Connexion, 
Police, YOT, Probation, CAFCASS, Secure Estate, NSPCC, Voluntary Youth Organisations, Faith 
Groups, Armed Forces, Immigration/Asylum Support Services, and Other. There are five abuse 
categories: Physical, Emotional, Sexual, Neglect and Other.  
17
 The 16 outcome categories are: Not Upheld – No further action after initial consideration, Being 
unfounded, Being unsubstantiated, Being malicious, Acquittal ; Police Involvement – Criminal 
investigation, Conviction; Disciplinary Procedures – Disciplinary Action, Suspension, Dismissal, 
Resignation, Cessation of use, Inclusion on barred/restricted employment list; Referral - Section 47 
investigation, Referral to DCSF, Referral to Regulatory Body.      
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The earliest reports start in 2007 up until the most recent in 2011. From these I have 
constructed a balanced panel of 66 Local Authorities over a three year period between 
2008 and 2010 (Appendix 1).18 Using this balanced panel the total amount of allegations 
made against public employees increased from 4691 to 6091 and for teachers this has 
also marginally increased from 2866 in 2008 to 2944 in 2010. To obtain a measure of 
relevant threat I normalised these totals by the number of teachers in each Local 
Authority taken from the School Workforce in England (2011). This growth in 
allegations equates to an increase of 1.49 to 1.5 allegations per 100 teachers per year. 
Assuming that these allegations are evenly concentrated over teachers over time, and 
that 46.1% of allegations are not upheld, this means an average teacher over a career of 
35 years can expect a 24.2% chance to have an non-upheld allegation made against 
them. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Aggregate Trends  
Between 1993 and 2005 the union density amongst teachers increased by 10.5 
percentage points, whilst amongst non-teachers it fell by 6 percentage points (Figure 1). 
This increase in unionisation rate has occurred across all teacher age groups, which 
implies that this growth rate is not solely due to improvement in recruitment rates 
amongst newly qualified teachers but a general demand in union membership across all 
teaching age groups (Figure 3).  
During this same period the formal bargaining power of trade unions did not 
improve. Additionally one may have expected a fall in teacher union membership as the 
Burnham Committee, through which unions were directly involved in the decisions of 
setting of teacher pay, was replaced by the School Teacher Review Body (STRB) 
1991.19 In the QLFS teachers are asked ‘are your pay and working conditions directly 
affected by agreements between a trade union and your employer?’ This shows a lower 
proportion of teachers agree with this statement than are union members (Figure 3), 
                                                          
18
 A smaller balanced panel of 32 local authorities over a longer period of 2007 to 2010 is also 
available and provides similar results. 
19
 There was an interim period between 1987 and 1991 when the Minister of Education had the power 
to determine the size of the pay award directly.  
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which implies that teachers are members and pay their dues for other reasons. Moreover 
as pay and working conditions are set centrally for all employees there is a traditional 
free-rider issue that teachers could chose not to be a union member (and pay the dues) 
but receive the same pay and conditions. To explain this previous papers have modelled 
union membership as a form of insurance against becoming unemployed, using the 
variation in the local unemployment rate as an indicator for the risk (Blanchflower et. al. 
1990). However there is indicative evidence that this is not the main driver of union 
membership amongst teachers as union density continued to fall during the start of the 
great recession. The hypothesis of this paper is that unions are now providing a private 
benefit in the form of legal insurance in the case of an allegation being made.  
 
4.2 Main Results  
In this section I present estimates of the effect of relevant news stories on union 
membership. I use the exogenous number of national news stories that originated in a 
region from the previous twelve months, as a shock to the perceived threat of an 
allegation being made and would expect an increase in probability in an individual 
teacher being a union member. Table 6 presents the marginal impacts of a news story 
from a logistic estimation of specification 8. To aid interpretation these have been 
transformed from the logistic parameters to the marginal effect multiplied by 100 and so 
can be thought of as percentage change in probability.20  
Column 1 of Panel A shows a positive significant raw correlation of 0.548** 
between the number of Extremely Relevant stories involving an accusation in a region 
on the likelihood of union membership.21 Column 2 conditions on individual 
characteristics that have been shown to be determinants of membership. There is little 
change in the coefficient which implies that there is little correlation between the 
incidence of news stories and these characteristics (0.588***). This is what one should 
expect if there was little sorting across region due to stories by teacher characteristics. 
Column 3 additionally allows for varying union demand in each region, and is therefore 
using the within region variation in news stories over time. The final column 
additionally includes year effects which allows for the average unionisation rate to 
                                                          
20
 Original estimates of the logit parameters available upon request. The parameters are transformed 
by PUnıonk ∗ 1 − PUnıonk , changing them from odds ratios to probabilities at the mean.  
21 I define an accusation story as coverage of the following types of stories: Allegations, Being Sued 
and Criminal Behaviour   
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increase over time, which is the smallest of the estimates at 0.498 but still significant at 
the 5% level. The quadratic term is negative and significant, implying that each 
additional story beyond the first has a smaller impact. Evaluating the marginal effect at 
the mean, I find that each additional highly relevant story increases the probability of 
being a union member by 0.428%. Panel B shows the same specifications on the same 
sample, but uses both extremely and highly relevant stories, instead of just the most 
relevant. As one may expect the marginal impact is smaller, at 0.380%**, but remains 
significant.22 
One may be concerned that these effects could be generated from random 
fluctuations in the number of news stories by region. Therefore as a robustness check 
Panel C of Table 6 estimates the impact of stories of Little to No Relevance on union 
membership. Reassuringly I find that the incidence of these stories have no impact on 
union demand.  
These estimates are the impacts within a region, this would not capture the total 
impact of news stories annually on national membership, as I am using the annual 
variation at the regional level whilst accounting for national year effects. To obtain a 
national impact I replace the 17 year effect terms with a single year trend variable. Total 
number of stories nationally per year is no longer absorbed by the year effect, and 
reflects the additional growth over the long run unionisation trend.23 The corresponding 
estimates are found in Table 7. The number of the most relevant stories nationally has an 
additional impact above and beyond the number of regional stories. The impact is 
smaller than the regional impact (0.108, versus 0.481). Using the average number of 
stories locally and nationally I can calculate the mean total effect of newspaper stories 
on union demand. Compared to a year with none of the most relevant news stories, the 
mean number of stories in the past year increases the probability of union membership 
by 1.46 percentage points.    
 
4.3 Media Impact by Relevance of Coverage 
The model describes a teacher’s rational decision process in choosing to become a 
teacher, highlighting the roll of the threat of litigation driven by news stories, on the 
                                                          
22
 I have run a parallel set of estimations which instead use a measure of news impact, derived from 
the number of words per story normalised by mean story length in that newspaper in in that year. 
These results mirror those found in this chapter and are available upon request.  
23
 The stories additionally include relevant union activity at the national level that could not be 
allocated to a specific region.  
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marginal benefit of joining the union. If a teacher shares more characteristics with the 
teacher in the story one may expect that the story is more relevant in their updating 
process.  
Table 8 presents results according to the school type of the potential union member 
works for (Primary School, Secondary School) and by the school type reported in the 
media. To simplify the table I report the final marginal impact of stories, accounting for 
the negative quadratic term, conditioning on individual characteristics, year and regional 
effects (original estimates appear in Appendix Table 3). Column 1 uses the subsample of 
Secondary School teachers, and Column 2 the sub-sample of Primary School teachers. 
The top panel estimates the impact of all relevant news stories, and shows that secondary 
school teachers react to media coverage but there is no significant reaction from primary 
school teachers. This coincides with there being more relevant stories involving 
secondary school teachers (relevant news: 285 Secondary stories, 90 Primary stories; 
Table 3). The lower two panels, Panels B and C, instead use only the stories involving 
Secondary and Primary School teachers respectively. I find that demand for union 
membership amongst Secondary School teachers significantly reacts to stories involving 
other secondary school teachers (0.907***) but not to stories involving Primary School 
teachers (0.131) (Column 1). For Primary School teachers neither effects are statistically 
significant, but the coefficient relating to Primary School stories is higher than the one 
for secondary schools.  
These results are replicated in columns 3 and 4 which instead uses all relevant news 
stories, not just those relating to allegations, criminal activity or being sued. As before 
this produces similar results to the highly relevant stories, in which secondary school 
teachers react more in general and react more to secondary school stories than those set 
in primary schools. With this broader news story definition I now find a marginally 
significant effect of Primary news stories on Primary School teachers.  
Table 9 has the same structure as Table 8 but focuses on the similarity of the 
teachers’ gender to that of the story. Here we see that only female teachers react 
significantly to relevant news stories in general. However, once we examine the impact 
by story type, male teachers do significantly react to news stories involving other male 
teachers (0.591*) but not to those relating to female teachers (-0.056). Interestingly, I 
also find that female teacher react more to stories involving male teachers rather than 
female teachers (0.897***, 0.386). One could infer that female teachers, despite 
ostensibly having more in common with other female teachers mentioned in the press, 
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may associate the incidence of false allegations to be higher in cases involving men and 
therefore react more to these types of stories. These findings are repeated using other 
story types (Columns 3 and 4), rather than those just relating to accusations against the 
teacher and produce similar results.   
 
4.4 Media Impact on Other Occupations 
 To this point the paper has estimated the impact of media coverage of 
accusations against teachers on the unionisation rate of teachers. One may have more 
confidence in the estimates that these stories are reflecting the change in the perceived 
threat of teachers if they also have effects on other related occupations, and no impact on 
unrelated occupations. Table 10 shows the impact of these stories on occupations that 
are increasingly less similar to teaching; educational assistants, higher education 
professionals, non-teacher public sector graduates, and non-teacher graduates. The 
coefficients of interest are not significant for any of the other occupational groups. 
However there is indicative evidence of an effect on education assistants which has a 
larger marginal effect at the mean compared to the teachers, but is insignificantly 
determined (0.622 versus 0.428*). This could be reflective of there being only 10,022 
Educational Assistants in the sample, compared with 30,392 teachers. Moreover, the 
marginal (insignificant) effects decrease in size as the occupations become less similar 
to teachers, with the effect of teacher news stories being a tenth of the size on non-
teacher graduates in general.  
 
4.5 Long Run Media Impact  
All the estimates presented thus far have been estimating the impact of media 
coverage that occurred in the twelve months prior to the interview, thereby restricting 
the impact of news that occurred before this time to have no influence on an individual’s 
decision. This section will vary the exposure length to examine the fade out of these 
media effects on union membership. Table 11 presents the impact of regional highly 
relevant media over periods of time increasing in six month periods from six months up 
to thirty months. I find that stories within the last six months have a similar impact to 
those over the last twelve, but once the period of time is extended to two years there is 
no significant impact of total news stories over that period.  
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This assumes all stories within this time period have the same impact, therefore 
Table 12 allows for individuals to be more affected by stories that happened more 
recently and shows the impact of news stories for each six month period up to thirty six 
months before the interview. Again I find that individuals react in a similar way to 
stories from the last six to twelve months, and there are effects from stories that 
happened between a year and eighteen months ago, but stories prior to that have not 
significant impact. This implies that for those marginal members who were otherwise 
indifferent to joining, being a union member is not an absorbing state. Alternatively, it 
could be interpreted that if a potential union member hasn’t joined within the first 
eighteen months of a story being published then that story is not going to impact on their 
decision.24      
As we have seen that there are effects of news stories up to eighteen months 
beforehand, I now estimate the total impact of media coverage on union membership 
over time. Allowing for separate effects for the amount of news stories in each six 
month period up to thirty six months prior to the QLFS interview, both nationally and 
regionally, I predict the probability of union membership for the years between 1993 and 
2010. These estimates are plotted in Figure 6. The model is a good fit as these predicted 
probabilities fit very closely to the plotted series of actual union density, rarely diverging 
from the 95% confidence interval band. To estimate the aggregate impact the increased 
perceived threat has had on union membership, I use these estimates re-predict union 
membership for each year, but fix the total news coverage to zero. This provides a 
counterfactual time series of what would have occurred had there been no increase in the 
threat of allegations. The figure shows that without media coverage the union 
membership would have been relatively stable at around 81% from 1996 onwards, in 
contrast to it steadily rising and reaching a peak of 87.5%. In the period from 1999 
through to 2009 the probability of union density is significantly greater than estimates 
where there was no media coverage and between 2002 to 2008 the estimated difference 
in union membership is 5% points.    
 
 
 
                                                          
24
 Despite observing approximately 25% of teachers twice a year apart, the sample is too small to 
separate these effects.  
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4.6 Actual allegations versus media impact 
 Thus far I have used media coverage as the determinant of the threat of an 
accusation being made against a teacher. But it may be the case that these news stories 
reflect a growing number of actual allegations being made against teachers, and the 
coverage itself has no impact. To the extent that any national increase in allegations 
would be accounted for with the individual year effects, and local differences in threat 
rate would similarly be accounted for with the regional effects, we may be convinced 
that this is the impact of media coverage. However, this makes an assumption that the 
incidence of a news story originating from a region in a given year is not strongly 
correlated with the number of incidents. I test this directly using the balanced panel of 
Local Authorities from 2008 to 2010, aggregating totals to be reflective of the region as 
a whole. The correlation between the incidence of highly relevant news stories and 
allegations per teacher is 0.27.25 Regressing the number of news stories from a region on 
the number of allegations per hundred teachers conditional on year and regional effects, 
still leaves a significant correlation. For each additional allegation per hundred teachers 
1.36 additional extremely relevant news stories appear in a national newspaper 
originating from that region.26 Therefore I reject the assumption that in this limited 
period the number of news stories is not related to the number of allegations per teacher.  
Ideally it would be possible to run a horserace between news stories and 
allegations over the entire sample, to determine which the more important factor is. 
However I only have the number of allegations for the last three years of the sample and 
for a limited number of Local Authorities, which limits any inference that can be made. 
With this in mind, I include the number of allegations per teacher in a region 
simultaneously with the number of news stories, in a specification similar to 8. This is a 
greatly reduced sample, but I continue to find that the number of news stories has a 
significant effect, but the actual rate of allegations is uncorrelated (Table 13). This is 
indicative evidence that it is the more salient news stories rather than the actual risk of 
                                                          
25
 The correlation with the total number of news stories in a region was 0.001 and insignificant, 
however the allegations per teacher would be the parameter of interest in a union demand 
specification. 
26
 This result is from a OLS regression of extremely relevant news stories from a region on the 
number of allegations per hundred teachers in that region. This uses fifteen regions over a three year 
period with regional and year effects. This has a coefficient of YUPQU9R8 =1.364  and standard error 
0.4401. Using the broader classification of highly relevant stories, generates more stories 
YUPQU9R8 =2.90  and standard error 0.794.   
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allegations that change an individual’s demand for union membership. This may be 
expected as the underlying actual risk is already accounted for by the teacher and the 
media coverage are changes to this perceived threat.  
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper examines the role of the threat of accusations has had in the demand for 
trade union membership amongst teachers in the UK. I have found that teachers from 
regions in which news stories concerning accusations against other teachers originated 
are more likely to join a union in the following eighteen months. For every ten stories a 
teacher is 5% more likely to join. These effects are larger if teachers share characteristics 
with the teacher mentioned in the story, e.g. secondary school teachers react more to 
stories involving other secondary school teachers, similarly for male teachers. I show 
that the impact of stories are again larger the more relevant they are to an innocent  
teacher. In contrast occupations that a less like teachers do not react to these stories.  
The specification accurately predicts the changes in union membership since 1993. 
Setting media stories to zero throughout the period, I forecast that union membership 
would remain steady at approximately 81% rather than increasing to 87% as seen in the 
data. This paper provides evidence as to why the unionisation rate amongst some 
occupational groups with direct and unsupervised interaction with vulnerable members 
of the public, has increased. Moreover, I provide a further answer to the puzzle of why 
individuals choose to join the union even if they could free ride and receive the higher 
pay and working conditions derived through union action without having to pay the 
union dues. Unions offering a private excludable service can maintain demand for 
membership, as long as demand for that service remains. The implication for policy is 
that there may be an increasing unmet demand for union membership in previously 
under-unionised service sectors. Moreover if regulations are introduced that protect 
individuals from allegation, then the demand for union services, and hence membership, 
will decline. Suggestive evidence for this can be seen in the fall in union density post the 
2005 governmental reforms on newspaper reporting, which continued to fall despite the 
worsening of economic conditions, which is traditionally thought of as a key driver of 
union demand.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Employees  
 Teachers All Employees 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
     
Union Member 0.840 0.367 0.276 0.447 
Public Sector 0.886 0.317 0.246 0.431 
Male 0.275 0.447 0.525 0.499 
Full Time 0.786 0.410 0.738 0.440 
University Qualification  0.743 0.437 0.180 0.384 
A-Level Qualification 0.761 0.426 0.304 0.460 
Age 42.67 10.32 40.29 12.78 
     
Tenure     
less than 3 months 0.066 0.249 0.058 0.235 
3 months but less than 6 0.016 0.125 0.047 0.211 
6 months but less than 12 0.026 0.158 0.068 0.252 
1 year but less than 2 0.082 0.275 0.107 0.309 
2 years but less than 5 0.188 0.390 0.207 0.405 
5 years but less than 10 0.205 0.403 0.193 0.395 
10 years but less than 20 0.241 0.428 0.196 0.397 
20 years or more 0.176 0.381 0.123 0.329 
     
Government Region     
Tyne and Wear 0.015 0.122 0.018 0.132 
Rest of North East 0.025 0.155 0.024 0.154 
Greater Manchester 0.037 0.190 0.039 0.194 
Merseyside 0.022 0.145 0.019 0.138 
Rest of North West 0.049 0.217 0.050 0.218 
South Yorkshire 0.021 0.142 0.021 0.144 
West Yorkshire 0.038 0.191 0.037 0.190 
Rest of Yorkshire & Humberside 0.028 0.165 0.029 0.167 
East Midlands 0.073 0.260 0.074 0.262 
West Midlands Metropolitan County 0.041 0.198 0.039 0.193 
Rest of West Midlands 0.048 0.213 0.050 0.218 
East of England 0.097 0.296 0.099 0.299 
Inner London 0.030 0.170 0.034 0.180 
Outer London 0.068 0.252 0.066 0.248 
South East 0.145 0.352 0.147 0.354 
South West 0.079 0.269 0.088 0.283 
Wales 0.050 0.217 0.046 0.208 
Strathclyde 0.039 0.193 0.035 0.185 
Rest of Scotland 0.057 0.232 0.055 0.228 
Northern Ireland 0.040 0.195 0.030 0.170 
     
Observations 30,392  988,256  
Source: QLFS 1993-2010 Autumn Survey, sample of all employees 18-64 
Notes: Teachers defined as Standard Occupational Classification codes (1993-2000):233, 234, 235 
and  Standard Occupational Classification codes  (2001-2010): 2314,  2315, 2316 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of News Coverage 1991-2010  
 Story Type 
Panel A: All Newspaper Stories 
Relevance of Story  Allegations Being Sued Suing Being Attacked 
Criminal 
Activity Sacked 
Employment 
Tribunal 
Union 
Activity Total 
Extremely Relevant 322 45 100 4 12 15 61 64 623 
Highly Relevant 179 28 52 45 53 36 43 112 548 
Little Relevance 155 12 3 19 123 14 12 56 394 
Not Relevant 55 1 2 10 68 4 0 4 144 
Total 711 86 157 78 256 69 116 236 1709 
          
Panel B: Balanced Newspaper Panel Stories 
Relevance of Story  Allegations Being Sued Suing Being Attacked 
Criminal 
Activity Sacked 
Employment 
Tribunal 
Union 
Activity Total 
Extremely Relevant 222 27 78 3 6 9 48 48 441 
Highly Relevant 115 22 36 29 37 16 35 78 368 
Little Relevance 95 5 1 10 77 8 9 46 251 
Not Relevant 38 1 2 1 32 0 0 2 76 
Total 470 55 117 43 152 33 92 172 1136 
Source: LexisNexis 1991-2010. News search of national newspapers with the following term: headline(teacher) and court or damages or sued or jail or litigation or 
dismissed or fired or allegations and #GC329#. National Newspapers: Daily Mail, Daily Star, Mail on Sunday, Morning Star, The Express, Sunday Express, The Daily 
Telegraph, Sunday Telegraph, The Sun, The News of the World, The Guardian, The Independent, The Observer, The People, The Times, The Sunday Times. The 
Balanced Panel of Newspaper Stories: Daily Mail, Mail on Sunday, The Guardian, The Independent, The Mirror, Daily Star, Observer, The Times, The Sunday Times   
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Table 3: Total News Coverage by Story Subject 
Panel A: All Newspaper 
Stories 1992-2010 
     
 Relevant Stories  Any Relevance Stories 
News Story Subject Story Type 
Accusation 
All Types  Story Type 
Accusation 
All Types 
By School Type      
Secondary School  435 661  706 975 
 (68.1%) (66.2%)  (67.0%) (66.1%) 
Primary School 126 186  184 249 
 (19.7%) (18.6%)  (17.5%) (16.9%) 
By Teacher Gender      
Male Teacher 327 469  591 762 
 (51.1%) (46.9%)  (56.1%) (51.6%) 
Female Teacher 303 521  455 705 
 (47.4%) (52.2%)  (43.2%) (47.8%) 
All Stories 639 999  1053 1476 
      
Panel B: Balanced Newspaper 
Panel Stories 1992-2010 
     
 Relevant Stories  Any Relevance Stories 
News Story Subject Story Type 
Accusation 
All Types  Story Type 
Accusation 
All Types 
By School Type      
Secondary School  285 439  443 620 
 (66.3%) (63.9%)  (65.0%) (63.7%) 
Primary School 90 142  128 182 
 (20.9%) (20.7%)  (18.8%) (18.7%) 
      
By Teacher Gender      
Male Teacher 218 315  381 490 
 (50.7%) (45.9%)  (55.9%) (50.4%) 
Female Teacher 200 362  289 471 
 (46.5%) (52.7%)  (42.4%) (48.4%) 
All Stories 430 687  677 973 
Source: LexisNexis 1991-2010 of National Newspapers, Balanced Panel  
Note: Percentages in parentheses represent proportion of all stories of that type on that subject. 
Story Type: Accusation includes- Allegations, Being Sued and Criminal Activity. Union Activity 
not included under All Types as is only counted in national totals as not based in one region or 
reflect a specific teacher type. Total stories do not equal those from Table 3 as some stories are 
double counted when both male and female teachers are mentioned, or both primary and 
secondary schools are mentioned.  
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of Allegations by Employer and  
 Type of Allegation 
 Type of Allegation 
Panel A: All Reporting Local Authorities 2007-2011 
Employer Physical Emotional Sexual Neglect Other Total 
Education 6,267 932 2,642 316 862 11,019 
Foster Carers 1,512 305 388 255 70 2,530 
Social Care 1,085 169 356 176 112 1,898 
Secure Estate 384 15 26 0 6 431 
Health 257 42 177 66 41 583 
Voluntary Youth Organisations 203 34 342 23 48 650 
Faith 177 8 96 1 12 294 
Police 142 33 72 9 12 268 
Immigration 39 2 39 6 0 86 
Connexions 14 4 14 3 5 40 
Youth Offending Teams 10 8 19 6 9 52 
Armed Forces 6 0 25 1 0 32 
Probation 5 0 2 1 0 8 
NSPCC 4 1 2 0 1 8 
CAFCASS 1 2 2 1 1 7 
Other 1,380 247 941 233 247 3,048 
Total by type 11,486 1,802 5,143 1,097 1,426 20,954 
      
Panel B: Balanced Panel of Local Authorities 2008-2010 
Employer Physical Emotional Sexual Neglect Other Total 
Education 2,440 284 1,123 111 224 4,182 
Foster Carers 647 120 171 98 32 1,068 
Social Care 486 76 167 85 48 862 
Secure Estate 159 8 12 0 0 179 
Health 129 27 90 24 19 289 
Voluntary Youth Organisations 84 13 151 13 25 286 
Faith 76 3 40 1 5 125 
Police 76 23 22 3 3 127 
Immigration 11 1 19 3 0 34 
Connexions 6 3 7 0 2 18 
Youth Offending Teams 3 3 6 6 4 22 
Armed Forces 0 0 11 0 0 11 
Probation 4 0 1 1 0 6 
NSPCC 2 0 1 0 1 4 
CAFCASS 0 1 2 0 1 4 
Other 465 115 374 94 77 1125 
Total by type 4,588 677 2197 439 441 8,342 
Source: Freedom of Information Requests to English Local Authorities  
Note: Lists of responding Local Authorities and balanced Panel of Local Authorities is in Appendix 1 
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Table 5: Recorded Outcomes of Allegations  
 
Allegation Outcome 
Panel A: All Reporting Local Authorities 2007-2011 
 
Not Upheld 
Police 
Involvement 
Disciplinary 
Procedures Referral Total 
Total  4,680 1,030 3,058 1,373 10,141 
Percent of total  46.1% 10.2% 30.2% 13.5%  
 
     
Panel B: Balanced Panel of Local Authorities 2008-2010 
 Not Upheld 
Police 
Involvement 
Disciplinary 
Procedures Referral Total 
Total  3,384 656 2,305 1,022 7,367 
Percent of total  45.9% 8.9% 31.3% 13.9%  
Source: Freedom of Information Requests to English Local Authorities  
Notes: Not Upheld – No further action after initial consideration, Being unfounded, Being unsubstantiated, 
Being malicious, Acquittal ; Police Involvement – Criminal investigation, Conviction; Disciplinary Procedures 
– Disciplinary Action, Suspension, Dismissal, Resignation, Cessation of use, Inclusion on barred/restricted 
employment list; Referral - Section 47 investigation, Referral to DCSF, Referral to Regulatory Body. Total 
outcomes do not equal total number of cases as not all cases had an outcome in the last 12 months.  
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Table 6: Effect of News Coverage on Union Membership  
Panel A: Extremely  Relevant News Stories of Accusations 
P(Union Membership) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Stories Regionally 0.548** 0.588*** 0.674** 0.498** 
0.235 0.206 0.325 0.251 
Stories Regionally 
Squared  
-0.024 -0.034** -0.047** -0.046*** 
0.018 0.015 0.019 0.014 
     
Marginal Effect at 
Mean 
0.512** 0.535*** 0.603* 0.428* 
0.234 0.207 0.326 0.252 
     
Panel B: All Relevant News Stories of Accusations 
P(Union Membership) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Stories Regionally 0.841*** 0.783*** 0.758*** 0.449*** 
0.158 0.139 0.200 0.149 
Stories Regionally 
Squared  
-0.041*** -0.039*** -0.034*** -0.026*** 
0.008 0.007 0.008 0.007 
     
Marginal Effect at 
Mean 
0.731*** 0.679*** 0.667*** 0.380** 
0.160 0.140 0.201 0.150 
     
Panel C: Little/No Relevance News Stories of Accusations 
P(Union Membership) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Stories Regionally 0.098 0.169 0.222 -0.152 
0.202 0.177 0.153 0.146 
Stories Regionally 
Squared  
0.015 0.003 -0.004 0.004 
0.012 0.010 0.005 0.005 
     
Marginal Effect at 
Mean 
0.120 0.173 0.216 -0.145 
0.202 0.177 0.153 0.146 
     
Teacher Characteristics     
Regional Effects     
Year Effects     
Observations 30,392 30,392 30,392 30,392 
Source: QLFS 1993-2010 Notes: This table presents estimates from 12 logit regressions of 
individual decision to join a union, four per panel. Reporting the marginal effects after 
transforming by A)l*)k ∗ 1 − A)l*)k . All coefficients and standard errors are 
multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation. Estimates can be read a percentage change in 
probability. Marginal effect at mean calculated by YW + 2YZ\]]]. Accusation stories are stories 
involving Allegations, Being Sued and Criminal Activity. Stories Regionally is a count for the 
number of news stories that originated in the region that the teacher resides. Standard errors in 
italics, clustered at the regional level.  
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Table 7: Effect of Regional and National News Coverage of Accusations 
on Union Membership 
 Story Relevance 
P(Union Membership) 
Extremely  
Relevant 
Stories 
 Relevant 
Stories 
 Little/No 
Relevance 
Stories Regionally 0.481*  0.436***  -0.159 
 0.263  0.147  0.137 
Stories Regionally 
Squared  
-0.042***  -0.022***  0.005 
0.015  0.001  0.004 
      
Stories Nationally 0.108**  0.030  -0.205 
 0.050  0.043  0.236 
Stories Nationally 
Squared 
-0.002*  0.000  0.005 
0.001  0.001  0.001 
      
Marginal Effect at 
Mean 
0.469*  0.403**  -0.182 
0.270  0.158  0.160 
      
Total Effect at Mean  1.460  1.205  -2.003 
      
Teacher Characteristics      
Regional Effects      
Time Trend      
Observations 30,392  30,392  30,392 
Source: QLFS 1993-2010 Notes: This table presents estimates from three logit 
regressions of individual decision to join a union on news stories. Each column 
shows the impact of stories of varying relevance. Reporting the marginal effects. 
All coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100 for ease of 
interpretation. Estimates can be read a percentage change in probability. Marginal 
effect at mean calculated by YW + 2YZ\m. Total effect at mean (\mY + \Z	]]]]Y + ̅Y +
Z]]]Y. Accusation stories are stories involving Allegations, Being Sued and 
Criminal Activity. Relevant Stories include both Extremely and Highly Relevant 
Stories. Stories Regionally is a count for the number of news stories that 
originated in the region that the teacher resides in the previous 12 months. Stories 
Nationally is a count for the number of all news stories in the previous 12 months, 
including stories that could not be allocated to a specific region. Standard errors in 
italics, clustered at the regional level. 
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Table 8: Effect of News Coverage on Union Membership by Teacher 
and Story School Type 
 Stories of Accusations  All Story Types 
 
Secondary 
School  
Teachers 
Primary 
School  
Teachers 
 Secondary 
School  
Teachers 
Primary 
School  
Teachers 
P(Union Membership) (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Panel A: Relevant Stories 
Total Marginal Effect 0.696*** 0.042  0.437** 0.090 
 0.241 0.147  0.196 0.136 
Panel B: Relevant Secondary School Stories 
Total Marginal Effect  0.907*** 0.048  0.389* 0.127 
 0.229 0.306  0.239 0.218 
Panel C: Relevant Primary School Stories 
Total Marginal Effect 0.131 0.627  0.057 0.632* 
 0.664 0.672  0.461 0.403 
      
Teacher Characteristics      
Regional Effects      
Year Effects      
Observations 13,949 14,076  13,949 14,076 
Source: QLFS 1993-2010 Notes: This table presents estimates from 12 logit regressions of 
individual decision to join a union. Columns 1 and 3 use the sub sample of Secondary School 
Teachers, columns 2 and 4 use the sub sample of Primary School Teachers. Panel A uses all 
estimates the impact of all relevant stories, Panel B the impact of all relevant secondary school 
stories and Panel C all relevant Primary School stories. Reporting the marginal effects at mean 
after accounting for quadratic terms. All coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100 
for ease of interpretation. Estimates can be read a percentage change in probability for an 
additional story. Marginal effect at mean calculated by YW + 2YZ\m. Accusation stories are 
stories involving Allegations, Being Sued and Criminal Activity. Relevant Stories include both 
Extremely and Highly relevant stories. Stories Regionally is a count for the number of stories 
that originated in the region that the teacher resides in the previous 12 months. Standard errors 
in italics, clustered at the regional level. 
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Table 9: Effect of News Coverage on Union Membership by Teacher 
and Story Gender 
 Stories of Accusations All Story Types 
 
Male 
Teachers 
Female 
Teachers 
 Male 
Teachers 
Female 
Teachers 
P(Union Membership) (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Panel A: Relevant Stories 
Total Marginal Effect  0.038 0.51**  0.147 0.294 
 0.154 0.201  0.18 0.136 
Panel B: Relevant Male Teacher Stories 
Total Marginal Effect 0.591* 0.897**  0.564* 0.473* 
 0.305 0.374  0.428 0.363 
Panel C: Relevant Female Teacher Stories 
Total Marginal Effect -0.055 0.386  0.086 0.128 
 0.305 0.412  0.220 0.221 
      
Teacher Characteristics      
Regional Effects      
Year Effects      
Observations 8,361 22,031  8,361 22,031 
Source: QLFS 1993-2010 Notes: This table presents estimates from 12 logit regressions of 
individual decision to join a union on news stories. Columns 1 and 3 use the sub sample of Male 
Teachers, columns 2 and 4 use the sub sample of Female Teachers. Panel A uses all estimates the 
impact of all relevant stories, Panel B the impact of all relevant stories involving male teachers 
and Panel C all relevant stories involving female teachers. Reporting the marginal effects at mean 
after accounting for quadratic terms. All coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100 for 
ease of interpretation. Accusation stories are stories involving Allegations, Being Sued and 
Criminal Activity. Relevant Stories include both Extremely and Highly relevant news stories. 
Stories Regionally is a count for the number of news stories that originated in the region that the 
teacher resides in the previous 12 months. Standard errors in italics, clustered at the regional 
level. 
Table 10: Effect of News Coverage on Union Membership by 
Occupation 
Occupation Group Teachers Education 
Assistants 
Higher 
Education 
Non Teacher 
Public Sector 
Graduates 
Non Teacher 
Graduates 
P(Union Membership) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Relevant Stories 
Regionally 
0.498** 0.688 0.235 0.161 0.052 
0.251 0.577 0.422 0.202 0.090 
Relevant Stories 
Regionally Squared  
-0.046*** -0.021 -0.018 -0.001 -0.000 
0.014 0.023 0.018 0.010 0.005 
      
Marginal Effect at 
Mean 
0.428* 0.622 0.185 0.133 0.051 
0.252 0.582 0.425 0.204 0.091 
      
Teacher Characteristics      
Regional Effects      
Year Effects      
Observations 30,392 10,022 9,007 49,671 154,932 
Source: QLFS 1993-2010 Notes: This table is presenting estimates from five logit regressions of teacher news 
stories of different occupational groups. I am reporting the marginal effects after transforming by A)l*)k ∗ 1 −
A)l*)k . All coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation. Estimates can be 
read a percentage change in probability. Marginal effect at mean calculated by YW + 2YZ\m . Accusation stories are 
stories involving Allegations, Being Sued and Criminal Activity. Relevant Stories include both Extremely and 
Highly relevant news stories. Stories Regionally is a count for the number of news stories that originated in the 
region that the teacher resides in the previous 12 months.  SOC codes: Educational Assistants  652, 6124;  Higher 
Education 230, 231, 2311, 2312. Standard errors in italics, clustered at the regional level. 
Chapter 4. Trade Unions  
159 
 
Table 11: Effect of News Coverage on Union Membership by News 
Coverage Period 
News Coverage period In last 6 
months 
In last 12 
months 
In last 18 
Months 
In last 24 
Months 
In last 30 
Months 
In last 36 
Months 
P(Union Membership) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Relevant Stories 
Regionally 
0.540** 0.449*** 0.521*** 0.331*** 0.141 0.065 
0.260 0.149 0.107 0.119 0.103 0.104 
Relevant Stories 
Regionally Squared  
-0.058*** -0.026*** -0.024*** -0.014** -0.005 -0.001 
0.019 0.007 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004 
       
Marginal Effect at 
Mean 
0.472* 0.380** 0.429*** 0.258** 0.112 0.055 
0.261 0.150 0.425 0.204 0.106 0.109 
       
Teacher Characteristics       
Regional Effects       
Year Effects       
Observations 30,392 30,392 30,392 30,392 30,392 30,392 
Source: QLFS 1993-2010 Notes: Reporting the marginal effects after transforming by A)l*)k ∗ 1 −
A)l*)k . All coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation. Estimates can 
be read a percentage change in probability. Marginal effect at mean calculated by YW + 2YZ\m. Accusation 
stories are stories involving Allegations, Being Sued and Criminal Activity. Relevant Stories include both 
Extremely and Highly relevant news stories. Stories Regionally is a count for the number of news stories that 
originated in the region that the teacher resides in the previous X months. Standard errors in italics, clustered at 
the regional level. 
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Table 12: Effect of News Coverage on Union Membership by                      
News Lag Period 
News Lag period Marginal Effects Total Marginal 
Effect 
P(Union Membership) (1) (2) 
Stories Last 6 Months 0.487** 0.424** 
0.214 0.215 
Stories Last 6 Months 
Squared  
-0.053***  
0.019  
   
Stories 7-12 Months 
Previous 
0.508*** 0.453*** 
0.148 0.148 
Stories 7-12 Months 
Previous Squared  
-0.037***  
0.008  
   
Stories 13-18 Months 
Previous 
0.948*** 0.861** 
0.348 0.349 
Stories 13-18 Months 
Previous Squared  
-0.078***  
0.030  
   
Stories 19-24 Months 
Previous 
-0.182 -0.166 
0.217 0.218 
Stories 19-24 Months 
Previous Squared  
0.010  
0.013  
   
Stories 25-30 Months 
Previous 
-0.319 -0.280 
0.326 0.328 
Stories 25-30 Months 
Previous Squared  
0.035  
0.032  
   
Stories 31-36 Months 
Previous 
-0.385 -0.348 
0.296 0.296 
Stories 25-30 Months 
Previous Squared 
0.015  
  
   
Teacher Characteristics   
Regional Effects   
Year Effects   
Obs 30,392 30,392 
Source: QLFS 1993-2010 Notes: This table presents estimates from one logit 
regression. Column 1 reports the marginal effects. Column 2 reports the total 
marginal effect at mean. All coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 
100 for ease of interpretation. Accusation stories are stories involving 
Allegations, Being Sued and Criminal Activity. Relevant Stories include both 
Extremely and Highly relevant news stories. Standard errors in italics, 
clustered at the regional level. 
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Table 13: Effect of News Coverage of Accusations and Actual 
Allegations on Union Membership 
News Relevance Extremely Relevant Stories Relevant Stories 
P(Union Membership) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
      
Stories Regionally  0.348** 0.335***  0.220 0.197 
  0.140 0.109  0.173 0.168 
Stories Regionally Squared   -0.055** -0.040**  -0.050 -0.046 
  0.021 0.019  0.093 0.065 
 
      
Allegations Per 100 Teachers -0.310*  -0.355 -0.310*  -0.388 
0.227  0.215 0.227  0.253 
       
Teacher Characteristics       
Regional Effects       
Year Effects       
       
Observations 3,399 3,399 3,399 3,399 3,399 3,399 
Source: QLFS 2008-2010 Notes: Estimates from a logit regression. Reporting the marginal effects All 
coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation. Accusation stories are 
stories involving Allegations, Being Sued and Criminal Activity. Relevant Stories include both Extremely 
and Highly relevant news stories. Standard errors in italics, clustered at the regional level. 
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Figure 1: Union Density Time Series by Occupation 
 
Source: QLFS 1992-2010 
 
Figure 2: Teacher Perception of Union Power  
 
Source: QLFS 2001-2010: All employees, regardless of union status were ask “Are your pay 
and conditions directly affected by agreements between your employer and any trade union? 
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Figure 3: Illustration of Union Membership Decision 
Panel A: Utility curve of teacher op, q∗ with wages r, union dues s.  
 
Panel B: Expected utilities of teacher op, q∗ with a high perceived risk tu=0.5 
 
Panel C: Expected utilities of teacher op, q∗ with a low perceived risk tu=0.1 
 
Notes: 	 is the utility of a 
union member who has had an allegation 
made against them and won (lost) their 
case. Similarly for non-members 
	.  	 represents the 
expected utility once an allegation has 
been made for a (non) union member.  
represents the cost of an allegation and  
the additional cost of  being found 
guilty.  
Notes: #	#	represents the 
expected utility of a (non) union member 
for a given threat level	v.  
When the risk is high δs=0.5, at the 
midpoint of each cord, then # 	 #.  
)'*)	y%$"% 
z*)	)'*)	y%$"% 
)'*)	y%$"% 
z*)	)'*)	y%$"% 
Notes: #	#	represents the 
expected utility of a (non) union member 
for a given threat level	v.  
When the risk is low δs=0.1, teachers 
are at a higher point on each cord and  
then # 	 #.  
)'*)	y%$"% 
z*)	)'*)	y%$"%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Figure 4: Union Density and Relevant News Stories over Time 
 
Source: QLFS 1992:2010, Lexis Nexus 1992-2010 Notes: Annual union density based on mean union 
membership of teachers based on QLFS reporting year. News story total based on total relevant news 
stories about teachers concerning Allegations; Being Sued, and Criminal Activity over a calendar year.  
Figure 5: Union Density by Age of Teachers over Time 
 
Source: QLFS 1992:2010 Notes: Annual union density based on mean union membership of teachers 
based on QLFS reporting year.  
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Figure 6: Predicted Union Density With and Without Media Reports 
 
Source: QLFS 1993-2010 Notes: Predictions of probability union from a logit regression for each year. Allow 
separate effect of news stories regionally and nationally (and their square), for each six month period up to 
thirty six months prior to the interview. The counterfactual estimates generated with the same parameters 
apart from setting the media terms to zero. Accusation stories are stories involving Allegations, Being Sued 
and Criminal Activity. Stories Regionally is a count for the number of news stories that originated in the 
region that the teacher resides in the previous 6 months, 7-12 months, 13-18 months, 19-24 months, 25-30 
months, 31-36months. Similarly Stories Nationally is a count for the number of all news stories, including 
stories that could not be allocated to a specific region. Standard errors in italics, clustered at the regional 
level. 
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Appendix 1: Local Authorities who responded to the Freedom of 
information request regarding allegations 
All Local Authorities who responded (Years of data):  
Local Authority (Years), Barnet (2) Barnsley (3), Bath and North East Somerset (3),  Bedford (1),  
Bexley (2),  Blackburn with Darwen (3),  Bolton (3),  Bracknell Forest (2),  Bradford (3),  Brent (4),  
Bristol City (3),  Bromley (3),  Buckinghamshire (4),  Calderdale (3),  Cambridge (2),  Camden (3),  
Central Bedfordshire (1),  Cheshire East Council (1),  Cheshire West and Chester (2),  Cornwall (1),  
Croyden (3),  Cumbria (3),  Derby (1),  Derbyshire (3),  Devon (1),  Doncaster (3),  Dorset (3),  
Dudley (3),  Durham (3),  East Riding of Yorkshire (4),  East Sussex (2),  Essex (4),  Gateshead (3),  
Gloustershire (2),  Greenwich (4),  Hackney (1),  Hammersmith and Fulham (2),  Hampshire (3),  
Haringey (2),  Havering (4),  Hertfordshire (2),  Hillingdon (3),  Hounslow (2),  Isle of Scilly (4),  Isle 
of Wight (3),  Islington (4),  Kensington and Chelsea (2),  Kent (4),  Kingston Upon Hull (3),  
Kingston Upon Thames (4),  Kirklees (3),  Knowsley (3),  Lancashire (4),  Leeds (4),  Leicester (3),  
Lewisham (4),  Lincolnshire (1),  Liverpool (1),  Luton (2),  Manchester (2),  Medway (3),  Milton 
Keyenes (1),  Newham (1),  Norfolk (3),  North East Lincolnshire (3),  North Lincolnshire (1),  North 
Somerset (4),  North Yorkshire (3),  Northumberland (4),  Nottingham City (4),  Nottingham County 
(2),  Oldham (4),  Oxfordshire (4),  Peterborough (1),  Plymouth (4),  Poole (3),  Reading (4),  
Redbridge (3),  Richmond (1),  Rochdale (3),  Rotherham (1),  Rutland (4),  Salford (4),  Sandwell 
(3),  Scilly Isles (4),  Sheffield (2),  Shropshire (1),  Slough (2),  Solihull (4),  Somerset (4),  South 
Glouster (2),  Southampton (2),  Southend (3),  St Helens (4),  Stockport (4),  Suffolk (3),  Surrey (2),  
Sutton (2),  Swindon (2),  Telford and Wrekin (2),  Thurrock (4),  Torbay (3),  Trafford (2),  
Wakefield (3),  Walsall (4),  Waltham Forest (3),  Wandsworth (4),  Warrington (2),  West Berkshire 
(2),  West Sussex (3),  Wigan (2),  Wiltshire (2),  Winsor and Maidenhead (2),  Wirral (4),  
Wokingham (2),  Wolverhampton (2),  Worcestershire (4),  York (3),  All (323) 
Balanced Panel of Local Authorities 2008-2010:  
Barnsley, Bath and North East Somerset, Blackburn with Darwen, Bolton, Bradford, Brent, Bristol 
City, Bromley, Buckinghamshire, Calderdale, Camden, Croydon, Cumbria, Derbyshire, Doncaster, 
Dorset, Dudley, Durham, East Riding of Yorkshire, Essex, Greenwich, Hampshire, Havering, 
Hillingdon, Isle of Scilly, Isle of Wight, Islington, Kent, Kingston Upon Hull, Kingston Upon 
Thames, Kirklees, Lancashire, Leeds, Leicester, Lewisham, Medway, North East Lincolnshire, North 
Somerset, North Yorkshire, Northumberland, Nottingham City, Oldham, Oxfordshire, Plymouth, 
Poole, Reading, Redbridge, Rutland, Salford, Sandwell, Sicily Isles, Solihull, Somerset, Southend, St 
Helens, Stockport, Suffolk, Thurrock, Torbay, Wakefield, Walsall, Waltham forest, Wandsworth, 
West Sussex, Wirral, Worcestershire 
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Appendix Tables 
Table A1: Reasons for Union Membership 
“What were the MAIN reasons why you initially joined a 
teacher union?” 
Belief in the union movement 40% 
To improve job security 44% 
To improve terms and conditions 56% 
For solidarity with other workers 24% 
Advice/opinion on educational policy 62% 
Support in the event of allegations from pupils 85% 
No particular reason 3% 
Observations 176 
Source: Online Survey of Hertfordshire Teachers 2010/11 for unrelated 
evaluation of UK Resilience Programme on teaching staff (Murphy 2011) 
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Table A2: Media Rubric  
  Allegations Being Sued Suing 
Being 
Attacked 
Criminal 
Activity Sacked 
Employment 
Tribunal 
Union 
Activity Total 
Extremely 
Relevant 
Found 
innocent, 
case 
thrown out  
Teacher 
sued for 
school 
activity  
Sues  for 
damages/ 
libel  
Pupil 
attacks 
teacher in 
classroom  
Manslaughter 
of pupil 
charges   
For health and  
safety or 
allegations  
Legitimate 
Unfair 
dismissal   
Discuss 
threat of 
allegations/ 
being sued   
Stories 322 45 100 4 12 15 61 64 623 
Highly 
Relevant 
 
 
Currently 
on trial, no 
verdict  
May be 
sued, 
could be 
sued  
Lose 
case, 
indirectly 
related to 
school  
Parent-
Pupil 
attacks 
teacher 
outside of 
school 
Criminal 
accusations 
from pupil   
Inappropriate 
behaviour, not 
up to 
standards   
Other Unfair 
dismissal,  
inappropriate 
behaviour  
As above 
but brief 
mention or 
union 
demands  
 
Stories 179 28 52 45 53 36 43 112 548 
Little 
Relevance 
Guilty of 
lesser 
offence, on 
trial of hard 
offence  
School/ 
Council 
sued  
Threats to 
sue for 
indirect 
teaching   
Attacked 
by ex 
pupil   
School 
related crime   
Miscellaneous  
school related 
activity  
Union back 
the dismal  
Comment 
on 
education 
policy    
Stories 155 12 3 19 123 14 12 56 394 
No 
Relevance 
Admits 
guilt of 
extreme 
sexual 
abuse  
Non 
school 
related 
activity  
Non 
school 
related 
activity  
Non 
school 
related 
activity  
Child 
pornography 
/murder  
Non-school 
related 
activity  
Non-school 
related 
activity  
Anti-union 
members  
 
Stories 55 1 2 10 68 4 0 4 144 
Total 711 86 157 78 256 69 116 236 1709 
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Table A3: Union Membership by Teacher and Story School Type – 
Showing Quadratic Terms 
 Accusation Stories  All Story Types 
Probability of Union 
Membership 
Secondary 
School  
Teachers 
Primary 
School  
Teachers 
 Secondary 
School  
Teachers 
Primary 
School  
Teachers 
 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Panel A: Relevant Stories 
Stories Regionally 0.795*** 0.066  0.524*** 0.127 
 0.239 0.146  0.193 0.134 
Stories Regionally Squared  -0.035** -0.009  -0.020*** -0.009 
 0.010 0.007  0.007 0.006 
Panel B: Relevant Secondary School Stories 
Secondary Stories  1.000*** 0.063  0.447* 0.151 
 0.228 0.304  0.238 0.217 
Secondary Stories Squared -0.049** -0.008  -0.021** -0.009 
 0.001 0.015  0.010 0.010 
Panel C: Relevant Primary School Stories 
Primary Stories  0.11 0.685  -0.009 0.701* 
 0.663 0.671  0.457 0.352 
Primary Stories Squared 0.036 -0.108*  0.068 -0.079* 
 0.069 0.060  0.064 0.035 
Observations 13,949 14,076  13,949 14,076 
Source: QLFS 1993-2010 Notes: This table presents estimates from 12 logit regressions of 
individual decision to join a union. Columns 1 and 3 use the sub sample of Secondary School 
Teachers, columns 2 and 4 use the sub sample of Primary School Teachers. Panel A uses all 
estimates the impact of all relevant stories, Panel B the impact of all relevant secondary school 
stories and Panel C all relevant Primary School stories. Reporting the marginal effects at mean. 
All coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation. Estimates 
can be read a percentage change in probability for an additional story. Marginal effect at mean 
calculated by YW + 2YZ\m . Accusation stories are stories involving Allegations, Being Sued and 
Criminal Activity. Relevant Stories include both Extremely and Highly relevant stories. Stories 
Regionally is a count for the number of stories that originated in the region that the teacher 
resides in the previous 12 months. Standard errors in italics, clustered at the regional level. 
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Table A4: Union Membership by Teacher and Story Gender – Showing 
Quadratic Terms 
 Accusation Stories All Story Types 
Probability of Union 
Membership 
Male 
Teachers 
Female 
Teachers 
 Male 
Teachers 
Female 
Teachers 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Panel A: Relevant Stories 
Stories  0.075 0.594***  0.218 0.363*** 
 0.154 0.200  0.179 0.135 
Stories Squared  -0.015** -0.031**  -0.018 -0.016** 
 0.006 0.009  0.006 0.005 
Panel B: Relevant Male Teacher Stories 
Male Stories 0.714* 1.090***  0.684** 0.602* 
 0.401 0.367  0.319 0.347 
Male Stories Squared -0.105** -0.151***  -0.069 -0.067 
 0.047 0.055  0.051 0.056 
Panel C: Relevant Female Teacher Stories 
Female Stories -0.036 0.426  0.130 0.152 
 0.304 0.411  0.219 0.220 
Female Stories Squared -0.016 -0.028  -0.020 -0.009 
 0.015 0.022  0.008 0.009 
      
Observations 8,361 22,031  8,361 22,031 
Source: QLFS 1993-2010 Notes: This table presents estimates from 12 logit regressions of 
individual decision to join a union on news stories. Columns 1 and 3 use the sub sample of Male 
Teachers, columns 2 and 4 use the sub sample of Female Teachers. Panel A uses all estimates the 
impact of all relevant stories, Panel B the impact of all relevant stories involving male teachers 
and Panel C all relevant stories involving female teachers. Reporting the marginal effects at mean 
after accounting for quadratic terms. All coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100 for 
ease of interpretation. Estimates can be read a percentage change in probability for an additional 
story. Marginal effect at mean calculated by YW + 2YZ\m. Accusation stories are stories involving 
Allegations, Being Sued and Criminal Activity. Relevant Stories include both Extremely and 
Highly relevant news stories. Stories Regionally is a count for the number of news stories that 
originated in the region that the teacher resides in the previous 12 months. Standard errors in 
italics, clustered at the regional level. 
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5. 
ILL COMMUNICATION:  
 TECHNOLOGY, DISTRACTION & 
WORKPLACE PRODUCTIVITY 
  
 
 
 * 
 
 
                                                          
I would like to thank my co-author Louis-Philippe.Beland for his contribution. We would like to thank 
Andriana Bellou, Vincent Boucher, David Card, Andrew Eyles, Baris Kaymak, David Kiss, Ismael Yacoub 
Mourifie, Daniel Parent, Shqiponja Telj and Felix Weinhardt and seminar participants at RES and University of 
Montreal for comments and discussions. We would also like to thank Vlad Khripunov and Guillaume Cote for 
excellent research assistance. Any remaining errors are our own. 
Chapter 5. Ill Communication 
172 
 
1 Introduction 
Information Technology is commonly viewed as increasing productivity. This is the 
reason that both governments and firms invest in research and new technologies. This 
paper estimates the impact of the removal of a modern piece of Information Technology 
(IT) on productivity. 
Since the development of information technology numerous studies have documented 
its benefits on productivity in the workplace (Kruger, 1993; Chakraborty and 
Kazarosian, 1999; Aral et al., 2007; Bartel et al 2007; Ding et al., 2009) and on human 
capital (Malamud and Pop-Eleches, 2011). However, since Solow’s (1987) infamous 
statement “You can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics”, 
this literature has been paralleled by another that has argued that these IT improvements 
have not improved productivity (Roach, 1987; Strassmann, 1990; Pischke & DiNardo 
1997). 
This productivity paradox was summarised by Brynjolfsson (1991) who stated that 
the lack of findings could be summarised with four reasons. The first two of which relate 
to the research methods. Firstly mis-measurement, it is hard to get good measures of 
inputs, outputs and most importantly of the technological innovation itself. Secondly, 
what are the appropriate time lags for measuring the impact of technology? Should we 
expect firms to increase productivity within a month, year, or decade? It may take time 
before the investment into new technology to pay off, so using an incorrect period of 
analysis could depress any impacts. The second two relate to the adoption of IT in the 
workplace. The technology may have redistributive effects, making some individuals 
more productive, but at the expense of others and so there is no net gain. Finally 
mismanagement, managers do not know how to implement new technology and 
therefore it is either not fully utilized or that it is only used to create slack instead of 
increasing productivity. 
We are going to discuss a new factor, distraction. With improving communication 
technology, it has become a lot easier to be distracted. New technologies are 
increasingly multifunctional, having both a primary purpose and abilities to connect to 
the internet, social media and play games. This has lowered the transition cost for users 
shifting from work to procrastination to near zero. Having multifunctional technology 
present in the workplace is common to many workforces today and so leads to the 
question; how much productivity is lost through this type of distraction? We will address 
this question of technology and workplace productivity in the context of the school 
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classroom. We use the banning of mobile phones on school grounds as a restriction on 
the potential distraction caused by technology. 
To do this we focus the experience of students from English classrooms as this 
setting addresses both the methodological issues highlighted by Brynjolfsson (1991). In 
England detailed, comparable and externally marked achievement test scores of students 
are regularly obtained to monitor their progress. This provides us with comprehensive 
information on the inputs and outputs of individuals and therefore provides a clean 
measure of individual productivity. Moreover over 90% of teenagers in England owned 
a mobile phone, therefore a ban will be likely to effect the vast majority of teenagers (E-
Marketer 2013). Figure 1 shows the percentage of teenagers and adults who owned a 
mobile phone in England between 2000 and 2012, showing a steady increase in 
ownership up to 94% in 2012. Using the removal of a technology rather than it’s 
marginal improvement also sidesteps the issue of how to measure this improvement. 
Secondly, the debate over suitable lag length is muted as the students affected by the ban 
can be directly identified and hence the appropriate outputs can be analysed. 
The case of teenagers and mobile phones in schools typifies the modern technology 
productivity paradox as they provide access to chat software, texting, games, social 
media and the Internet in the classroom. However they could also be used by teachers as 
an educational aid to improve productivity. There is debate in many countries as to how 
schools should address the issue of mobile phones. However, this debate has been 
dominated by the media, with some advocating for a complete ban (Telegraph 2012; 
Childs, 2013) while others promote the use of mobile phones as a teaching tool in 
classrooms (Barkham and Moss, 2012; Drury, 2012; O’Toole. 2011; Johnson, 2012; and 
Carroll, 2013).  Despite their prevalence and high profile debate the consequences of 
mobile phones for high school student performance has not yet been academically 
studied. 
The distracting nature of mobile phones has previously been examined by Bhargava 
and Pathania (2013), by estimating their use on the incidents of road accidents.  They 
exploit a pricing discontinuity in call plans and show that there is a large jump in phone 
use post 9pm. However, they find that this jump in phone usage is not followed by an 
increase in car accidents.  Possible explanations put forward for this lack of affect are 
that; drivers compensate by improving their driving behaviour, a ”Peltzman Effect” 
(Peltzman, 1975); or some are risk loving and so are just substituting away from another 
distracting activity such as talking to passengers; or that there may be heterogenous 
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effects and that the local estimated effect may be zero but could still be negative for 
some drivers.  
Fairlie and Robinson (2013) conducted the largest-ever field experiment that 
randomly provides free home computers to students, they find no effects on a wide range 
of educational outcomes and are precise enough to rule out even modestly-sized positive 
effects. Looking towards new technology in the classroom Berlinski et al. (2011) 
implement a large scale randomised control trial in Costa Rica, providing large 
quantities of computer equipment to rural schools. Despite the large nature of the 
treatment, they find limited to negative results of the treatment. One interpretation of 
their results is that when technology is not used appropriately it can be detrimental to 
student outcomes.  
Machin et al (2006) estimate the impact of ICT investment on student outcomes in 
England, using changes in funding rules as an exogenous shock to investment. They find 
positive effects of ICT investment on student achievement in English and Science, but 
not for Mathematics (where computers were rarely used). Combining mobile phones and 
education, Bergman (2012) used the technology to inform the parents of students of 
homework assignments through texting. The students of parents who were receiving 
messages gained in test scores. However, none of these papers have estimated the impact 
of removing a technology on individual productivity.   
In this paper, we estimate the effect of a mobile phone ban on student test scores 
within schools that implemented them. The lack of consensus of the impact of mobile 
phones means that there is no government policy relating to their use in schools. This 
means that schools have complete autonomy in their mobile phone policy, and have 
differed in how they have reacted. We exploit these differences through a difference in 
differences estimation strategy, using a two-way fixed-effect model, comparing the 
gains in test scores across and within schools before and after a phone ban was 
introduced. 
We generate a unique dataset on the history of mobile phone policies from a survey 
of high schools in the three largest cities in England (Birmingham, London, Manchester) 
and Leicester, carried out in spring of 2013. This is combined with administrative data 
of the complete student population from the National Pupil Database (NPD). Given the 
retrospective nature of the NPD we can establish the academic attainment of students at 
these schools from 2001 onwards and so can use differences in implementation dates of 
these policies to measure the impact on student performance. Moreover these data tracks 
student over time, so that we may account for prior attainment and a set of pupil 
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characteristics including, gender, race, free school meals eligibility, and special 
educational needs. 
We find that after a phone ban the gains in student test scores improve by 5% of a 
standard deviation (0.05σ). These gains are driven by the most deprived children and 
that students with high prior attainment are neither positively or negatively affected by 
their ban. Furthermore, our results indicate that there are no significant gains in 
attainment if the bans are not widely complied with. Accordingly these estimates are of 
the average treatment on the treated effect and not an average treatment effect on all 
schools. 
Returning to the productivity paradox literature, these results reflect the redistribution 
and mismanagement arguments put forward by Brynjolfsson (1991). Redistribution, in 
that not all students are equally effected by the presence of mobile phones. Our results 
suggest that non-disadvantaged students are not negatively affected, whilst students 
eligible for Free School Meals or Special Educational Needs gain significantly once 
phones are barred from school premises. We also see mismanagement, as given these 
large gains made by students, schools could have improve test scores earlier by 
introducing the ban at an earlier date. This paper shows that for schools that enforced 
bans on mobile phones, the achievement of disadvantaged students significantly 
improves. Schools could significantly reduce educational inequality by prohibiting 
mobile phone possession in schools. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the empirical 
strategy; Section 3 provides a description of the data, survey and descriptive statistics; 
Section 4 is devoted to the main results, robustness checks and heterogeneity; and 
Section 5 concludes with policy implications. 
 
2 Empirical Strategy 
We estimate the impact of a mobile phone ban, using the differences in timing of the 
introduction of policies across different schools using a two-way fixed effect model. 
Equation (1) represents our baseline specification. 
 
  =  + 	
 +  +  +  (1) 
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where  is the test score of student i in school s in year t.1 We assume there are 
three components to the error which are unobservable; µ is the difference in student 
attainment due to unobservable school effects; γ represents common shocks to all 
schools in a particular year; and  which is the idiosyncratic error and contains all of the 
variation of individual outcomes within a school year. There may be a concern that only 
high achieving schools introduced mobile phone bans, and so without accounting for 
these long-run achievement differences between schools this would lead to an upward 
bias estimates of the ban. Similarly if there was a positive trend in student test scores, in 
that they were growing over time and mobile phone bans were only introduced in the 
later periods, some of this growth would be wrongly attributed to the bans. We can 
easily account for these two components by allowing for school and year mean 
achievement to vary through fixed effects. The inclusion of these fixed effects allows for 
the introduction of mobile phone bans to be non-random e.g. more likely to occur in 
schools with low test scores, as it allows for covariance between 
 and  as well as 
. Note it does not allow for the effect of the ban to vary across schools or student 
types.2 

 is the variable of interest and is an indicator variable for whether school s is 
prohibiting mobile phones from the premises in time period t.  It captures the impact of 
the introduction of the mobile phone ban on student performance. Accordingly, the 
coefficient of interest is 	 which represents the increase in test scores due to the ban. 
This is estimated using the within school variation in test scores over time. 
Another major threat to the basic specification (1) is of pupil sorting to schools 
according to mobile phone policy. If the most able students changed schools to attend 
those with bans, again this would lead to an upward bias in the results. Conditioning on 
pupil characteristics and prior achievement ostensibly accounts for sorting on the basis 
of observables and a range of unobservables given that prior attainment is a noisy 
measure of all unobservable and observable inputs up until this point in time for the 
student e.g. ability, parental investments.  
Specification (1) is very restrictive as it does not allow for differences in student 
outcomes apart from through  .  The individual level panel aspect of the NPD allows 
for us to account for each students prior attainment, which is a large determinant of 
                                                          
1
 We also estimate impacts on achievement level at age 14 and can be seen in Appendix A. These are 
very similar to our main findings, but with a smaller sample size as we stop the analysis in 2009 as this 
assessment changed from externally marked to teacher assessed. 
2
 Standard errors are clustered at the at the school-year level. 
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future attainment. Our prior attainment measure, Yist−1 , is student test scores at age 11 
which is at the end of primary school and therefore represent all the inputs up until the 
student starts secondary school. This changes the interpretation of the 	 parameter from 
the increase in test scores due to the ban, to the increase in the gains in test scores due to 
the ban. In addition to prior achievement we also condition on other observable 
permanent student characteristics, thereby allowing the growth rate of test scores to vary 
by each of them. Xi represents the vector of student characteristics; SEN, FSM, gender, 
and ethnicity. The inclusion of these individual controls are to account for student 
sorting, the extent to which 	 changes with their inclusion provides us with a gauge for 
how much sort to school according to phone bans occurs. 
 
  =  + 	
 + 	 +  +  +  +  (2) 
 
A final potential threat to validity arises if there were other positive changes to the 
school that are correlated with the introduction of the mobile phone ban. Up to this point 
we had assumed the school effects were invariant over time, if schools introduced other 
policies that improved test scores at the same time as the phone ban, this again would 
lead to an upward bias. To address this, we use survey information on whether any 
leadership or policy changes occurred during the period of analysis and so we control for 
such changes (). This is open to recall bias, but we would expect that head 
teachers would be very familiar with school-level policies and leadership changes.3 In 
our most demanding specification we also account for linear in mean peer effects for 
each student. We know which students were in the same school year as student i, and it 
is possible that the other students also effect the growth in attainment of the student 
through peer effects. Therefore we additionally condition on the mean characteristics 
and prior attainment of all the other students, in school s in year t, . The inclusion 
of peer characteristics and information on other policy and leadership changes allows us 
to account for time variant characteristics of the school. 
 
  =  + 	
 + 	 +  +  	+  +  +  +  (3) 
 
                                                          
3
 Six schools had a change of leadership during this time period. One school had a change in 
school uniform policy at the same time as the change in mobile policy. Our results are robust to 
omitting this school from the estimations. 
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Finally we estimate the heterogeneity of the impact of mobile phone bans by student 
characteristics in a triple differences framework. 	 is the additional difference in 
student outcomes by binary student characteristic c within schools that had implemented 
the ban in period t. We use our most flexible specification (3) above for these estimates 
and obtain the additional effect of a ban on: SEN students, FSM students, males, 
minorities and by achievement level at age 11. 
 
  =  + 	
 + 	
 ∗ ℎ !" ! + 	 
 + +  	+  +  +  +  (4) 
 
3 Administrative and Survey Data 
3.1   Administrative Student and Performance Data 
The National Pupil Database (NPD) is a rich education dataset of the complete state 
school population of England. It contains information on student performance, schools 
attended plus a range of as student characteristics; gender, age, ethnicity, Free School 
Meals (FSM) eligibility and Special Educational Needs (SEN) status. Each student is 
allocated an individual identifier which allows for them to be tracked over time and 
across schools. We generated a dataset which follows students from the end of primary 
school at age 11 through to the end of compulsory school education at age 16, and so 
allowing us to condition on prior attainment. Moreover, we use the combination of these 
characteristics and school attended information to generate peer characteristics, which 
are a mean of other students characteristics in that school year. 
All students in publicly funded schools follow the National Curriculum.   This 
progresses through a series of five Key Stages. Our paper focuses on secondary school 
students.  Students start secondary school at age 11 after completing Key Stage 2 in 
primary school. Key Stage 3 covers the first three years of secondary school and Key 
Stage 4 leads to subject-specific exams at age 16, called a General Certificates of 
Secondary Education (GCSEs). 
GCSE test scores from 2001 to 2011 are our main measure of student achievement. 
Each GCSE is graded from A* to G with an A* being worth 58 points and decreasing in 
increments of six down to 16 for G grade (details of the coding and their equivalence 
can be found in DfE, 2011). Students take multiple GCSEs, the mean number of GCES 
or equivalents taken in the sample is 9. We use a total sum of these GCSE points, 
standardized each year so that it has mean zero and standard deviation 1. This is to ease 
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interpretation and to account for any grade inflation that may have occurred during this 
time period.4  
We also use alternative measures of student performance to examine the robustness 
of the results, these are 1) a points score which reflects the differences in difficulty in 
attaining certain grades as recommended by Eyles and Machin (2014)5; 2) a standard 
measure of achievement recognized by employers and in school league tables is if a 
student achieved five GCSEs at grade C or above including English and Maths; 3) the 
impact of this  student performance at age 14; and 4) a school level measure of the 
proportion of students achieving 5 GCES at grade C or above including English and 
Maths, which may reflect gaming on behalf of the school.  
 
3.2    Mobile Phone Survey Data 
There is no official policy or recommendation from Department of Education in 
England to schools regarding mobile phone usage in schools. Therefore schools’ mobile 
phone policies are decided at the school level by the head teacher and the school’s 
governing body, which has resulted in a large variation in mobile phones policies across 
schools over time. 
As information relating to school policies are not collected centrally, in the spring of 
2013 we conducted a survey of high schools about their mobile phone policies in four 
large cities in England; Birmingham, Leicester, London and Manchester. Before 
approaching the schools we obtained permission from the relevant Local Authorities6. 
Every secondary school from these Local Authorities were then contacted.  This 
consisted of two personalized email, and a follow up phone call seven days after the last, 
had we not yet received a reply. The email invited the head teacher or school 
administrator to complete an online survey or reply to the questions via email7. The 
phone call also invited the head teacher to complete it online or immediately over the 
phone. 
                                                          
4 Grade inflation would not affect the final results as the inclusion of year effects would account for 
them. However, standardising by year does make the summary statistics easier to interpret.  
5
 This allocated points to GCSEs and their equivalents on a 1-10 scale: A*=10, A=8, C=6, D=4, E=3, 
F=2, G=1. 
6
 From within London we did not obtain permission five Local Authorities (Hackney, Lewisham, 
Newham, Redbridge and Tower Hamlets) which combined have 77 secondary schools. The City of 
London Authority does not contain any public schools and therefore was not approached. The 
remaining 27 London Local Authorities gave permission with 337 secondary schools being 
approached. 
7 The    survey    questionnaire    is    presented    in    Appendix.            Survey    website    :  
http://mobilephoneatschool.weebly.com  
Chapter 5. Ill Communication 
180 
 
The survey contained questions about the current policy toward mobile phones, when 
it was implemented, whether there was a previous mobile phone policy and, if so, when 
it was implemented. This was repeated until we could construct a complete mobile 
phone policy history at the school to 2000. These questions were complemented with 
questions relating to punishments for violating the policy and how well the head teacher 
considered the policy was complied with. They were also asked if there were any other 
policy or leadership changes occurring over the same time period, to account for any 
general shifts in educational policy at the school (Dhuey and Smith, 2013). 
We received completed surveys from 90 schools, which represents 21% of the high 
schools in the four cities in our sample. Table 1 presents statistics on when mobile phone 
policies were put into effect and how well it was enforced. We define a school as 
introducing a phone ban if they answered; A) Complete ban of mobile phones on school 
grounds; or F) Other - Students hand all phones in at the start of school. Headteachers 
were asked to rate ’to what extent would you say the policy is adhered to by students?’  
on a seven point scale with 1-’Not at all’ to 7 ’Completely’.  A school was considered to 
have a high-compliance ban if the response was greater than four. The table shows that 
the peak years of implementing a ban were between 2005 and 2010, and that most of the 
bans are complied with. 
Table 3 uses the NPD to illustrate the representativeness of the schools in our sample 
compared to schools in the cities and to England as a whole, over the entire period.  
Comparing standardized age 16 test scores, we see that schools in these cities score 
slightly more than the national average but that the schools in our sample achieve 
significantly higher scores than other schools within these cities (0.069σ). In contrast the 
cities have slightly lower age 11 achievement than the national average, and that the 
sampled schools have an even lower intake quality (-0.072σ) although not statically 
significant at the 10% level. Taken together these imply that the schools in our sample 
over the 2001-2011 period have a higher gain in test scores than the average school. 
Despite this the sample schools have a significantly more disadvantaged population than 
other schools in the city and nationally, having more minority, Special Educational 
Needs and Free School Meal eligible pupils. There is no difference in the proportion of 
males students nationally, in the cities or in the sample. 
Table A.10 presents descriptive statistics for the same characteristics of the surveyed 
schools pre- and post-policy introduction. It shows that the average age 16 attainment is 
significantly higher post-policy compared to pre (0.093σ), but that there was no 
significant improvement in the prior attainment of the intake students to these schools. 
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This implies that there is minimal sorting by parents according to mobile phone policy 
or any other changes that occurred in the school.  Other permanent student 
characteristics change slightly pre- and post-ban, with a 5.3% decrease in the proportion 
of minority students and a 5.2% and 6.8% increase in the proportion of SEN and FSM 
students. As these variable are not standardized each year these differences could be 
reflecting general trends in the population. Once the changes over time and the 
difference across schools are taken into account there are no significant differences in 
these variables before and after the ban was introduced.8 
 
4 Results 
4.1    Main Results 
Table IV presents estimates of the impact of a mobile phone ban on individual 
student performance in five specifications which account for more potential biases 
moving from left to right. Column 1 is the most basic specification that only accounts 
for the across school and across year mean differences in test scores. Here we find that 
the introduction of a mobile phone ban improves student test scores by 5.93% of a 
standard deviation.  
However we still may be concerned that student sorting by observable or 
unobservable characteristics may be driving this estimate. The columns 2 and 3 
successively include student characteristics in order to account for this. Conditioning on 
prior attainment indicates that the growth in test scores is 0.064σ and that this marginally 
increases when additionally controlling for student characteristics to 0.067σ. These 
estimates did not change significantly from the basic specification implying that sorting 
is not driving the results. 
The last two columns account for time varying school characteristics. Including an 
indicator variable which denotes if there was a leadership change at the school in year t 
and onwards, decreases the estimate9. Results of our preferred specification (5), which 
allow for linear in mean peer effects, continue show an improvement in student 
performance after a school bans mobile phones.  After a ban has been introduced an 
                                                          
8
 Appendix Table estimates these variables on an indicator variable for if a policy has been introduced 
at that school conditional on year and school effects.  Each characteristics is tested separately and 
none were found to be significantly correlated. 
9
 The coefficient for leadership changes is large and positive, which is what would be expected if new 
head teachers brought in new beneficial policies/management. =20.4 
Chapter 5. Ill Communication 
182 
 
average student attending that schools has 5.06% of standard deviation higher gains in 
test scores compared to a school which did not introduce the ban. 
These estimates assume the ban to have constant impact after it was introduced 
through time. Figure 3 relaxes this assumption and also allows for us to check for pre-
trends in student attainment before the introduction of the ban. This plots the impact of 
the ban by exposure length, with the reference year being the year prior to the phone ban 
being introduced. Estimates with negative exposure implies the years prior the ban 
where we would not expect to find and impact of the ban. Using our most preferred 
specification we find a significant impacts of the ban after two years. There is a general 
upward trend in the impact of the ban, this reflects that these students have experienced 
more time in a school which has had a phone ban in place.10 Moreover there is little 
evidence that the schools were generally improving before the phone introduction as all 
the years prior to the ban do not have impacts significantly different from zero.   
 
4.2    Placebo and robustness checks.  
Before exploring the heterogeneity of the effects, it is important to test a key 
assumption of the model. We are obtaining unbiased estimates of 	 as long as we have 
#$%	
 , ' = 0. If schools that introduced a mobile phone ban were improving 
regardless then these gains could be falsely attributed to the policy. Whilst this is 
partially addressed with the event study show in Figure 3, we test this directly in two 
different ways. Firstly with a placebo treatment and secondly testing for common trends 
amongst schools that introduced a ban in different years. 
The placebo ban is generated by imposing that the ban occurred two years before it 
was actually initiated. This placebo intervention should have no significant impact on 
the gains in student test scores. If there is a significant relationship then there are 
correlations between the trend and the intervention. Table V presents a parallel set of 
results as Table IV, but with the effects of a placebo intervention. The analysis is 
restricted up until the actual ban was introduced, thereby allowing for two years of 
artificial growth in these schools. We find that there are no significant gains in test 
scores associated with a placebo ban. 
Unlike a traditional difference in differences setting, the vast majority of the schools 
receive the treatment. This would cause a problem when attempting to show common 
                                                          
10
 Estimations that directly estimated this additional positive trend failed to find a significant 
relationship.  
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trends for the treated and control groups as all expect two schools would form the 
treatment group. Instead we compare the pre-treatment trends of schools that adopted the 
bans in different years. This is treating each school who adopted the ban in a specific 
year as a different treatment group, and we test that the early adopters have similar 
trends to the late adopters. If schools that adopted the policy in different years have 
similar pre-trends then we can be more confident in our results. Each school was 
assigned a cohort dependent on the first year they introduced a ban (Cohort). This cohort 
indicator was then interacted with a year trend variable, and estimated on age 16 test 
scores before the ban was in place in that school. 
  =  + ∑  ∗ #ℎ# 
	
*	 + 	 +  
 + 	+  +  +  +  (3) 
We test for significant differences in the pre-trends e.g.*	 ≠ *. We find no 
significant differences in pre trends (Table A.2). 
Thus far we have use age 11 test scores as a measure of prior achievement for 
attainment at age 16. However there is another statutory exam that takes place between 
these ages. We replicate Table 4 in appendix Table A.3 instead using achievement at age 
14. This has the advantage that it is a more recent measure of student ability, but has the 
disadvantage that these exams are conducted at secondary school and therefore could 
also be affected by the ban. Therefore we only use the age 14 test scores of students 
attending schools who have not yet implanted a ban. As there is only two years between 
the age 14 and age 16 exams this reduces the sample significantly, but also examines the 
short run impact of phone bans. The estimates are very similar to before with a mobile 
phone ban improving test scores by 5.3% of a standard deviation.  These results also in 
part address the issue of pre-trends, as we see that there are significantly larger gains 
between 14 and 16 in test scores for students who were attending schools who 
introduced a ban during that time. This is a small window of time for other effects to 
incur. If a positive trends were in place in schools previous to this, the age 14 tests 
scores would be higher and then the gains in test scores would be accordingly lower. 
One may be additionally concerned that these results are dependent on the outcome 
measure that we are using, therefore for the remainder of this section replicates the 
previous results using a different set of outcome variables to establish the robustness of 
the estimates. The age 16 measure of achievement used so far in this paper is the 
standardized point score over all exams taken at the end of compulsory schooling using 
the scoring system from the official government league tables. An alternate scoring 
system which accounts for the different difficulties for attaining grades finds very 
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similar results and associated tables can be found in the appendix (Tables A.5, A.6 and 
A.7).  
However, there is another measure that is widely used by the government and 
employers, this is whether the student achieved at least five GCSEs above a C including 
English and Maths. We derive a binary variable representing this for each student in our 
sample. This is used as the outcome of interest in the same specifications, and so 
assumes a linear probability model. In our most demanding specification, we find that a 
ban improves the probability of a student attaining 5-GCSEs at A*-C level by 1.92% 
points on a baseline of 38% students in our sample attaining this level (Table A.8). 
Finally we present equivalent results at the school level, using the proportion of students 
achieving this level (Table A.10), which shows schools improve after the introduction of 
the ban. 
 Overall, results are robust to alternative specifications and set of student 
characteristics including different measures of prior achievement and peer effects.  
These numerous robustness checks provide confidence that mobile phone bans play a 
role in determining school and student performance. 
 
4.3    Heterogeneity 
Table VI studies the heterogeneity of a ban on students with different characteristics, 
under a triple differences frameworks, estimating the additional impact on SEN, FSM, 
male, minority students and by prior attainment. This is in addition to any baseline 
effects of the ban under specification 5. The results indicate that a mobile phone ban has 
a positive and significant impact on FSM-eligible students (column 1), SEN students 
(column 2) and males (column 3). In columns (1), (2) and (3) the baseline effect of a 
mobile phone ban is not significant when controlling for student characteristics and ban 
interaction, which indicates that results are driven by certain students and that not all 
students are significantly affected by mobile phone bans. 
The interaction of the ban with prior achievement is negative (column 5), implying 
that it is predominantly low ability students who are gaining from the ban. Prior 
achievement is measured in percentiles, with the top percentile having a score of 1. 
Therefore the coefficient of -5.89 means that students in the top percentile nationally 
would lose 0.059σ with the introduction of a ban compared to a student at the bottom. 
However there is a general positive effect of the ban of 0.058σ and so overall are not 
harmed by the ban. This is tested formally in the next table. Column 7 additionally 
includes the interactions with ability, FSM and SEN simultaneously and we find that all 
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three interaction terms are significant. This is in line with the heterogeneity results, with 
the most at risk students gaining the most. 
Table 7 examines the linearity of the impact of mobile phone bans by prior 
achievement in more detail. Students are grouped into five quantiles based on their 
achievement level at age 11, where group 1 means lowest achievement group and group 
5 is the highest achievement group. This time the coefficients are representing the total 
effect of the ban on an ability quintile, as the main effect of the ban is not included. 
Again we see that the low achieving students are gaining the most from the ban. Those 
in the lowest quintile gain 0.133σ more after a ban has been introduced. Only the top 
two quintiles do not significantly gain from the policy, but they are also not negatively 
affected. 
One would expect the impact of a mobile phone ban to vary according to how well it 
was enforced. We replace the single 
 variable with two one for bans with high 
compliance 
 − !-ℎ  and one with low compliance 
 − .#/, as reported by 
the head teacher. Table 7 shows estimates impact of the ban by compliance, as expected 
we find much larger and significant effects in schools that reported a high compliance to 
the ban compared to where it was not enforced. 
The heterogeneity of these results are replicated conditional on age 14 ability. Table 
A.4, shows the estimates by ability have slightly smaller positive effect for the least able 
students, but these effects are not significantly different to before. Tables A.6 and A.7 
also replicate the heterogeneity using the alternative age 16 test score measures.  Finally 
Figure 3 shows the density of standardized student test scores before and after a mobile 
phone ban. It shows that the density of test scores shifts right after the imposition of a 
ban.  
 
5 Conclusions 
Modern information communication technology has the potential to improve 
individual productivity, however given it’s multifunctional abilities can also be 
distracting and reduce productivity. Whether the gains outweigh the losses is a question 
facing many workplaces today. This paper examines the impact on productivity from 
removing a common form of information technology (mobile phones) in an education 
setting where individual inputs and outputs can easily be measured.  
We combine survey data on mobile phone policies in schools in four cities with 
administrative data on student achievement to create a history of student attainment in 
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schools from 2002-2011. Using a two way fixed effects estimations, we estimate the 
effect of mobile phone bans on student performance, using the variation in 
implementation dates.  Balancing tests find no difference in pre-policy trends across 
early and late adopters. 
Our results indicate that in schools that have introduced a mobile phone ban there is 
an increase in student performance of 5.1% of a standard deviation. We find that 
banning mobile phones improves the outcomes of the low-achieving students (12.4%) 
the most and has no significant impact on high achievers. The results suggest that low-
achieving students are more likely to be distracted by the presence of mobile phones, 
while high achievers can focus in the classroom regardless of the mobile phone policy. 
Given heterogeneous results, banning mobile phones could be a low cost way for 
schools to reduce educational inequality. 
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Table 1: Mobile Phone Ban Policies in Effect over Time 
Year Mobile Bans High-compliance 
 Bans 
Low-compliance  
Bans 
2000 0 0 0 
2001 0 0 0 
2002 3 2 1 
2003 6 5 1 
2004 9 7 2 
2005 19 13 6 
2006 29 20 9 
2007 43 31 12 
2008 58 38 20 
2009 71 47 24 
2010 85 54 31 
2011 88 55 33 
2012 90 56 34 
Source: School Survey. Notes: Mobile Phone implementation each year. Headteachers 
were asked what their phone policy is and when it was introduced. A phone ban is 
classified as 1) A complete ban of mobile phones on school grounds; or 2) Students 
hand all phones in at the start of school. Headteachers were asked to rate ’to what 
extent would you say the policy is adhered to by students?’ on a seven point scale with 
1-’Not at all’ to 7 ’Completely’. A school was considered to have a high-compliance 
ban if the response was greater than four. Source: Mobile phone policy survey of 
schools in four cities in England: Birmingham, Leicester, London and Manchester 
  
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics - Representativeness of Sample 
Student Characteristics     All Students in 
English 
Students in 
Sampled 
Cities 
Students  in 
Responding 
Schools 
Difference 
Between 
Responding 
Schools and 
Cities 
 
Test Scores: Age 16  
 
0.00 
 
0.01 
 
0.07 
 
0.07* 
 (1.00) (1.02) (0.94) (0.04) 
Test Scores: Age 11  0.00 -0.03 -0.09 -0.07 
 (1.00) (1.01) (1.01) (0.04) 
Male 0.51 0.50 0.47 -0.04 
 (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.03) 
Minority 0.48 0.66 0.74 0.10*** 
 (0.50) (0.48) (0.44) (0.03) 
SEN 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.02** 
 (0.35) (0.37) (0.38) (0.01) 
FSM 0.16 0.24 0.31 0.09 
 (0.37) (0.43) (0.46) (0.02) 
Total Students 5,576,276 789,638 130,482  
 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on key variables for all schools, schools in city surveyed, schools in 
sample and difference between schools in sample and in city surveyed. SEN means Special Educational 
needs student and FSM means Free School Meal students. Source: National Pupil database (NPD) and 
mobile phone policy from survey. 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of Pre and Post Policy 
Student 
Characteristics     
Students  in 
Responding 
Schools 
Pre Phone 
Ban 
Post Phone 
Ban 
Pre-Post 
Difference  
No Ban 
Test Scores: Age 16 0.07 0.02 0.12 0.09** 0.14 
 (0.94) (0.96) (0.92) (0.04) (0.93) 
Test Scores: Age 11 -0.09 -0.11 -0.08 0.02 0.02 
 (1.01) (1.01) (1.01) (0.04) (0.95) 
Male 0.47 0.47 0.47 -0.00 0.53 
 (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.02) (0.50) 
Minority 0.74 0.77 0.72 -0.05** 0.79 
 (0.44) (0.42) (0.45) (0.03) (0.41) 
SEN 0.18 0.15 0.21 0.05*** 0.20 
 (0.38) (0.36) (0.40) (0.01) (0.40) 
FSM 0.31 0.28 0.35 0.07*** 0.25 
 (0.46) (0.45) (0.48) (0.02) (0.43) 
Total Students 130,482 62,214 66,266  2002 
Notes: Table 3 presents descriptive statistics on key variable Pre and Post policy and for all schools and schools 
in city surveyed. SEN means Special Educational needs student and FSM means Free School Meal students. 
Source: National Pupil database (NPD) and mobile phone policy from survey. 
 
 
Table 4: Effect of Mobile Bans on Age 16 Student Performance  
Age 16 Test Scores (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Mobile Ban 5.93** 6.35**  6.70** 6.90** 5.06* 
 2.91 2.91 2.94 2.92 2.86 
      
Prior Test Scores: Age 11      
Student characteristics      
Leadership changes      
Peer characteristics      
School effects      
Year effects      
      
Observations 130,595 130,595 130,595 130,595 130,595 
Adj -R-squared 0.148 0.415 0.455 0.456 0.460 
Note: Table 4 presents regression estimates for student performance. Outcome variable is 
standardized test score at age 16. All estimates and standard errors are multiplied by 100 to 
ease interpretation. We use robust clustered standard error at the school-year level with school 
and year fixed effect. Students characteristics are control for indicator for male, minority, 
Special Educational Needs, Free School Meal status. Key Stage 2 is standardized student test 
score at age 11 (before high school). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: National Pupil 
database (NPD) and mobile phone policy from survey. 
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Table 5: Effect of Placebo Mobile Bans on Age 16 Student Performance 
Age 16 Test Scores (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A: Placebo Only      
Placebo Mobile Ban 2.88 2.96 3.08 4.02 3.50 
 3.20 3.14 3.22 3.21 3.17 
Panel B: Placebo and Actual Ban  
Placebo Mobile Ban 2.45 2.48 2.48 3.44 3.12 
 3.19 3.12 3.2 3.19 3.16 
Mobile Ban 5.49*** 6.01* 7.58** 6.89** 4.81* 
 2.91 2.91 2.94 2.92 2.87 
Prior Test Scores: Age 11      
Student characteristics      
Leadership changes      
Peer characteristics      
School effects      
Year effects      
      
Observations 130,595 130,595 130,595 130,595 130,595 
Adj -R-squared (Panel A) 0.147 0.414 0.452 0.453 0.457 
Note:Table 5 presents regression estimates for student performance. Placebo ban is introducing the 
ban two years before it was actually introduced. Outcome variable is standardized test score at age 16. 
All estimates and standard errors are multiplied by 100 to ease interpretation. We use robust clustered 
standard error at the school level with school and year fixed effect. Students characteristics are control 
for indicator for male, minority, Special Educational Needs, Free School Meal status.. Key Stage 2 is 
standardized student test score at age 11 (before high school). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: National Pupil database (NPD) and mobile phone policy from survey. 
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Table 6: The Effect of Mobile Phone Bans on Student Performance  
by Student Characteristics 
Age 16 Test Scores (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
       
Mobile Ban 3.98 4.26 4.17 8.96*** 5.87** 4.49 3.61 
 (2.98) (2.99) (2.95) (3.43) (2.91) (2.96) (3.02) 
Mobile Ban * FSM                      7.37***     4.88** 4.63** 
 (2.02)     (1.94) (1.93) 
Mobile Ban * SEN                                    10.89***     5.85** 
  (2.36)     (2.39) 
Mobile Ban * Male                                                    4.13**     
   (2.10)     
Mobile Ban * Minority                                                            -4.90*    
    (2.63)    
Mobile Ban * Prior Test 
Scores: Age 11 
    -5.89*** -5.42*** -4.55*** 
    (1.05) (1.02) (1.06) 
        
Prior Test Scores: Age 11        
Student characteristics        
Leadership changes        
Peer characteristics        
School effects        
Year effects        
        
Observations 130,595 130,595 130,595 130,595 130,595 130,595 130,595 
Adj R-Squared 0.495 0.495 0.495 0.495 0.497 0.498 0.498 
Note: Table 6 presents regression estimates for student performance. Outcome variable is standardized test score 
at age 16. All estimates and standard errors are multiplied by 100 to ease interpretation. We use robust clustered 
standard error at the school level with school and year fixed effect. Students characteristics are control for 
indicator for male, minority, Special Educational Needs, Free School Meal status.. Key Stage 2 is standardized 
student test score at age 11 (before high school). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: National Pupil 
database (NPD) and mobile phone policy from survey. 
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Table 7: The Effect of Mobile Phone Bans on Student Performance by Prior 
Attainment 
Age 16 Test Scores (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Impact by age 11 Test Scores     
Mobile Ban* 1st Quintile  13.29*** 14.40*** 13.68*** 12.36*** 
 (3.11) (3.14) (3.13) (3.05) 
Mobile Ban* 2nd Quintile   8.59*** 9.94*** 9.30*** 8.02*** 
 (3.07) (3.11) (3.08) (3.05) 
Mobile Ban* 3rd Quintile 5.78* 6.72** 6.22** 4.97 
 (3.12) (3.15) (3.13) (3.07) 
Mobile Ban* 4th Quintile 2.98 2.68 2.14 1.06 
 (3.15) (3.18) (3.16) (3.11) 
Mobile Ban* 5th Quintile -0.82 -1.97 -2.63 -2.70 
 (3.42) (3.47) (3.49) (3.38) 
     
Test Scores: Age 11 Categorical     
Student characteristics     
Leadership changes     
Peer characteristics     
School effects     
Year effects     
     
Observations 130,595 130,595 130,595 130,595 
Adj R-Squared 0.422 0.442 0.453 0.457 
Note: Table 7 presents regression estimates for student performance. Outcome variable is 
standardized test score at age 16. All estimates and standard errors are multiplied by 100 to ease 
interpretation. We use robust clustered standard error at the school level with school and year 
fixed effect. Students characteristics are control for indicator for male, minority, Special 
Educational Needs, Free School Meal status.. Key Stage 2 is standardized student test score at age 
11 (before high school). In this table, student performance at age 11 (Key Stage 2) are grouped in 
5 category based on their achievement level at age 11, where group 1 means lowest achievement 
group and group 5 are highest achievement group. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: 
National Pupil database (NPD) and mobile phone policy from survey. 
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Table 8: The Effect of Mobile Phone Bans on Student Performance by Ban 
Compliance 
Age 16 Test Scores (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
      
High Compliance- Mobile Ban 6.42** 6.81**  7.12** 7.45** 6.60* 
 (3.00)  (2.99) (3.03) (3.04) (2.96) 
Low Compliance- Mobile Ban 2.12 2.67 3.42 5.87 8.60 
 (6.58) (6.53) (6.56) (5.29) (5.40) 
      
Prior Test Scores: Age 11      
Student characteristics      
Leadership changes      
Peer characteristics      
School effects      
Year effects      
      
Observations 130,595 130,595 130,595 130,595 130,595 
Adj R-Squared  0.168 0.427 0.456 0.460 0.466 
Note: Table 8 presents regression estimates for student performance. It separates ban into high-
compliance (principal assessment score above or equal to 4 out of 7) and low-compliance 
mobile ban. Outcome variable is standardized test score at age 16. We use robust clustered 
standard error at the school-year  level with school and year fixed effect. Students 
characteristics are control for indicator for male, minority, Special Educational Needs, Free 
School Meal status.. Key Stage 2 is standardized student test score at age 11 (before high 
school). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: National Pupil database (NPD) and mobile 
phone policy from survey. 
 
  
Chapter 5. Ill Communication 
195 
 
Figure 1: Mobile Phone Ownership Rates in England 
 
Notes: Phone ownership rates in England amongst 
individuals 13 years and over. Source: Oftel/ Ofcom 
Based on face to face survey data, 2011 
 
 
Figure 2: Age 16 Student Test Scores density Pre and Post Phone Ban 
 
 
Notes: Density of standardised age 16 test scores for all 
years in sample Pre/Post Phone Ban. Schools which never 
introduced a ban not included. Source: National Pupil 
Data Base 
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Figure 3: Impact of Phone Ban by Years of Exposure 
 
Source: National Pupil Data Base, School Survey 
Notes: Estimated impact of time since the year prior to policy conditional on school, and year effects, 
prior test scores, pupil characteristics, leadership changes and peers effects. Reference year is the year 
prior to introduction. Error bars represent the 95% confidence intervals with robust standard errors 
clustered and the school year level.  
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Appendix 1 - School Survey  
Mobile Phone survey questionnaires 
Question 1.1) What best describes the school’s current mobile phone policy? 
a) Complete ban of mobile phones on school grounds  
b) Allowed on grounds, but must be turned off 
c) Allowed on grounds, but must be turned to silent and off during classes  
d) Allowed on grounds, but must be turned to silent at all times 
e) Allowed on grounds, but must be considerate with use  
f) Other -Yes 
g) None 
 
Question 1.2) If Other, could you please briefly describe current policy.  
Note: Only Answer: Hand into reception, and collected at end of day. 
Question 1.3) When was the current policy first introduced? 
Question 1.4) What are the punishments for misuse of phones on school grounds?  
Question 1.5) Out of 7 to what extent would you say the policy is adhered to by 
students? [With 7 being ’Completely’ and 1 being ’Not at all’] 
 
Question 2) Was there a different policy in place before this?  - Yes/No 
If Yes, please answer the following.  
If No please skip to question 4.  
In the space below please answer questions 1.2 to 1.5 for this pervious policy 
(brief description of policy/introduction date/punishments/adherence). 
 
Question 3) Was there a different policy in place before this?  - Yes/No  
If Yes, please answer the following.  
If No please skip to Question 4.  
In the space below please answer questions 1.2 to 1.5 for this pervious policy 
(brief description of policy/introduction date/punishments/adherence). 
 
Question 4) Were there any other policy or leadership changes at the same time as 
the mobile policy change? 
 
Question 5) Do you have any other comments? 
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Table A.1: Balancing Test 
Variables Prior 
Attainment 
Male Minority SEN FSM 
      
Mobile Ban -.074 -0.39  0.01 0.81 1.07 
 (1.25)  (0.44) (0.72) (1.00) (0.70) 
      
Observations 130,595 130,595 130,595 130,595 130,595 
Note: Table A.1 presents regression estimates for different outcome variables to investigates if 
schools that impose a ban are different and if students are sorting into schools based on student 
characteristics. SEN means fraction of Special Educational Needs student, FSM means fraction Free 
School Meal students. Key Stage 2 means standardized average test score at age 11 of the school. 
Male and Minority are fraction of students that are male and from a minority group respectively. We 
use robust clustered standard error at the school level with school and year fixed effect. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: National Pupil database (NPD) and mobile phone policy from survey. 
 
Table A.2: Descriptive statistics on School Growth Trends by Adoption Cohort 
Age 16 Test Scores (1) (2) 
   
2003 Cohort -1.21 -2.28** 
 (1.11) (0.91) 
2004 Cohort -1.23 -2.30** 
 (1.11) (0.91) 
2005 Cohort -1.23 -2.29** 
 (1.11) (0.91) 
2006 Cohort -1.24 -2.30** 
 (1.11) (0.91) 
2007 Cohort -1.23 -2.29** 
 (1.11) (0.91) 
2008 Cohort -1.23 -2.30** 
 (1.11) (0.91) 
2009 Cohort -1.23 -2.29** 
 (1.11) (0.91) 
2010 Cohort -1.23 -2.29** 
 (1.11) (0.91) 
2011 Cohort -1.18 -2.25** 
 (1.11) (0.91) 
   
Student Characteristics   
School Effects   
Year Effects   
Observations 62,214 62,214 
Table A.2 compares the average growth rate in schools before the introduction of a 
mobile phone ban by year the ban was introduced. The standard errors are clustered 
by school year. Student characteristics are Key Stage 2 test scores and student’s 
gender, ethnicity, SEN and FSM eligibility. Source: National Pupil database (NPD) 
and mobile phone policy from survey. 
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Table A.3: The Effect of Mobile Bans on Student Performance Conditioning on age 14 
Test Scores 
Age 16 Test Scores (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Mobile Ban 6.86** 5.51** 6.14** 6.38** 5.30** 
 (2.71) (2.59) (2.60) (2.64) (2.67) 
      
Prior Test Scores: Age 14      
Student characteristics      
Leadership changes      
Peer characteristics      
School effects      
Year effects      
      
Observations 83,211 83,211 83,211 83,211 83,211 
Note: Table A.3 presents regression estimates for student performance. Outcome variable is 
standardized test score at age 16 and control for standardized test score at age 14. All estimates and 
standard errors are multiplied by 100 to ease interpretation. We use robust clustered standard error at 
the school-year level with school and year fixed effect. Students characteristics are control for 
indicator for male, minority, Special Educational Needs, Free School Meal status. Key Stage 2 is 
standardized student test score at age 11 (before high school). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: National Pupil database (NPD) and mobile phone policy from survey. 
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Table A.4: The Effect of Mobile Bans on Student Performance by Age 14 Prior 
Achievement Quintile 
Age 16 Test Scores (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Impact by age 14 Test Scores     
Mobile Ban* 1st Quintile  10.43*** 11.21*** 11.39*** 10.06*** 
 (3.05) (3.02) (3.04) (3.03) 
Mobile Ban* 2nd Quintile   9.28*** 10.58*** 10.79*** 9.64*** 
 (3.11) (3.08) (3.12) (3.16) 
Mobile Ban* 3rd Quintile 5.53* 6.21** 6.44** 5.20 
 (3.05) (3.08) (3.13) (3.13) 
Mobile Ban* 4th Quintile 2.49 2.67 2.92 1.75 
 (3.09) (3.09) (3.13) (3.14) 
Mobile Ban* 5th Quintile -0.22 0.39 0.68 -0.07 
 (3.42) (3.47) (3.49) (3.49) 
     
Test Scores: Age 14 Categorical     
Student characteristics     
Leadership changes     
Peer characteristics     
School effects     
Year effects     
     
Observations 83,211 83,211 83,211 83,211 
Note: Table A.4 presents regression estimates for student performance. Outcome variable is 
standardized test score. All estimates and standard errors are multiplied by 100 to ease 
interpretation. We use robust clustered standard error at the school-year level with school and 
year fixed effect. Students characteristics are control for indicator for male, minority, Special 
Educational Needs, Free School Meal status. Age 14 test scores are Key Stage 3 results 
before they were teacher assessed (2008/9)/ In this table, results are grouped in 5 category 
based on their achievement level (Key Stage 3) at age 14, where group 1 means lowest 
achievement group and group 5 are highest achievement group. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 Source: National Pupil database (NPD) and mobile phone policy from survey. 
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Table A.5: The Effect of Mobile Bans on Alternate Age 16 Student Performance 
Age 16 Alternate Test Scores (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Mobile Ban 5.57** 6.01** 6.33** 5.77** 4.81** 
 (2.69) (2.68) (2.71) (2.69) (2.63) 
      
Prior Test Scores: Age 11      
Student characteristics      
Leadership changes      
Peer characteristics      
School effects      
Year effects      
      
Observations 130,595 130,595 130,595 130,595 130,595 
Adj R-Squared 0.159 0.464 0.499 0.500 0.504 
Note: Table A.5 presents regression estimates for student performance. Outcome variable is standardized 
test score at age 16 accounting for differences in difficulty of attaining grade. All estimates and standard 
errors are multiplied by 100 to ease interpretation. We use robust clustered standard error at the school-year 
level with school and year fixed effect. Students characteristics are control for indicator for male, minority, 
Special Educational Needs, Free School Meal status. Key Stage 2 is standardized student test score at age 
11 (before high school). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: National Pupil database (NPD) and 
mobile phone policy from survey. 
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Table A.6: The Effect of Mobile Bans on Alternate Age 16 Student Performance by 
Student Characteristics 
Age 16 Alternate  Test 
Scores 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
       
Mobile Ban 3.82 4.40 4.20 8.33*** 5.58** 4.27 3.75 
 (2.74) (2.76) (2.74) (3.11) (2.68) (2.72) (2.78) 
Mobile Ban * FSM                      6.80***     4.61*** 4.46** 
 (1.86)     (1.78) (1.78) 
Mobile Ban * SEN                                    8.13***     3.44 
  (2.10)     (2.15) 
Mobile Ban * Male                                                    3.37*     
   (1.95)     
Mobile Ban * Minority                                                            -4.37*    
    (2.43)    
Mobile Ban * Prior Test 
Scores: Age 11 
    -5.21*** -4.76*** -4.31*** 
    (0.99) (0.96) (1.01) 
        
Prior Test Scores: Age 11        
Student characteristics        
Leadership changes        
Peer characteristics        
School effects        
Year effects        
        
Observations 130,595 130,595 130,595 130,595 130,595 130,595 130,595 
R-Squared 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.502 0.501 0.501 
Note: Table A.6 presents regression estimates for student performance. Outcome variable is 
standardized test score at age 16 accounting for differences in difficulty of attaining grade. All estimates 
and standard errors are multiplied by 100 to ease interpretation. We use robust clustered standard error at 
the school-year level with school and year fixed effect. Students characteristics are control for indicator for 
male, minority, Special Educational Needs, Free School Meal status. Key Stage 2 is standardized student 
test score at age 11 (before high school). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: National Pupil database 
(NPD) and mobile phone policy from survey. 
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Table A.7: The Effect of Mobile Bans on Alternate Age 16 Student Performance by 
Prior Age 14 Achievement Quintile 
Age 16 Alternative Test Scores (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Impact by age 14 Test Scores     
Mobile Ban* 1st Quintile  11.05*** 12.11*** 11.44*** 10.22*** 
 (2.85) (2.88) (2.86) (2.79) 
Mobile Ban* 2nd Quintile   9.03*** 10.30*** 9.72*** 8.53*** 
 (2.84) (2.87) (2.84) (2.81) 
Mobile Ban* 3rd Quintile 6.00** 6.89** 6.44** 5.27* 
 (2.9) (2.92) (2.91) (2.86) 
Mobile Ban* 4th Quintile 2.86 2.56 2.06 1.05 
 (2.94) (2.96) (2.94) (2.9) 
Mobile Ban* 5th Quintile -0.78 -1.87 -2.47 -2.57 
 (3.21) (3.25) (3.27) (3.18) 
     
Test Scores: Age 14 Categorical     
Student characteristics     
Leadership changes     
Peer characteristics     
School effects     
Year effects     
     
Observations 130,595 130,595 130,595 130,595 
R-Squared 0.442 0.482 0.483 0.487 
Note: Table A.7 presents regression estimates for student performance. Outcome variable is 
standardized test score in student 8 best subject. All estimates and standard errors are multiplied 
by 100 to ease interpretation. We use robust clustered standard error at the school-year level with 
school and year fixed effect. Students characteristics are control for indicator for male, minority, 
Special Educational Needs, Free School Meal status. Key Stage 2 represents test score at age 11. 
In this table, results are grouped in 5 category based on their achievement level at age 11, where 
group 1 means lowest achievement group and group 5 are highest achievement group. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: National Pupil database (NPD) and mobile phone policy 
from survey. 
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Table A.8: The Effect of Mobile Bans on Student Performance Probability of 
Achieving 5 GCSES Including English and Maths 
Age 16 Alternate Test Scores (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Mobile Ban 1.98** 2.17** 2.24** 2.23** 1.92** 
 (0.93) (0.91) (0.91) (0.92) (0.89) 
      
Prior Test Scores: Age 11      
Student characteristics      
Leadership changes      
Peer characteristics      
School effects      
Year effects      
      
Observations 130,595 130,595 130,595 130,595 130,595 
R-Squared 0.195 0.436 0.446 0.446 0.446 
Note: Table A.8 presents regression estimates for student performance. Outcome variable is passing 
GCSE - EM. All estimates and standard errors are multiplied by 100 to ease interpretation. We use robust 
clustered standard error at the school-year level with school and year fixed effect. Students characteristics 
are control for indicator for male, minority, Special Educational Needs, Free School Meal status. Key 
Stage 2 means test score at age 11. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: National Pupil database 
(NPD) and mobile phone policy from survey. 
 
Table A.9: The Effect of Mobile Bans on Student Performance at age 14 
Age 14 Test Scores (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Mobile Ban 0.99 1.59 2.53* 2.98* 2.34 
 (1.77) (1.49) (1.50) (1.54) (1.53) 
      
Prior Test Scores: Age 11      
Student characteristics      
Leadership changes      
Peer characteristics      
School effects      
Year effects      
      
Observations 112,339 112,339 112,339 112,339 112,339 
R-Squared 0.195 0.745 0.756 0.757 0.757 
Note:Table A.9 presents regression estimates for student performance at age 14. Outcome variable is 
standardized test score at age 14.  All estimates and standard errors are multiplied by 100 to ease 
interpretation. We use robust clustered standard error at the school-year level with school and year fixed 
effect. Students characteristics are control for indicator for male, minority, Special Educational Needs, 
Free School Meal status. Key Stage 2 means standardized test score at age 11. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 Source: National Pupil database (NPD) and mobile phone policy from survey. 
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Table A.10: The Effect of Mobile Bans on School Performance at Age 16 
School Performance  % 
Students 5 A-C inc Eng+Maths  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
    
Mobile Ban 1.88* 2.08** 2.04** 2.07** 
 (1.02) (1.00) (0.97) (0.98) 
     
Prior Test Scores: Age 11     
Mean Student characteristics     
Leadership changes     
School effects     
Year effects     
     
Schools 90 90 90 90 
Observations 816 816 816 816 
R-Squared 0.350 0.876 0.881 0.885 
Note: Table A.10 presents regression estimates for proportion of student who pass the GCSE- 
EM test. All estimates and standard errors are multiplied by 100 to ease interpretation. We use 
robust clustered standard error at the school-year level with school and year fixed effect. 
Students characteristics are control for indicator for male, minority, Special Educational 
Needs, Free School Meal status. Key Stage 2 is standardized student test score at age 11 
(before high school). The leadership changes variable control if there was a leadership or 
policy changes occurring at the time of the introduction of the policy. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1 Source: National Pupil database (NPD) and mobile phone policy from survey 
